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PLO WORKING TO BRING DOWN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 9 Jun 79 pp 41-44

[Interview with PLO Official Spokesman 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, Conducted by Louis Fafis in Damascus]

[Excerpts] PLO Official Spokesman 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar spoke with AL-MUSTAQBAL about the Baghdad resolutions, the Arab downfall, and the Palestinian political and military struggle against occupation and the treaty. He presented the Palestinian concept of what could stimulate the forces of the Arab nation to seize its rights and unify its aspirations and hopes.

[Question] The PLO is working on more than one level to topple the separate peace agreement between al-Sadat and Israel. What practical steps are you taking? Will you continue the fedayeen action against Israel?

[Answer] The Egyptian-Israeli treaty signed between the Egyptian regime and Israel with the sponsorship of the United States of America is considered the most serious thing to have affected the Palestinian cause and the Arab nation from the time of Balfour until now, because in addition to its incompatibility, in program and content, with Arab and international law, for the first time an Arab leader has surrendered and recognized the legitimacy of Zionism as a doctrine, practice and course of action in the Arab region. And this means laying the foundation for aggression against and occupation of all Palestine, and the preface to increased Zionist Israeli expansion in the Arab homeland.

If we add to that the nature of the relations which this treaty's clauses imposed on Egypt, with the size, location, power and Arab and African resources that Egypt represents, this treaty's serious danger to the existence, cause, rights, present and future of the Palestinian people, the Arab nation and Africa becomes clear.

The PLO has started cooperating with the Arabs in a number of practical steps to oppose this conspiratorial treaty, and what it has done in this respect to date can be summarized by the following points.

First is the isolation of this treaty on the popular Palestinian level. There were extensive demonstrations and popular conferences in all the cities and

and villages of the occupied Palestinian territories, at which time our people declared their rejection of the treaty and its addenda, and in particular the autonomy conspiracy, in a huge national referendum. In this way they made plain their desire, in spite of the occupation and its measures. It became clear to world public opinion that any attempt to implement the autonomy conspiracy will not express the opinion or will of our people, but will be an attempt by the parties to the treaty to artificially create autonomy or self-management, which is a falsification of the will of the Palestinian people. Our people outside the occupied Palestinian territories formed an extension at one with our people within the occupied homeland by declaring the same desire and the same rejection of this treaty, and by holding to the unity of the Palestinian people, their rights, and their representation by the PLO, something which has become clear to world public opinion. This step was essential, important and operational in isolating the treaty on the popular Palestinian level.

Second, the Baghdad summit and the resolutions of the Arab foreign and economy ministers conference in Baghdad were both another step towards isolating the treaty and its parties on the Arab level, and the PLO participated with the Arabs in this respect. These are practical and necessary steps to halt the Arab decline as represented by the Egyptian regime's capitulation to the imperialist-Israeli solution which is represented by the treaty and the earlier "Camp David" agreements.

Third is the escalation, by our people within the occupied homeland, of their political, military and mass struggle against the occupation and the treaty, and the perseverance of our people and our fighters outside the occupied homeland, and their heroic resistance to the annihilation attempts and the various pressures exerted by the Zionist enemy and its tools on the Lebanese scene.

Fourth, the PLO has worked with our Arab brothers and the Islamic countries to isolate the treaty and its parties on the level of the Islamic world. This was reflected in the resolutions of the tenth Islamic foreign ministers' conference in Fez, Morocco.

Fifth, the PLO, in cooperation with the Arabs, is making concerted efforts to carry out the international isolation of the treaty in the African sphere, the non-aligned nations group, and the next session of the UN General Assembly.

This is what is being done to isolate the treaty and its parties on the Palestinian, Arab, Islamic and international levels. Greater efforts can still be made to topple the treaty and its parties. We must work to create a new reality in the Arab world to make up for the strategic gap resulting from the Egyptian regime's departure from the Arab ranks struggling against the Zionist enemy. In this respect, the need has arisen to strengthen the northern front, in which Syria forms the main support and central link in the perseverance and resistance, and to establish the eastern front, where the PLO is making efforts to urge speed and not haste in embodying the Syrian-Iraqi joint national action charter, and to reinforce unified Syrian-Iraqi capabilities with the capabilities and strengths of the perseverance and resistance front countries and all the auxiliary Arab forces. All of this should be done in order to thwart the strategic attempt of the Zionist-imperialist

enemy, which has based its calculations on the supposition that removing Egypt from the battle will deprive the region of its explosiveness and thereby overcome the obstacles in the way of carrying out its plots step by step. The PLO is also helping provide the objective conditions needed to crystallize the Arab stand in a more decisive, resolute direction and to give it a greater share in the responsibility for opposing the treaty, its parties, its results and its effects, whether on the popular Arab level or on the level of Arab relations with various international powers.

In this context it must be pointed out that the bonds of friendship and cooperation linking some Arab countries with the countries of the socialist camp, especially the Soviet Union, need to be further developed and deepened, and the right conditions for that must be provided. Also, the relations of some other Arab states with the United States need to be reformulated so as to influence the United States' interests and position in the Arab world, because the American administration has played and is still playing a significant role in imposing the Zionist-imperialist solution on the Arab world.

Here it must be made clear that on the official Arab level, a self-defensive operation against the American-Israeli attack must be undertaken and reflected in practical political, economic, financial and petroleum stands. We are demanding the possible, not the impossible, and the revolutionary and non-revolutionary Arab states can do much more than they are doing.

The "Camp David" agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and its addenda leave only one option for our people--the option of resistance and struggle in all spheres, and on the various levels, to topple the agreements and restore our people's right to their homeland, their right to return and determine their own destiny and to establish their independent state--rights recognized by the entire world except for the "Camp David" parties. Therefore, continuing the battle against the treaty and the autonomy conspiracy is within our patriotic, national and human powers at this stage. In this context the efforts made by our people in the occupied homeland to escalate their military resistance activities against the occupation and to continually improve their methods and increase their efficiency can be understood.

[Question] The PLO has threatened to strike at American interests--the head of the snake, as Abu-'Ammar has said. Will you carry out your threats?

[Answer] What you call threats are an expression of our well-known stand against American political ventures and of our confidence in our ability to thwart them. Threats, in order to have some effect, must fulfil the following conditions: (1) the one who threatens must have the power to threaten; (2) he must have the power to carry out the decision to threaten; (3) he must carry out the threat at the proper time; and (4) the enemy must be convinced that the threatener has the power to carry out the threat.

If we look at the Palestinian and Arab situation, we find that most of these conditions are present, and only a few remain to be achieved. This is something which must be completed, and it will not tolerate any delay.

The United States has many interests inside and outside the Arab and Islamic world. Some of them are petroleum interests, some are commercial, and some are economic and financial, in addition to strategic, political, cultural and other interests. Here we must say that current American Middle East policy is in basic conflict with the real interests of the Arabs and the people of the Islamic world, and that the American administration's role in the Arab-Israeli struggle radically conflicts with the beliefs and interests of the Palestinian people, the Arab nation, the people of the Islamic world, and all the world liberation forces. Therefore, as Abu-'Ammar said, America truly represents the head of the snake in the conspiracy against the Palestinian people. The United States of America must tangibly realize that its Palestinian, Arab, Islamic and international interests are threatened by its current hostile Middle East policy, and that this policy even conflicts with the real interests of the American and European peoples. Therefore, the implementation of these threats by various Arab as well as Islamic forces can be carried out at the right time, in the right place, and against the right interests.

[Question] It was recently reported that a disagreement had broken out between you and the Soviet Union. Is this true? What was the reason? Are you 100 percent satisfied with Moscow's stand towards the organization and the Palestinian cause?

[Answer] Palestinian-Soviet relations are very good, and are continually developing and growing. The last joint statement issued before the Baghdad summit and after the negotiations by the Palestinian delegation led by Yasir 'Arafat with the Soviet leadership in Moscow in early December 1978 formulated and recorded the nature and basic roots of these relations. As we see it, the above-mentioned joint statement can be considered a friendship agreement with the Soviet Union. Our consultations are continual, and coordination between ourselves and our friends in the Soviet Union is developing. It is not true that there is any disagreement. Moscow's stand towards the PLO and the proven rights of the Palestinian people has not changed. The Soviet Union considers the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied homeland, and it supports our proven national rights to return to our homeland, determine our destiny, and establish our independent Palestinian state on our national soil. This stand arises from a proven, fundamental policy. The Soviet foreign minister, in his recent Damascus meeting with Yasir 'Arafat, assured us that the Soviet Union rejects the "Camp David" agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and that it will not allow international legitimacy to be given to these agreements which constitute a betrayal of the interests of the Egyptian and Palestinian people and the Arab nation. He stressed that the Soviet Union will resort to the veto if these agreements are submitted to the Security Council. He informed us that the "Camp David" parties had buried the Geneva conference, and said, "The Soviet Union will remain true to its Palestinian and Arab friends." At this meeting the Palestinian and Soviet sides expressed their satisfaction with the development of friendly relations between them.

[Question] What are the facts about Rashshad al-Shawa's current trip, and what are the results?

[Answer] Rashshad al-Shawa, who is as you know president of Gaza Municipality, had requested a meeting with Yasir 'Arafat, president of the executive committee. 'Arafat received him and informed him of the PLO's firm stand rejecting the "Camp David" agreements and the autonomy conspiracy. He warned al-Shawa of the dangers and harm inherent in the agreement, and cautioned him about the danger of becoming entangled in the "Camp David" plots and the autonomy conspiracy. It can be said that the PLO's situation within the occupied Palestinian territories is firm, and that there is complete Palestinian national consensus on adhering to the stand which the PLO has adopted, a consensus created by unmatched popular support. Any departure from this national consensus is subject to retribution by the patriotic, national responsibility.

[Question] What is the PLO's stand on the formation of a political government in Lebanon? Are you in contact with the Lebanese Front or do you have pre-conditions for talking with them? What is your role on the Lebanese scene?

[Answer] The PLO believes in and is working for Lebanon's unity, Arabism, independence and sovereignty, and it considers the Palestinian presence in Lebanon only temporary until our people return to their homeland, Palestine.

We have expressed this conviction of ours in practice, and we have defended Lebanese soil in spirit, and our blood has mingled with the blood of our Lebanese brothers. We are committed to the Beiteddin resolutions, and before them to the Cairo agreement and its addenda, which regulates our relations with the legitimate Lebanese authorities. We wish Lebanon nothing but stability, sovereignty and independence.

The matter of forming a political Lebanese government is an international Lebanese affair to be decided by the Lebanese themselves. The only thing that concerns us is that there be in Lebanon a government which believes in Lebanon's Arabism, independence and sovereignty, which will resolutely resist any attempt to infringe on its territorial integrity and its people, and which will put Lebanon where it naturally belongs--with the Arab cause and not with its enemies. There are no contacts between us and the Lebanese front, and our role in the Lebanese arena is the role determined by the agreements regulating relations between us and the legitimate Lebanese authorities. More than once we have declared that we reject any homeland for us other than Palestine, and therefore we have resisted and are resisting the idea of a substitute homeland and the settlement theories, because of our belief in and insistence on our right to return to our homeland, Palestine. Those who push settlement and the substitute homeland are tools of the plots to eliminate the Palestinian cause in the interest of Zionism. They are "Camp David" parties. We in the Lebanese arena respect Lebanese legitimacy, and we are striving for our legitimate interests as defined by the agreements regulating our relations with the legitimate authorities in Lebanon. We have supported President Sarkis, we have dealt with him as with a president of the republic, and we have not rebelled against him. We are not plotting against Lebanon's unity. Those who are working to divide Lebanon and rebel against the legitimate authorities are the tools of Israel in the south and elsewhere. We are in the same trench with the fraternal Lebanese people and their legitimate authorities in every effort to protect Lebanon from Israeli expansionist ambitions, bestial aggressions, and attempts to divide Lebanon and its people.

[Question] How does the PLO propose to treat the matter of Sa'd Haddad? Do you agree that the role of the UN forces in southern Lebanon should be concentrated?

[Answer] There is no such matter called the Sa'd Haddad matter. What happened and is happening in the south is veiled Israeli occupation, which is taking cover under Sa'd Haddad and his likes, and this occupation must be opposed. The PLO has declared more than once that it sides with the UN's role in achieving a withdrawal of the Zionist enemy forces from southern Lebanon. The UN secretary general, in his meeting with Yasir 'Arafat and in his consecutive reports to the Security Council, has continually praised the PLO's positive role in this respect, and has frankly confirmed that Israel alone is responsible for the non-implementation of Israeli withdrawal and the inability of the legitimate Lebanese authorities to expand their presence in the south. Therefore, we do not see ourselves concerned with intervening in Lebanese affairs with respect to its relations with the United Nations, even though we adhere to and strive for our legitimate interests as stipulated in our agreements with the legitimate Lebanese authorities.



'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar
"Expelling Egypt Will Not Freeze the Arab Revolution"

PLO LEADER CALLS FOR MORE ARAB DYNAMISM, RESTORATION OF STRATEGIC BALANCE

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 2 Jun 79 p 26

[Interview with Fatah Central Committee Member Khalid al-Hasan, conducted by AL-MUSTAQBAL]

[Excerpts] AL-MUSTAQBAL conducted this important interview with Khalid al-Hasan (Abu-Sa'id), member of the Fatah Central Committee and of the Palestinian National Council, during his visit to Paris. Here is a summary of the main topics touched on by AL-MUSTAQBAL's discussion with the senior Palestinian official.

[Question] What are the PLO's current goals, after the changes which have taken place in the Middle East, and especially after the signing of the "peace agreement" between al-Sadat and Israel?

[Answer] Our goal is to work to destroy the Camp David program and to eliminate its negative effects, because it conflicts with the United Nations resolutions and with the establishment of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. In addition to destroying the "Camp David" program we want to reaffirm and apply the United Nations resolutions, the most important being (1) the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories and (2) the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, to return to their homeland, and to construct their independent state.

[Question] What demands is the PLO determined to make at the non-aligned conference to be held in Havana?

[Answer] Our demands arise from the Baghdad summit conference resolutions, which were applied at the Islamic nations conference in Fes, Morocco, at which time we were able to freeze Egypt's membership. We will do the same thing in Havana. We are demanding the suspension of Egypt's membership in the non-aligned group. We will also call for an extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly to study the Palestinian issue and the Middle East struggle.

[Question] Are there any ambiguities facing the coming meeting of the world parliamentary federation council to be held this September in Caracas?

[Answer] We submitted to the above-mentioned meeting a bill to be entered in the agenda of the conference, calling for the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, to return to their homeland, and to construct their independent state.

Immediately afterwards, the Zionist enemy, supported by America, presented a counterproposal demanding support for the "Camp David agreement" and the al-Sadat-Israel treaty as a first step towards a "comprehensive peace," and calling for considering the PLO an "international terrorist" organization!

Behind the scenes, we were able to arrive at a moderate formula with the European bloc for presenting a proposed resolution for including the Middle East in the agenda.

Naturally, Europe's isolation from America is our gain, but it is not enough. Therefore, the non-aligned states will discuss the matter of the Caracas conference, in order to coordinate their actions.

I am convinced that the course of events in the region during the next few months will influence the direction of the Caracas conference. If the Sadat program's failure is not confirmed, that will weaken the Arab position at this conference. This demands effective Arab action.

[Question] What is your stand on the al-Sadat-Begin Beersheba negotiations concerning the so-called autonomy for the Palestinians of the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

[Answer] Al-Sadat had said, "We will start negotiations about autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza with the participation of the Palestinians." Today al-Sadat has forsaken this slogan by saying, "There is no need for Palestinian participation in the negotiations until five years from now!"

This means that al-Sadat cannot find a single Palestinian negotiator to participate in his conferences. On the contrary, he has seen that the Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories have clustered around their national leadership embodied by the PLO. In "autonomy" we see a continuation of the occupation in a veiled form, after giving it "legitimacy." Therefore we will resist this plot to the end. Here the importance of the PLO's stand and the significance of Palestinian national unity must be comprehended, because the organization has to play a part in keeping with the effective force represented by the Palestinian issue in the struggle with America and Zionism.

[Question] You mentioned the need for effective Arab action. By that do you mean there is a shortcoming? Was the Baghdad conference insufficient to topple the "Camp David" plan and the al-Sadat program?

[Answer] Three basic, important resolutions were issued by the Baghdad summit. The first was the Egyptian resolution for blockading, isolating and toppling the al-Sadat regime, so that Egypt can resume its Arab aspect and its natural role among us.

The second resolution pertained to restoring Arab strategic dynamism, which means the formation of a unified Arab military council incorporating all the states of the Arab East. This has not yet been accomplished, because without regaining strategic balance with the enemy we cannot plunge into a successful political struggle.

The third resolution pertained to Arab dynamism and the minimum phased goals, which are the total withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, the right to self-determination, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

It grieves me, nay, it pains me to say that up til now there is no effective Arab dynamism, and that the desired strategic balance has not been achieved. This greatly weakens the world's perception of Arab earnestness.

We must shift from reaction to action, and we must not neglect anything. We must work dynamically and rapidly, and our reaction should not be limited to defensiveness. For example, the Arabs have recently been subjected to a concentrated propaganda campaign about the energy crisis and oil prices, making it seem as if the Arabs were the cause of the energy crisis. We must exploit Carter's statements and his criticisms of the oil companies and their enormous profits, and we must make them bear the responsibility for the energy crisis.

[Question] What is your opinion of the Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement? How far has it gone?

[Answer] The national charter must be completed with the same dynamism it started with, so that it can be an effective element in restoring the desired strategic balance I mentioned previously.

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JOURNALISTS SEE WEST BANK IN STATE OF TENSION

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 21 Jun 79 p 15

[Article by AL-QABAS' 'Amman Correspondent Ghazi al-Sa'di: "Political Ferment in the West Bank"]

[Text] The West Bank is currently experiencing a political and intellectual ferment, especially since the start of the autonomy negotiations in which Egypt, Israel and the United States are participating. At the same time, the Zionist military government authorities are countering this ferment very nervously, in many cases convulsively. This was confirmed by the West Bank correspondent of the Israeli paper MA'ARIV during the field press investigation he conducted in the West Bank cities.

The West Bank correspondent for MA'ARIV said, "At present tension prevails throughout the occupied territories, and this tension is evident in the views of the Arab residents, who speak with animosity towards the Israeli military government and the Israelis in general.

There are those who frankly reveal what is hidden in their hearts, and there are those who conceal their feelings. A student tore a page from his notebook and wrote on it in Arabic and English the expression 'I hate the Israelis' and gave it to me as a souvenir, while the owner of a fabric store told me, 'Your presence here makes us hate living. We have no present and no future. If it were in my power to shorten your presence here by one day, I would be willing to spend everything I have to achieve this goal.'

"In the Na'um Park of Ramallah, things are as usual. Formerly it had teemed with Israelis, whereas now none of them go there except on week days or Saturdays. But one is not aware of their absence, for the economic situation permits many local residents to go there often."

Loss of Control

The MA'ARIV correspondent continues his press report, 'I happened to be in Ramallah the same day the military government authorities destroyed a house in the village of al-Janih and padlocked four homes in Ramallah and al-Birah. While I was there, I heard a conversation among three secondary school students

about the 'difficult circumstances' experienced by the Israeli military government. They said, 'The military government has lost its self-control, just as it has lost control of the area's inhabitants. Political events are forcing it to adopt measures which it may not want to adopt.' The oldest of the three said that both the military government authorities and the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank are very much at a loss and are expecting black times in the region, if not this year then during the next two years."

Nervousness

I asked Karim Khalaf, president of Ramallah Municipality, "Is it true that the situation has gone this far?" He answered, "The young Arabs are at a loss, for they grew up under Israeli occupation and in an environment of military rule. Everything they see and hear makes them despair."

"The young Arabs are asking, 'What will happen here five or ten years from now? Will Israel withdraw, or will it incorporate the West Bank into itself?'"

"On the other hand, right now the military government is confronted with nervousness and tension, as indicated by what happened in Bi'r Zayt. Because of an insignificant incident, the Israeli military government authorities closed the university, which made hundreds of students lose an entire school year. Because of another incident, the authorities closed the secondary schools and punished hundreds of students. Then there was the padlocking and destruction of homes. All this shows the nervousness of the Israeli military government."

Political Ferment

As for Fahd al-Qawasimah, president of Hebron Municipality, he told the MA'ARIV correspondent, "In the middle of our city a farce has been going on for five weeks. A small group of Jewish women, with scores of children, took over an abandoned house, and from it organized demonstrations against Begin, Dayan, Weisman, and all the members of the Israeli government. The residents of the region don't know whether to laugh or cry at this farce."

The president of Hebron Municipality added that the Israeli military government is in a state of nervousness. As opposed to the situation which prevailed before the Likud party came to power, the Israeli military governors are at present unable to make any decisions pertaining to daily affairs in the West Bank. The defense minister cannot resolve any matter without the issuance of a cabinet decision, which makes for complicated situations.

Before Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's initiative, the regime controlled the West Bank; the military government knew its duties and the residents knew theirs. But now, the West Bank is experiencing intellectual and political ferment, both the Israeli military side and the local inhabitants. This state of ferment has led to a state of unrest, nervousness and tension. But since the Israelis are the rulers and the Arabs the ruled, of the two the Arabs suffer the greatest damage.

Two Factors to the Tension

Journalist Ibrahim Da'bis, who works for the newspaper AL-QUDS, says, "I see two elements spreading tension, unrest and confrontation between the Israeli military government and the Arab inhabitants. The first element is the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, for it pushes aside and shelves the Palestinian cause and makes it unlikely that a solution will be found for it.

"The second element is the West Bank activities of the Gush Etzion movement. Many Israelis find it hard to comprehend these activities' practical significance and repercussions on the Arab landowners who live in the shadow of a nightmare, fearing the ultimate confiscation or appropriation of their lands."

Ibrahim Da'bis stresses that these two elements have forced the Arab inhabitants to take desperate measures. He says that the recent arrest of a number of Arab youths on the suspicion of participation in anti-Israeli activities indicates an unprecedented development in the region. Anti-Israeli activities are expected to escalate, and naturally the Israeli authorities will counter these activities. But they will not be satisfied with that. We are now feeling strict censorship over the Arab press, and the military government is using an iron fist against the inhabitants. I believe that the seriousness of this confrontation will intensify over the long run in such a way that it will be difficult to react to it.

Self-Management

The MA'ARIV correspondent continued his article by saying, "West Bank Commander Gen Benjamin ben Eliazir and the military governors know the truth of the situation, and they are extremely worried about what is going on before their very eyes. The confrontation between the reserve soldiers and the Jewish women taking refuge in Hebron distressed and shamed the governors. The closing of the Bi'r Zayt University is creating serious problems on the West Bank. All the Israeli officers know what it means to suspend a thousand university students from their studies by a military order.

"The uneasiness of Israeli military circles is directed towards the future. Israel speaks of the self-management project as if it were a topic for an academic seminar, while on the West Bank this issue is regarded as an explosive factor and a timed fuse threatening to destroy the entire situation. At the present time, the Israeli military government is functioning as a fire station, for it cannot devote itself to projects because no one knows what will happen a year or two from now. As long as there are no projects, it functions according to methods which sometimes bring about calm and teamwork and sometimes nervousness and tension."



Karim Khalaf, President of Ramallah Municipality



Fahd al-Qawasimah, President of Hebron Municipality

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

VIENNA PLO REPRESENTATIVE CRITICIZES CARTER UTTERANCES

Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 14 Aug 79 p 2 AU

[VOLKSSTIMME dispatch: "PLO on Negotiations With the United States: 'We Will Not Accept Any Preliminary Conditions'--Vienna PLO Representative Criticizes Carter Utterances"]

[Text] Vienna--The representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the International Organizations in Vienna, Dr Husayn stated on Monday [13 August] that the most recent utterances of the American President Carter on the PLO and on the establishment of a Palestine state indicated that the American attitude continued to be directed against the PLO, the national rights of the Palestine people and the Arab nation.

The anti-Arab statements would serve the aggressive policies of Israel and not prepare a favorable atmosphere for a dialog between the United States and the PLO. It is unacceptable that the United States demands Israel's recognition by the PLO as a precondition for a dialog, as Israel had driven out the Palestine people and stolen their land, and is perpetrating continual genocide of the Palestine people. Moreover Israel had officially stated that it will not recognize the PLO, even if the PLO should recognize Israel.

A balanced and healthy U.S. policy should take into account the following: recognition of the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people, recognition of the right to self-determination of the Palestine people, their right to return and found a Palestine state on Palestine soil, halting of the splitting policy and the threatening of Arab countries, halting the arms shipments to Israel and halting of American support for Israel within and outside the United Nations. The PLO is striving for a just, durable solution in the Middle East. Europe should have an interest in recognizing the PLO because Europe is more closely linked with the Middle East than the United States.

The chairman of the PLO, 'Arafat, stated in an interview with the U.S. magazine TIME that he wanted peace, "but a just peace which does not make my people a people of refugees or oppressed people under an occupation power. Only that means peace. Anything else would be surrender."

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

JAPANESE UNDERSTANDING OF PALESTINIAN CAUSES SEEN GROWING

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 23 Jun 79 p 15

[Article by 'Umar Taha: "Japanese-Palestinian Friendship League--A Turning Point in Tokyo's Policy"]

[Text] The announcement of the formation of the "Japanese Parliamentary Palestinian Friendship League" last week was a basic turning point in Japan's foreign policy in general and its policy towards the Middle East cause in particular. The league's founding meeting was marked by a number of unique phenomena, the most outstanding being the participation in it of representatives of all the Japanese parties, not to mention the desire of more than 100 parliamentary delegates to attend the meeting and their delivering speeches unanimously supporting the Palestinian people in the political and military struggle.

On 14 June, in one of the halls of the Japanese parliament members' building, Arab ambassadors met with more than 100 deputies representing all the Japanese parties without exception. In the middle of the hall hung a large sign on which was written, in Japanese and Arabic, "The Japanese Parliamentary Palestinian Friendship League."

The meeting began and the deputies took turns delivering speeches, all of which supported the cause of the Palestinian people led by the PLO. The Japanese-Palestinian friendship league council approved the proposals presented by the preparatory committee--a constitution for the league and a statute of activities. The council also approved the election of Mr Utsunomiya as president, Mr Isurugi as vice president, and Mrs Yamaguchi as secretary. It was decided to form a board of directors for the league consisting of three representatives from the ruling Free Liberal Democratic party, two representatives from the Socialist party, and one representative from each other participating party. The task of forming the secretariat and choosing advisors from among prominent parliamentary personalities was left to the league's administrative authority.

The league's president delivered a speech in which he spoke of the Palestinian cause's significance to the Arabs and the Moslems, and stressed the need to restore to the Palestinian people their legitimate rights as a basic condition for solving the Middle East crisis and establishing a lasting peace.

An Invitation To Abu-'Ammar

The president of the parliamentary league for Japanese-Palestinian friendship proposed to the council that Head of the PLO Yasir 'Arafat and Faraj Qaddumi, head of the PLO political department, be invited to visit Japan. The proposal was approved and it was left to the president to send the invitation and set a date.

Then Director of the Tokyo PLO office Fathi 'Abd-al-Hamid, who through his keen knowledge has succeeded in penetrating the depths of Japanese political life, delivered a speech on this occasion. This was followed by a speech by the dean of the Arab diplomatic corps, Algerian Ambassador Ibrahim Ghafi, who expressed his appreciation for the efforts which have been made to establish the league, support Palestinian rights, and cement Arab-Japanese relations.

The formation of a league of this type is considered a unique event in Japan, since never before has any other Japanese friendship society had such a large number of delegates as members of its constituent assembly. Furthermore, no other Japanese society has ever had the support of all the political parties, which indicates the high rank which the Palestinian cause currently occupies in Japan.

A Turning Point

One of the parliamentary deputies commented on the establishment of the Japanese-Palestinian league, saying that it is a turning point in the way the Japanese people look at the Palestinian cause. Until a short time ago, they looked on the PLO as a terrorist organization, and some of them were afraid to have any direct dealings with the organization's Tokyo office or to openly express their convictions about the Arab cause, fearing that it would be said of them that they were friendly with the PLO, inasmuch as such a description might convey a connection between their stand and the Red Army and the Japanese radicals, and inasmuch as this description would put pressure on economic circles to remain hostile to the organization and, in another context, to oppose the adoption of any stand supporting the organization.

Petroleum and Politics

The Japanese have once again made a connection between the Palestinian cause and oil, and from now on will find it impossible to separate politics from economics. There was no choice for the Japanese--either they become entangled in schemes to ensure petroleum by arms, or through joint advantage. It had also become imperative for the Japanese political decisionmakers, who had rejected the call to intervene militarily to protect petroleum, to investigate methods of pleasing the Arabs. Will the Arabs be pleased by a colorless, wavering stand, or will it take support for their basic causes and for the rights of the Palestinian people to please them?

While the formation of the league reflects a Japanese understanding of the political side of the Palestinian cause, the clearness of their view of the

Palestinian people's cultural struggle is in turn reflected by another achievement in another field.

The Japanese intellectual sector's view of Palestine today is clear. The achievements of Palestinian cultural activity attract attention and arouse admiration.

For example, attention has been attracted by the exhibit of Palestinian representative art which showed from August 1978 to January 1979. The experiment in Palestinian artistic expression finds many supporters, sponsors and students today. Naturally, it is limited to expression in line or color, but there is also the experiment in verbal expression, since the poetry of the Palestinian resistance has found increasing admiration among a broad range of Japanese readers. It is unusual to find a Japanese poet who does not know of Mahmud Darwish or Tawfiq Ziyad. Many Palestinian poems have been translated into Japanese.

The Literature of the Revolution

What is said of poetry can also be said of the short story and the narrative. Only a few months after selections of Ghassan Kanafani's works were published, the first printing was sold out. Much has also been written about the features of the Palestinian story and narrative, most importantly about the clarity of the Palestinian vision, which has been able to persevere in the face of threat and massacre, and which dreams of tomorrow and works to create it. A commentary on the drawings of Palestinian children exhibited in many Japanese cities said that "the Palestinian child is regaining his self-confidence by experimenting in artistic expression. He has the courage to express himself, and does not flee from tragedy but faces it. Through confronting it, he dreams of his tomorrow. At the same time he is a cub of the revolution, and belongs to it, not to take revenge and destroy, but to build a tomorrow in which the Palestinian will impose his own humane conditions to replace the inhumane conditions of Zionism. Therefore the Palestinian does not join the revolution in order to react to fascist aggressiveness with a similar fascism, but to wipe out the inhumane fascist presence and replace it with a humane presence."

Thus Japan understands the drawings of the Palestinian children as belonging to tragedy, as courageously facing it, as a humane dream of tomorrow, and then as a revolution which will make this tomorrow for a generation which has not faced the massacre and distress which the previous generation has.

The Economic Viewpoint

President of the parliamentary Palestinian-Japanese friendship league Utsunomiya repeated what Abu-'Ammar said to him, that "We, the Palestinians and the Japanese, understand the meaning of sacrifice, something which those who plot to exterminate us do not understand."

Abu-'Ammar's statement met with understanding and responsiveness from the generation which has not yet been disfigured by the cultural invasion of Japan. Since in Japan the view of Palestine has started getting clearer along these lines, it will constitute, just as the armed struggle did before, a model for a special experiment being created by the Palestinian people. The economists' and capitalists' view of Palestine has various features. The Palestinian people, as the Japanese economist sees them today, are a cultured, educated people bringing together experts, advisors, academicians, university professors and businessmen.



Fathi 'Abd-al-Hamid, Director of the PLO Tokyo Office

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RAMALLAH MAYOR ACCUSES U.S. OF SUSTAINING TENSION IN MIDEAST

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 11 Aug 79 p 3 JN

[Article by Serene R. Farraj]

[Text] Amman, Aug. 10--Mr. Karim Khalaf, the mayor of Ramallah, said today that United States policy is to sustain tension and instability in the Middle East in order to secure its interests in this part of the world.

He told the JORDAN TIMES in an interview: "I do not think that America's position regarding the Palestinian issue will change, because ever since the emergence of the Palestinian cause, until the present moment, the U.S. has been biased against it and has worked continuously to stand against any decisions taken in favour of the Palestinians.

"For example, the U.S. used its right of veto to block United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236 that recognises our right of self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state." Mr. Khalaf added that since Israel is a small American governate, it has priority in the American budget. It is a military base established to protect U.S. interests in the area.

Mr. Khalaf went on to say that the U.S. has been able to use Egypt's President as-Sadat for its own interests in the Middle East against the aspirations of the Arab world. "Had, in my opinion, the U.S. been serious and sincere in achieving comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East it would have done the following: Recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the sole representative of the Palestinians; exerted more pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories occupied since 1967, as the late President Eisenhower did in 1956 after the tripartite aggression on Sinai and the Gaza Strip; recognised the Palestinians' legitimate rights of self-determination and their right to establish an independent Palestinian state on their own land.

"However, due to the U.S.' continuous policy against the Palestinians and its bias towards Israel, we can deduce that it will not be serious in achieving comprehensive and just peace in the area. I believe that the

Camp David agreements are a (stumbling) block in the path towards peace being charted by the U.N., since they violate U.N. resolutions. I do not agree with the idea of amending Resolution 242, as it has been originally rejected by the Palestinians. Why did America refuse Resolution 3236, which the PLO accepted?"

The Ramallah mayor said he thought the so-called American-Palestinian "rapprochement" or dialogue that some reports say may result in U.S. recognition of the PLO or an amendment to Resolution 242, is an issue being exploited by the U.S. media to distract the Arab people and the Palestinians in particular from their primary struggle against Zionism. "I believe this will lead to nowhere, because the U.S. policy will never meet the Arab people's aspirations and aims. They are always in conflict," he said.

Asked about European Arab rapprochement, Mr. Khalaf said: "The European nations, having realised that Arab solidarity might eventually threaten their interests in the Arab world, were induced to strengthen their relations with the Arab states. Only if Europe's new stand towards the Arab is accompanied by the recognition of the PLO, and of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, can a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East be implemented."

As chairman of the water authority in the West Bank, Mr. Khalaf was able to brief us on the problem of water there. He said that Israel had always planned to dominate and connect water and electricity resources in the West Bank with its own, so that the Palestinians will always be at the mercy of the occupation, even in drinking a glass of water or lighting a room. "Drinking water is abundant in the newly established Jewish settlements, while it is scarce in Arab villages, and we are doing our best to provide Arab villages with new sources of water," he said.

Regarding water for irrigation, the Israeli authorities have already taken over all the artesian wells in the West Bank and put a meter on each well to limit the yearly usage of water. For example, if a farmer has 600 dunums, he will be able to irrigate only 100 dunums and eventually the rest of the crops will die, and if he uses more than the fixed limit, he will either pay a fine or be taken to jail. "Plus the fact that we were not given the permission to dig new wells, while in Jewish settlements, new wells are being dug," Mr. Khalaf added. "In Ouja village, near Jericho, there is a spring which has never before gone dry. This year, it dried up due to the many artesian wells and settlements built around it. This is part of Israel's immigration policy, but even if we have to eat the grass and the soil of our own land and drink turbid water, we will never leave our country."

When asked about the so-called "autonomy" plan, Mr. Khalaf said: "All the Arab mayors have adopted a unified stand to face and abort the so-called autonomy plan, which aims at liquidating the Palestinian cause. Our people, the Palestinians, are continually struggling to erase the so-called autonomy plan."

He went on to say: "From my point of view, the U.S. has realised the failure of this conspiracy, but they do not have enough courage to admit it. Therefore, I expect the failure of the autonomy talks, which are taking place now, even if decisions are taken to implement the plan, for the following reasons: The unified stand of our people in Palestine in rejecting the Camp David Agreements and the so-called autonomy plan has discouraged those who supported it at the beginning--our unified stand was expressed in the many conferences and seminars held in Jerusalem, at Bi'r Zayt University, Bethlehem University, and Najah University; the unified Arab stand towards Camp David agreements, the boycott of Sadat's regime, the resolutions taken at the Baghdad summit, and the conference of foreign and economy ministers held in Baghdad also, will inevitably work to put an end to the so-called autonomy plan."

On the subject of Jewish settlements, Mr. Khalaf said "we express our objection to these settlements by striking, demonstrating and raising these issues in court, but as it happens, our enemies are our judges, so to whom can we complain?" He added: "I would like to point out that after the signing of the Camp David agreements, the number of Jewish settlements increased, as did torture and oppressive measures, especially against our students. We witnessed this through the closure of schools, institutions, universities and the imposition of high fines on students. The world must understand that we shall continue our struggle to liquidate the conspiracy of the autonomy plan in order to attain our legitimate rights."

Mr. Khalaf will be leaving soon to the United States soon to attend two conferences to be held in Washington D.C. The first, sponsored by the Palestine American Congress, will be held from Aug. 17-19, and the second one, sponsored by the Palestine human rights campaign, will be held on Sept. 20.

"I am not going there to negotiate with the Americans, as I have been accused by media," he said. "I was invited to attend these two conferences. The PLO is our sole representative, and no one is authorised to speak for it."

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

'AL-DUSTUR': WEST GERMAN MOVES TO RESOLVE MIDEAST CONFLICT

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 10 Aug 79 p 1 JN

[Editorial: "West Germany and the Palestinians"]

[Text] We would like to believe that the overtures made by the West German Government to the Palestinians in recent months are signs of a genuine awakening of conscience which could grow and expand to contribute effectively toward lifting the injustice committed against the Palestinian people by the long German and European silence.

When Juergen Moelleman, the FRG foreign minister's envoy, said in his press conference in Beirut yesterday: We are seeking to improve our relations with the Arab world and with the Palestinian people--whome we have somewhat neglected, he was most likely trying to atone for the Bonn government's years of silence on the Palestinian people's tragedy.

That this awakening should occur several decades late is better than not at all, especially since the Germans in particular should feel a special responsibility toward the Palestinian people, because the crimes committed by the Nazis against European Jewry created a favorable climate for the Jewish influx into Palestine and the consequent establishment of Israel.

Moreover, the West German conscience after the war chose for a long time to view the Arab-Israeli conflict only from one angle. German compensations to Israel were generous, and these compensations played a decisive role during the fifties and early sixties in consolidating the Jewish state at the expense of the Palestinian people and homeland.

Hence, we cannot but welcome West German moves that began with the visit of Foreign Minister Genscher to Iraq and a number of Gulf states and his constructive statements during his visit and later in the Bundestag, on the Palestinian people's rights. These moves also include Moelleman's visit to Beirut and the statements he made yesterday after his meeting with PLO Chairman 'Arafat.

We do not know much about the 8-point plan proposed by Moelleman for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, his call for mutual recognition

by Israel and the PLO is at least more logical than the U.S. call on the Palestinians to unilaterally recognize Israel. If it is true that this plan enjoys the blessing of the West German Government, one can assume that it also enjoys the blessing of all the EEC countries. This makes it, in its broad outlines at any rate, close to the European view on a solution to the crisis, a view that may become the subject of serious discussion if the self-rule talks should collapse.

It is important for the Arab states, which rejected the Camp David accords, to encourage European interest in the Palestinian cause, and to join Europe in a constant dialog on this matter, so that European enthusiasm for action would not be shattered by Arab indifference. Likewise, it is important for the Palestinian side, whose PLO Central Council meets in Damascus tomorrow, not to turn its back to the encouraging overtures from the European side, especially following the detente in European-Palestinian relations after 'Arafat's meeting with the Austrian chancellor and the former West German chancellor. Diplomacy is war by other means. When goals are united, free from compromise and not relinquished, then the means that lead to achieving these goals through political action are all legitimate.

CSO: 4802

SAUDI-BAHRAINI CAUSEWAY PROJECT ADVANCES

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 30 Jul 79 p 2

[Article by Tim Sisley and James Buchan]

[Text] JEDDAH, July 29 — The long-delayed causeway scheme to link the Eastern Province to the island of Bahrain moved a step forward Sunday with a government announcement in Taif that it had approved specifications and a list of pre-qualified contractors.

The Ministry of Finance and National Economy announced that a joint Saudi-Bahraini technical committee, with help from specialists from the World Bank and a number of universities, had approved the designs and specifications for the 22-kilometer causeway drawn up by Danish consultants.

It also said that contractors had now been prequalified and the consultants had been asked to issue specifications so that bids could be received within six months.

The announcement follows talks in Taif last week between Bahraini Minister of Development and Industry Yusuf Shirawi and Saudi planning and

industry officials.

Ali Murad, Bahrain's director of works, said earlier this month that eighteen consortia had been selected to tender, but their names would not be released until both the Bahraini and the Saudi governments had ratified the choice.

Minister of Industry and Electricity Dr. Ghazi Alghosaihi said recently that work on the causeway would begin in the autumn, but Murad said that it would begin by the autumn of next year: whichever, the Saudi ambassador to Bahrain was quoted in the "Financial Times" a fortnight ago as saying that the Kingdom would spend "any amount of money" to see the project completed.

It may be a good deal of money. The original plans, drawn up in the early 1970s, envisaged land-filled causeways running out from either shore, with a two or three mile ferry link as a preliminary to the expensive installation of bridging. The cost then was unofficially put at \$80 million.

But the design now incorporates four bridges spanning 12 kilometers of the total 22 kilometers, with the span over the main navigation channel reaching a height of 26 meters. The cost has been estimated at some \$800 million, or ten times the original.

The most likely route for the causeway was picked from a choice of two by Foundation Engineering, a subsidiary of the Richard Costain Group of Britain, commissioned by Saudi-Danish Consultants acting for the Saudi government.

It runs from the Budaiya area on the northwest coast of Bahrain to a point on the Saudi coast near the village of Al-Aziziyah.

The most recent projections suggest that by the year 2000, 29,000 passenger cars and 2,600 trucks will cross the causeway each day.

After the final basic design received the approval of both governments in November 1976, the delays began.

BRIEFS

IRAQ, KUWAIT DISCUSS WATER SUPPLY--Baghdad, 9 August--Iraqi-Kuwaiti talks on linking the two countries with a joint power network and supplying Kuwait with water from the Tigris River will be completed in Kuwait during the next week. Irrigation Minister 'Abd-al-Wahhab Mahmud said that an Iraqi delegation made up of experts from the Ministries of Irrigation, Planning, and Industry and Minerals will leave for Kuwait within the next few days. In a statement to the weekly ALIF BA' magazine, the minister said that during the visit the delegation will familiarize itself with the steps taken by competent Kuwaiti quarters so far regarding sketches on the plan to supply Kuwait with pure water from the Tigris River. These talks are part of the bilateral protocol of cooperation concluded earlier this year. [Text] [Baghdad INA in Arabic 1045 GMT 9 Aug 79 JN]

ISLAMIC BANK PDRY LOAN--Today an agreement was signed in Jiddah between the Islamic Development Bank and the PDRY. The agreement stipulates that the bank will finance the exportation of oil for the PDRY from the al-Buraqah oil marketing company for 10 million Islamic dinar equal to \$13 million. The agreement was signed on behalf of the bank by Dr Ahmad 'Ali and, on behalf of the PDRY by 'Ali Nasir Jabir of the PDRY national bank and Muhammad 'Abd al-Husayn 'Ali of the PDRY national oil company. [Text] [Riyadh SNA in Arabic 2045 GMT 7 Aug 79 LD]

PALESTINE FUND SHARES PAID--Amman, 10 August--A QNA correspondent in Amman has learned that Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iraq have paid their shares in the fund for the support of the occupied Arab territory. It should be recalled that 7 Arab countries share in the fund's capital, which amounts to \$150 million. The fund was established at the ninth Arab summit conference in Baghdad. [Text] [Doha QNA in Arabic 1950 GMT 10 Aug 79 JN]

GULF-EUROPEAN SUMMIT--Kuwait, 14 August--The Kuwaiti newspaper AL-QABAS quoted responsible sources here as saying that a Gulf-European summit will be held in early 1980 to formulate a joint cooperation program. This program will cover the transfer of technology to Gulf countries in exchange for securing Arab oil supplies to Europe. The sources added that Gulf and European envoys will exchange visits to discuss the subject and fix the date for a joint preliminary ministerial meeting. [Text] [Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0940 GMT 14 Aug 79 JN]

SEPTEMBER OPEC CONFERENCE DENIED--Kuwait, 13 August--Humayd Zuhayri, director of public relations at OPEC, has denied reports that an OPEC ministerial conference will be held in September. In a statement to the newspaper AL-ANBA', Zuhayri said that OPEC has not extended any invitation to any OPEC member state on this matter. [Text] [Damascus SANA in Arabic 0850 GMT 13 Aug 79 JN]

PLO OFFICIAL IN JORDAN--Palestine National Council [PNC] Chairman Khalid al-Fahum in Amman yesterday met with the PNC members who are residing in Jordan. Al-Fahum briefed them on latest developments in the Palestinian arena in particular and in the Arab and international arenas in general. On Palestinian-European relations, al-Fahum said: During his recent meeting with Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and Socialist International Chairman Willy Brandt, Brother Abu 'Ammar had refused a request to commit himself in writing or orally to abandon the PLO National Charter which the PLO implements in letter and spirit. Al-Fahum also said: Brother Abu 'Ammar refused to answer when asked about the system the new Palestinian state will adopt. The brother leader said: The Palestinian people will choose the system they want in a democratic manner. [Text] [Voice of Palestine [Clandestine] in Arabic to the Arab World 0645 GMT 15 Aug 79 JN]

PLO OFFICE, NO ISRAELI EMBASSY--Beirut--It was reported here today that a PLO office will replace the Zionist enemy embassy in Managua. Informed sources said that a delegation of the revolutionary government in Nicaragua gave this pledge to Yasir 'Arafat, PLO Executive Committee chairman, during its latest visit to Beirut. [Text] [Baghdad Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1845 GMT 11 Aug 79 JN]

CSO: 4802

MOROCCAN PARTY OFFICIAL CRITICIZES ALGERIA

Rabat MAP in English 1208 GMT 14 Aug 79 LD

[Text] Paris, August 14 (MAP)—Aabderrahim Bouabid, first secretary of Moroccan party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) declared here Monday to Radio France Inter that "The sacred union for the defense of our territory" has been undertaken in Morocco.

Bouabid said in his interview to France Inter that "It is Algeria who led Mauritania to claim the Western Sahara, or a part of this region, to oppose the Moroccan policy, and to enable thus Algeria to have a corridor from Tindouf (south of Algeria) to the Atlantic Ocean."

"The granting of this corridor to Algeria, he added is excluded in the perspective of hegemony. However, it is not excluded in the perspective of a regional cooperation, which [words indistinct] the perspective of a regional cooperation, which would include all the Saharan territories, be it the Western Sahara, or the Saharan parts administered by Algeria, Mauritania and Mali."

Bouabid stated further that "The Algerian Government's policy will lead to a destabilization in the region, and to useless and murderous wars, and we wish that the Algerian people will have something to say in this matter."

"The Polisario, Bouabid went on, is armed and supported by Algeria, and without the latter it would have never existed, as it did not exist to struggle against the Spanish."

"We are obliged to defend ourselves, and sometimes we defend ourselves by counterattacking. However, sometimes we hesitate (in counterattacking) not to worsen the situation," concluded Bouabid.

CSO: 4420

NORTH-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ALGERIAN PAPER ON MOROCCO'S USE OF U.S. WEAPONS IN SAHARAN WAR

Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 26 Jul 79 pp 1, 7 LD

[Unattributed report: "Washington Encourages Rabat To Be Intransigent"]

[Text] Agencies have reported from Washington that the United States might lift restrictions on Morocco's use of the arms supplied to it by Washington. This was stated by the U.S. assistant secretary of state in the light of the escalation of operations inside Morocco by the Saharan People's Liberation Army, particularly since June.

A U.S. source said that no steps have yet been taken in this regard but the U.S. Congress and President Carter's administration are currently studying "the situation resulting from the problem of Western Sahara." The assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern affairs made a statement before a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives in which he said that the United States has no intention of changing its attitude toward the dispute. It recognizes that Morocco and Mauritania "administer" affairs in Western Sahara but that sovereignty over the region "is still unresolved." He said that Washington hopes for a negotiated peaceful solution respecting the Saharan people's rights. But the U.S. assistant secretary of state admitted that attacks by Saharan rebels inside Moroccan territories "have basically changed the nature of the crisis" and that "Morocco is now defending its soil." He said that in view of this situation Washington is finding it increasingly difficult to convince Rabat of the expediency of "U.S. moderation" in arming it.

It is recalled that the United States, together with France, is Morocco's biggest arms supplier. U.S. military aid allocations to Morocco during the current fiscal year have totaled \$45 million.

CSO: 4402

BRUSSELS PAPER: USSR IS 'SEEKING TO REPLACE' AFGHAN LEADERS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 7 Aug 79 p 3 LD

[Article by Abed Attar: "The Soviet Cart and the Afghan Horses"--names in parentheses as published]

[Text] Has a quarrel broken out between Afghanistan and the USSR? It appears that Moscow is seeking to replace President Taraki and his prime minister Hafizollah Amin who, as we know, seized power following the bloody April 1978 coup organized by Moscow and have retained it as a result of Soviet military aid which has continually increased, especially since the signing of the friendship, cooperation and good-neighborliness treaty in December.

Having to contend with a Muslim rebellion, the Taraki-Amin tandem has refused to follow Soviet advice to enlarge its team by including personalities not belonging to Khalq (the Afghan Communist Party). Since the USSR could not change the cart, it decided to change the horses.

Mere rumors? Mr Amin has indirectly dispelled any doubts about this by denouncing efforts to broaden the government. "The classes overthrown by the revolution have no right to participate in the political struggle," he stated among other things. And he added with reference to Moscow: "The first prerequisite for our friendship is respect for our national sovereignty, our independence and the freedom of our beloved country."

In fact, the Kremlin has made the error of trying to progress too fast, just like Vietnam in Cambodia. Soviet advisers have reached the conclusion that the social and agrarian reforms have been implemented too quickly and too brutally to be accepted by a tribal society still under the domination of feudal leaders and the clergy.

True, the Afghan Government has finally decided to shelve its plan for the elimination of illiteracy among women which inflamed feelings in certain regions but the distribution of plots of land among peasants has practically been concluded. Some 600,000 hectares have been shared out among 230,000 families. (However, the country could be short of some 500,000 tons of

grain this year.) At any rate, the Soviet tacticians have in particular underestimated the spirit of independence which has moved the Afghan tribes for centuries.

Faced with the rebellion in the name of Islam which has been rampant more or less throughout the country for more than a year, Moscow is afraid of being forced to commit its own troops in the Afghan hornets' nest if it continues to rely on the present team. In fact, it realized that Washington will not wait for the arrival of the Red Army on the shores of the Persian Gulf before reacting. Nor is it ignorant of the fact that a special American force is now ready to go into action at a moments' notice in order to bar the way to the Gulf. After all, Mr Brzezinski, President Carter's adviser for national security affairs, asked the Soviet Union quite clearly last week not to try to impose any "alien doctrines on profoundly religious and nationalist peoples." This warning was repeated by the State Department on Friday.

However, while it is fully committed to the Afghan venture, the USSR is nonetheless prepared to do everything in its power to avoid a military or even political setback. First because it is a matter of prestige. Second because a victory by a Muslim rebellion would sooner or later have contagious repercussions in its own republics (especially in view of the triumph of Khomeyni's Islamic revolution). And finally because such a setback would force the Soviet Union to postpone indefinitely its regional strategy aimed at reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.

"We will not desert our friends, the Afghan people, in their misfortune," President Brezhnev recently stated. And Soviet diplomats have stated in private quite freely: "The revolution (that is, the USSR, of course) has come to stay with or without Taraki and Amin."

The Kremlin is keeping in reserve (Babrak Karmal), leader of another communist party--the Parcham (Banner) Party--and a former deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Council, who was sent to Prague as ambassador 3 months after the April putsch but has since had his credentials withdrawn by Kabul. R. (Karamal) [as published], who is believed to be utterly devoted to Moscow, is an ideal figure to further the Soviet plans. In addition, there is Gen (Abdul Kader Daegarwal), the man who carried out the April coup, but who has been imprisoned for nearly a year for "trying to overthrow the beloved leader, Comrade Taraki." He could become very useful to Moscow if he resurfaced in time.

Feeling the storm approaching, President Taraki reshuffled his government at the end of July in order to be able to keep an eye on the colonels more effectively by assuming supreme command over the armed forces and appointed his prime minister defense minister--a post previously occupied by a soldier. However, many observers in Kabul have not hesitated to assert that this reshuffle took place without Soviet assent and perhaps even against Soviet wishes.

Be that as it may, everything indicates that time is running out for the USSR and even more so for Taraki. In fact, the Afghan rebels (70,000 men, according to their leaders) are daily gaining ground and more or less control more than half Afghanistan's territory. Most roads--both major and secondary--are controlled by them. The government forces (110,000 men) have been weakened by spreading desertions and control only the cities. As for Kabul which under the former regimes was the mecca of peaceful hippies, it has been turned into a fortress.

A telltale sign--the United States is evacuating about 100 of its diplomats and their families, leaving only some 50 of its personnel behind. Moscow, on the other hand, repatriated the wives and children of its 4,000 technicians and military advisers--about 100 of whom have apparently been killed--several months ago. It would appear that some of them were even mutilated (their noses, ears and genital organs being cut off) by the insurgents.

Trapped, the USSR has been forced to increase its supplies of heavy and sophisticated armaments, including MI-24 helicopters with heavy firepower (apparently piloted by Russians) and napalm bombs. It seems that some of the Afghan refugees who arrive in hundreds in Pakistan every day have been burned.

Since the beginning of hostilities, 125,000-140,000 people have fled from the Taraki regime and sought refuge in Pakistan's border provinces where they live in temporary camps. Since no subsidies are being received from the UN High Commission for Refugees, they are being looked after by the Islamabad government and helped to a certain extent by members of local tribes. Kabul, which is as vexed by this as Vietnam is by the "boat people," has accused the Pakistani Government of supporting the Muslim rebellion in collusion with China, the United States and Iran.

CSO: 4900

AFGHANISTAN

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL CHANGES

Kabul KABUL TIMES in English 19 Jul 79 pp 1, 4 BK

[Text] The statement of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:

In the basic lines of the revolutionary duties of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan a series of vast measures have been foreseen for the purpose of bringing changes in the economic and social life as a result of which economic backwardnesses are going to be wiped out and an independent national economy will be set up instead and the standard of living of the toilers of Afghanistan will be raised.

In the course of the past year the Revolutionary Council and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan took and implemented vast measures in the development of economic, social relations and administration of the economy of the country. The economic and social development plan of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which is formulated for 1358-1362 [1979-1983] and its implementation is the duty of every patriot and aware person of the country, is considered one of the outstanding factors of the development of national economy of the country.

For the purpose of attracting patriotic and national elements in the development affairs of the national economy and for the purpose of providing full assurance to the strata of the Afghan society for the future.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has taken the following decisions:

1--For implementation of the five year economic plan and further development of the state sector in the national economy the respective state authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in their activities provide necessary all-sided assistances to private enterprises and investment which are not contrary to the aims of the Great Saur Revolution.

2--State ownership is public property, underground wealth, energy resources, communication media, banks and insurances.

Beyond these limits private investment in development of industries, commerce, transport and public service are encouraged allsidedly and their security is guaranteed provided they are not against the provisions of law and economic interest of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

As such the Ministry of Planning Affairs, governors and municipalities are missioned to provide all-sided assistance to the private investments in the national economy.

3--Retail and wholesale are free and will always be encouraged. The government for the sake of national interests will shoulder the task of control, observance of regulations of sale and purchase, payment of taxes and fixing of just prices.

For the purpose of helping the peasants in selling their products and raw materials and for the purpose of provision of primary materials to the rural inhabitants help will be extended to the establishment of consumer cooperatives.

The state will also encourage the alliance of craftsmen in the production union because provision of raw materials for such unions is made in a better way and their production power and sale of commodities will become more effective.

In the field of foreign trade all-sided assistances will be made to national firms and traders in export and import of goods.

In case the state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan deems necessary the need for monopolizing the import and export of a commodity the subject will be announced prior to the decision of the state.

The state encourages private enterprises for promoting the production and quality of the export goods and defend them against competition with foreign goods.

5--[Numbering as received] In the field of taxation policy the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has in view to regulate income through direct just taxation and gradual decrease in indirect taxation.

6--The banks of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are duty-bound to help private enterprises especially in the important areas of national economy through extension of loan etc.

7--The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan missions all the ministries, state organs in the capital and the provinces to observe the provisions of this statement in discharging their tasks.

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN WARNED AGAINST INTERFERING IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS

Kabul KABUL TIMES in English 19 Jul 79 p 2 BK

[Editorial: "Pakistan Should Avoid Playing With Fire"]

[Text] The great leader of the people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Nur Mohammad Taraki, general secretary of the PDPA CC and president of the RC while talking to the elders and representatives of Farah and Nimroz provinces at the People's House recently said: "Pakistan should know that it should not deteriorate its relations with Afghanistan without responsibility. It should not think this relations like an internal affairs. But this is a great international issue. It should not interfere in our internal affairs and should not make any conspiracy against us".

The great leader of the people of DRA further said that this is a dangerous act to interfere on others affairs and it is, in effect, a play with fire that will burn not only Pakistan and the region but its flames will spread throughout the world.

The fact is here that the reactionary circles of Pakistan have established a childish habit. They have so far acted against the progressive noble people of Sindh and they did not counter act. They have brought all kinds of tyranny and cruelty against the oppressed people of Panjab who did not react against them either. And they have repeated their cruel actions against other nationalities in Pakistan while did not receive any reaction either. Due to these actions they have been spoiled now, like the child, and think that everybody and every country would not tell them anything.

But they are totally mistaken. These reactionary circles should better realise that upon interfrerring in the internal affairs of the DRA they are playing with fire, the heroic Afghans who defeated the most powerful masters of the Pakistani reactionary circles that is the old colonialism.

The Pakistani reactionary circles should better realise that the Afghans are the king killers, they have killed the feudalism which is still sucking the bloods of the downtrodden of Pakistan. The Afghans have eliminated the ikhwanushayateen, these Moslem looking farangis who are still living on the shoulders of our oppressed brothers in Pakistan due to inhuman policy and exploitative system of the reactionary circles of Pakistan.

Thus, you reactionary circles of Pakistan ponder deep and think wisely whether you can resist the heroic Afghans? Surely not.

We are going to warn you reactionary circles of Pakistan that no one can be deceived by your hollow words when you say that you are giving way to a number of insurgents and fugitives "on humanity basis". It is all ridiculous to think this way and pretend your hostile action on the basis of humanism. Because, if you really believe in humanism so why you are not providing ground for a social justice in Pakistan. Why do you let the feudal lords and big land owners to exploit the poor people of Pakistan? Why from amongst all people of Pakistan only three thousand big land owners make use of half of irrigation water at that country while the majority of the small land owners lack sufficient irrigation water? Why do you allow the big land owners to increase their land and authority so as they could badly crush the oppressed peasants?

Thus if you are looking forward to realise humanism in Pakistan think first of all about your own people.

Besides that, of course, the fugitives that you are helping them are not really Afghans. They are the ikhwanushayteen under certain maulanās known as Shorbazaris maulanās and certain colonialists spies in the guise of Islam. Thus if the reactionary circles of Pakistan are really claiming Islam they should not call those elements as Afghan brothers. We never call them brothers and they are not our Moslem brothers nor they are Afghans. But they are and have been for years the spies, servants and the lackeys of colonialism and imperialism.

CSO: 4920

AFGHANISTAN

THOUSANDS JOIN SHIBERGHAN DEFENSE OF REVOLUTION COMMITTEE

Kabul KABUL TIMES in English 22 Jul 79 p 3 BK

[Text] More than 4,300 people have entered the membership of the Committee for Defence of Revolution [CDR] in Shiberghan, centre of Jauzjan Province.

Stating the above in an interview with the reporter of the KABUL TIMES, Abdul Satar Serati, head of the committee said: The Committee for Defence of Revolution in Shiberghan is among the organisations established at the creative initiations of great leader and teacher of the people of Afghanistan, Nur Mohammad Taraki, general secretary of the PDPA CC and president of the Revolutionary Council of DRA is aimed at ensuring the welfare of new Afghan society and unity of peoples of our country, and was set up on Jadi 26, 1357 [16 January 1979]. At the outset the committee had 350 members and now its membership has reached to 4,329.

So far, according to the work programme of Shiberghan CDR, 31 executive committees have been established, of which five are in five districts covering 1,600 families and the remaining 26 in the far-flung villages. The CDR is engaged in improving the living conditions of the noble people of Jauzjan.

To raise the level of their knowledge and information, all the 31 CDR's have subscribed to the Jauzjan newspaper and people who speak Pashtu, Turkmani and Uzbeki have also subscribed to the DA SAUR ENQELAB daily and Gorash and Yuldoz periodicals.

The reading of these publications will enable the members of CDR's to get further information and insight about the useful plans and objectives of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

In each centre of CDR the issues of Khalq periodical are available which play an important role in raising the political consciousness of the members.

Talking about the activities and services rendered so far by the members of CDR he said: The Shiberghan CDR has taken active part in collective work in planting of saplings, levelling of roads and, construction of bridge

and culverts in their respective areas. As a result of the CDR's voluntary and collective work ten kms of road has been levelled and more than 50 bridges and culverts constructed. They have also helped in installation of pylons and extension of lines.

In accordance with the article four of the CDR Charter, the members also patrol at night in the villages and towns for security purposes. In the past several months not a single theft was reported.

The head of Shiberghan CDR said the CDR has helped in creating a spirit of cooperation and sincerity among the members and helps the individuals when they have problems.

The Shiberghan CDR leadership has a secretary, two elected deputies and four selected consultative aids represented by Turkman, Uzbek, Pashtun and Tajki who work jointly and unitedly in carrying out the CDR objectives.

CSO: 4920

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

PRC COTTON ACCORD--Kabul, 14 July, (Bakhtar)--The accord on the export of 5,000 tons cotton, worth \$7,275,000 U.S. was signed with the People's Republic of China in Kabul yesterday. The agreement was signed by Zabiullah Shafi, head of the Herat Cotton Co. agency and Li, commercial attache of embassy of China to Kabul. With the signing of this accord, of the 5,000 tons cotton 3,500 tons will be sent to China in Assad and the remaining 1,500 tons in the month of Mizan this year. [Text] [Kabul KABUL TIMES in English 16 Jul 79 p 3 BK]

MINISTER MEETS CDR MEMBERS--Faizabad, 28 July, (Bakhtar)--Pohanwal Mohammad Mansur Hashemi, minister of water and power, met the noble and patriotic people of Shahre Buzurg Alaqadari of Badakhshan who registered to fight for defence of the sacred land, at the compound of Badakhshan Governorate at 10:00 a.m. last Wednesday. The minister of water and power, while speaking on the gains of the Great Sawr Revolution and the nature of the Khalqi state of Afghanistan said that it is a matter of pride that our Khalqi state supports the legitimate rights of the toiling people of Afghanistan and enjoys the backing of all our noble and toiling people. Disclosing the shameless conspiracies of the enemies of the people of Afghanistan, the minister of water and power while expressing pleasure over the sentiments and patriotic measures of the noble people of Share Buzurg Alaqadari said that the power of the people is eternal and creative and when need comes your services will be utilised in eradication of enemies of the people of Afghanistan. [Text] [Kabul KABUL TIMES in English 28 Jul 79 p 3 BK] Faizabad, 29 July, (Bakhtar)--Pohanwal Mohammad Mansur Hashemi, minister of water and power, met at the centre of Badakhshan a number of noble people of Baharak Alaqadari, who have registered their names with the Committees for Defence of Revolution [CDR]. Pohanwal Hashemi addressing them in a speech said, the enemies of the toiling people of Afghanistan are plotting against our Khalqi state under different forms. At this sensitive and historical juncture, it is our duty not to refrain from any sacrifice in safeguarding the national honour of the country and realisation of lofty aspirations of the Great Sawr Revolution and we should eliminate the enemies of the toiling people of Afghanistan. In reply some people from among the audience, on behalf of others, in their speeches promised their all-round sacrifice in realisation of lofty objectives of Great Sawr Revolution and elimination of enemies of the revolution. [Excerpt] [Kabul KABUL TIMES in English 29 Jul 79 p 3 BK]

AL-HARBI DISCUSSES BEN BELLA'S RELEASE, ALGERIAN OPPOSITION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 27 Jul 79 pp 22-23

[Interview with Mohamed Harbi, Conducted by Huda al-Husayni]

[Text] "None of the Algerian leaders think like Ben Bella. The only ones who think approximately like him are the opposition."

With these words Mohamed Harbi began his talk with me. Mohamed Harbi is an Algerian who is proud of being an Algerian, and a member of the movement for the defense of democratic freedoms. He was editor-in-chief of the magazine REVOLUTION AFRICAINE (the magazine where Ben Bella's wife worked), and was also a political advisor to Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella. He opposed the coup led by President Boumediene against Ben Bella in 1965, so he was arrested and imprisoned. Then he was placed under house arrest in southern Algeria and was not allowed to go from one city to another. He left Algeria in 1973, and has incessantly demanded the release of his "friend" Ben Bella. Right now he is studying at the Sorbonne in France. Last year he published the first part of his book "The Algerian Liberation Front."

Informed persons say that letters were exchanged between Ben Bella and Mohamed Harbi before the announcement of Ben Bella's release, and that there was serious coordination between parties inside and outside the country. Mohamed Harbi does not deny or confirm this, preferring to talk about what happened after Ben Bella's release.

[Question] Some of them say that Ben Bella's release was nothing but an Algerian charade, since the man is still under house arrest.

[Answer] I don't believe that it was a charade. We did not know where Ben Bella was, in which prison or detention camp. Now we know that he is under house arrest in the M'sila region. For the prisoner, house arrest to a certain extent resembles freedom, for I have experienced them both.

Ben Bella received Algerians who had come to visit him, but naturally he was cautious about what he said to them. It is interesting that his black hair is still black, and that there are no white hairs on his head.

I believe that by the end of this year at the latest he will be permitted to meet with foreign journalists. He was responsible for the approval given to conducting press interviews. A French television station and an American one came to an agreement and submitted a request to conduct the first interview with Ben Bella, offering 50 million French francs. Naturally, this offer will not reach Ben Bella, for the Algerian information agency rejected the idea of the interview, but I believe that if the offer had reached Ben Bella he too would have refused it.

Right now Ben Bella is not making statements about anything. If he speaks, that in itself might be cause for return to the secret prison. In a country ruled by force, whatever does not suit the regime must be abolished, whether by prison or by ...

[Question] I heard from an informed Algerian source that the new Algerian leadership will not permit Ben Bella, if he goes free, to pursue any political activity. What is the meaning of this freedom? Is this right?

[Answer] This is not Ben Bella's problem; it is Algeria's problem. Freedom, for Algeria, means the Algerians' ability to express their opinions with frankness and reassurance. Algeria is ruled by a bureaucracy which doesn't trust itself. Algerian Berber Leader Ait Ahmed has said, "I want Ben Bella to resume political activity. This is better for us."

In Algeria, men like Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed and Mohamed Bogdialf, if they ruled, would change the face of the country. They are all populists, and their problem is that they are from the opposition.

[Question] Algerian information claims that the new generation doesn't know about Ben Bella.

[Answer] If that is true, then why did they keep him in a secret prison for 14 years? Why are they now placing him under house arrest and preventing him from political action?

The new generation is trying to understand what happened in the past and to read the real Algerian history. I believe, as do many Algerians, that the regime which existed in 1965 (the advent of Boumediene) blotted out all the mistakes which Ben Bella made, meaning that right now daily life is very wretched.

The sole demand of the new Algerian generation is democracy. And Ben Bella, after 14 years in prison, is still concerned with democracy and considers it an important demand, just as he feels that freedom of expression and difference of opinions are matters which will confirm the democracy of the regime.

I don't believe that Ben Bella will hesitate in pursuing political activity if he is permitted to do so, and I don't imagine that they will let him do so, because they know him too well.

We must wait for the day the Algerian people act, and they will act. Look at Spain, which lived for 40 years under oppression and dictatorship. Matters develop much slower than we think. In Algeria they limited the people's demands to ensuring housing and bread, diverting them from the real demands. They made the countryman, whose only concern is food for his children, migrate to the city. They made him forget the Algerian man's struggle for freedom, and did not let him breathe its oxygen. And whoever insists on acquiring his freedom has been transformed, in the view of the leaders, into an opposition figure and has left the country.

[Question] But there is an Algerian receptiveness to the opposition, and there are some opposition figures who have returned to Algerian, like Tahar Z'biri.

[Answer] I don't believe that there is any receptiveness; the press is exaggerating in this respect. As for Z'biri's position, it is a special one. He is an officer, and all his friends are officers who agreed with him on removing Boumediene. However, he acted hastily by not organizing the coup with them. He went his own way and failed. The officers who had been with him were forced to stand alongside Boumediene, fearing for their lives. Furthermore, Z'biri was a friend of Yahiaoui, and this friendship remains deep to this day, unaffected by the former's flight to Morocco and the latter's remaining in the government.

Let us go on to the other opposition leaders, Ait Ahmed for example. There have been fruitless contacts with him. They told him that he could return without any political preconditions, but they didn't discuss with him the basis for his return or the principle of political action. So he refused.

Mohamed Boudiaf announced that he will not return to Algeria unless they allow him to practice free political activity. This is what we all dream of!

There have been contacts of this type with me, which resulted in nothing. They want the opposition to return to the country without any discussion. Thus the government benefits while claiming openness and freedom!

The problem in Algeria is not one of persons. Everything must be re-examined. Algeria needs to stop and consider, and to allow the people to share in determining their destiny. It does not need the people to remain with their eyes downcast, looking for a bite to eat, while the leaders follow their whims.

For example, the people abroad talk overmuch about Bouteflika and his sins, forgetting Industry Minister Abdelsalem Bel'id, who played a much more serious role than Bouteflika, for he was the one who made Algeria, the "Algeria of Industrialization," what it is today. All the people are concerned about what happens abroad and forget the domestic scene.

Algeria's problem was created by a generation which lived outside Algeria. When it returned, instead of looking for the roots of the problem in order to ascertain what policy it should formulate, it formulated a policy which it felt would realize its personal aspirations. This is what the Algerians felt.

[Question] Let's go back to Ben Bella. What were his real relations with 'Abd-al-Nasir?

[Answer] Egyptian intelligence treated Ben Bella very badly, and this was one of the reasons with which Boumediene armed himself to overthrow Ben Bella. It is true that Ben Bella was very fond of 'Abd-al-Nasir, but this affection did not prevent him from keeping his own counsel. For example, 'Abd-al-Nasir asked him to get into the provisional Algerian government headed by Ben Khedda, but he refused. At the time, 'Abd-al-Nasir sent Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal and 'Ali Sabri to Krim Belkacem to bring him to a certain meeting place, but Ben Bella had made up his mind to refuse, and he was right.

When Ben Bella entered Algeria and took over its government, Egyptian intelligence began conspicuously interfering in internal Algerian affairs, which harmed Ben Bella and at the same time aroused his indignation. Egyptian intelligence activity reached its peak when Egyptian Ambassador 'Ali Khashbah was in Algeria. I remember that we were on an official visit to Moscow and were invited to Egypt. In the airplane Ben Bella said to me, "I don't want to see this creature ('Ali Khashbah) in Algeria. You tell that to Haykal, so he in turn can tell 'Abd-al-Nasir."

I said to him, "You will be seeing 'Abd-al-Nasir--why don't you tell him yourself?"

He said to me, "Abd-al-Nasir will know."

I didn't understand what he meant by "'Abd-al-Nasir will know." But when our plane landed at Cairo Airport, 'Abd-al-Nasir was there to meet us, and at his right hand stood 'Ali Khashbah and some senior Egyptians. Ben Bella got out, shook hands with 'Abd-al-Nasir and all the personalities there to meet him, and paid no attention to 'Ali Khashbah's hand which was held out to him. Thus 'Abd-al-Nasir knew Ben Bella's desire. Ambassador 'Ali Khashbah did not return to Algeria, but the work of Egyptian intelligence did not stop.

[Question] Why didn't Boumediene finally get rid of Ben Bella, i.e. execute him, instead of keeping him in prison for 14 years?

[Answer] Boumediene had no intention of shedding blood in Algeria! For example, Omar Mellah shot and wounded him, but even so Boumediene didn't execute him. The reason was that during the Algerian revolution strong rumors arose that Boumediene loved to shed blood. For this reason I believe that if he had executed anyone during his rule, he would have thereby changed these rumors into truth. He tried every way of getting the people to forget these things.

[Question] Let's get back to you and your relationship with Ben Bella.

[Answer] We had a misunderstanding from March 1962 to April 1963, the reason being that I was against the Evian Agreement, because that agreement removed

Algeria from the circle of Arab states and did not solve Algerian social problems. I disagreed with Ben Bella, because they were demanding his opinion and he had some reservations about Algeria's Arabism, and because he later said, "In any case, I am in prison, with my hands tied, unable to do anything to create another state of affairs suitable for Algeria. I am unable to get out of prison to do anything against this agreement." Which means that he was not entirely for or against the agreement. He knew how to evade responsibility!

I remember that when I declared my opposition to the Evian Agreement, Sani Sharaf contacted me through Tal'at Sidqi (a Syrian) and asked me the following question: "Is Ben Bella capable of coming to power if he relies on the army?" I answered, "Of course he is capable of taking power."

Then he said to me, "You are against the Evian Agreement. So why don't you rely on the army?"

My answer was, "Because I don't know of any military leader who would surrender the power and return it to the people."

Thus the disagreements continued between me and Ben Bella about the army and the Evian Agreement. I believe that Ben Bella overestimated the revolutionary nature of the army, not knowing that in the army there was a new generation which did not know the country very well because it had lived abroad, and which was obsessed with attaining power.

Then, Ben Bella wanted the government to remain divided amongst the many quarreling factions, in spite of his belief, most of the time, in the inevitability of some matters. But he had gone beyond this belief, and had failed in making the necessary arrangements.

In any case, when Ben Bella was in power, Algeria was in a state of collapse, and did not have the resources and means which Boumediene, for example, had. Algerian petroleum was in the grip of the French, as well as the country's other resources. There were terrible divisions among the people, and it was hard to surpass those difficulties in a short period of time. Ben Bella didn't have enough time or the necessary devotion. But even so, under Ben Bella's rule we were able to speak frankly about everything we felt, not like it was with Boumediene. I am not speaking of Chadli.

[Question] Is it true that Yahiaoui was against Ben Bella's release?

[Answer] No, I don't believe that anyone now in power has any personal reasons against Ben Bella, especially since they were not directly responsible for the coup which swept him away.

There are personal matters between Boumediene and Ben Bella, one of which is that Boumediene was his friend, and swept him away, imprisoned him, took his place, and obliterated his name.

Boumediene wanted the elite to manage the affairs of state, while Ben Bella wanted the people to have a say in politics.

Ben Bella considered his foremost Middle East ally to be Egypt, while Boumediene was against this idea and would say, "Algeria first." All the Algerians went along with this principle until the 1967 defeat, which brought Boumediene into the sphere of Arabism and created Arab inclinations in him.

[Question] And the new president--Chadli Benjedid?

[Answer] I don't know him. I don't believe that he will pursue any Arab policy.

[Question] And if Yahiaoui takes power?

[Answer] The same thing would happen with respect to Algerian Arab policy. I feel that for an Algerian, Ben Bella is exceptional in his concern for Arabism.

[Question] Will the Algerian situation change after Boumediene's death and the advent of Chadli?

[Answer] The most remarkable thing about the new ruler is his moderation and his merely superficial recognition of the problems. But the political infrastructure is the same and never changes.

[Question] What about Algeria's relations with its neighbors?

[Answer] The basic principle is the need to arrive at real economic participation. As for unity as a whole, this generation will not realize it. It is a slogan which they repeat and don't believe in.

[Question] Will you return to Algeria?

[Answer] Yes, when the Algerian leadership restores even a small percentage of democracy to the people.

8559

CSO: 4402

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

FRENCH APPRECIATION MESSAGE--Algiers--Mr Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and secretary general of the National Liberation Front, has received a message of thanks from French head of state Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Here is the text of the message: "I greatly appreciated the congratulatory message which you sent me on France's national day in your own name and on behalf of the Algerian people and government and I thank you for it warmly. "Like you, I am convinced that the ties which unite France and Algeria based on their common desire to respect their own choices and values call for dialog and consultation to remove misunderstandings and establish friendly and confident cooperation. By strengthening relations between our two countries such a move can only consolidate the ties which the peaceful links of geography, history and culture have established between the nations of Western Europe and the Arab world and Africa. "I also sent my good wishes to you personally and for the Algerian people's happiness." [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 13 Aug 79 p 1 LD]

KIM IL-SONG MESSAGE--Algiers--Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and party secretary general, has received the following message of thanks from Mr Kim Il-song, president of the DPRK: "I would like to express my deep gratitude for the message of solidarity which you sent me, on behalf of the Algerian people and their government and on your own account, to mark the month of solidarity with the Korean people and as a mark of support for our people's just cause, in the firm conviction that the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between our two countries will constantly be consolidated and developed in future. I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere wishes for your health and happiness." [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8 Aug 79 p 3 LD]

CSO: 4400

INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT PROPOSED

Manama AL-BAHRAIN in Arabic 20 Jun 79 pp 16-17

[Article by Sa'id Nur-al-Din: "Production in the Cooperative Movement; Integration of the Agricultural, Consumer and Industrial Cooperative Sectors Is Necessary"]

[Text] Cooperative production has philosophies and goals, and it has a history and leaders. In contemporary history it has advocates who believe that the value and exaltedness of cooperation lie only in what it contributes in the way of agricultural and industrial production and consumer goods. However, its value is also in the changes it brings about in the spheres of intellectual production, inasmuch as it is a valuable tool in writing, publishing and culture. The goal of production in the agricultural cooperative sector is to increase the real value of crops with the processing industries, and utilizing the potentials of the environment. In the industrial cooperative sector it is a tool for organizing the workers in projects which depend on self-administration and free participation in which work represents an organized source of income and achievement. In the consumer cooperative sector it is the hoped for method for satisfying the needs of consumers and reducing retail prices. It also serves to coordinate and integrate these sectors. It is a significant grass roots economic system governed by a set of principles and policies.

Cooperative production is a subject which enjoys the attention of governments because it develops industrial property in small projects the goal of which is to protect the workers, jobs and the consumers, so that talk about cooperative production is becoming a sign of the total picture of production. Any call to mobilize a single sector by itself towards production in agriculture or industry, for example, or towards cooperative consumerism, is inadequate and falls far short of the mark. That is because cooperative production, services and distribution are tightly interlinked areas.

Cooperative Production: A Study of the Kinds of Cooperatives

Cooperative industrial production involves a small or large project which is registered in accordance with the statutes of the Cooperative Law, and has the form of a cooperative society. Cooperative industrial production is also an

original branch which completes the basic jobs of the agricultural cooperatives, the consumer cooperatives and the housing cooperatives.

The following are cooperative societies engaged in industrial production:

1. Workers' industrial cooperatives.
2. The industrial branches of the agricultural cooperative societies, the forest cooperatives, the livestock cooperatives and the fishing cooperatives.
3. The industrial branches of the consumer cooperatives and their central cooperatives.
4. The industrial branches of the housing cooperatives.
5. The industrial cooperative societies which are active in private production, most significantly the cooperatives which contract for work and the industrial cooperatives for industrial loans.

The Areas of Productive Work in the Cooperatives

1. In the purely industrial cooperatives the jobs are supplying, advancing credit, guidance and organizing the work while protecting migratory jobs and their labor force, most significantly jobs pertaining to construction, traveling, road and bridge building and irrigation.
2. In the agricultural cooperatives there are processing jobs: meat, dairy products, wool, thread, fiber, seeds, fruit, oils, and processed crops such as tobacco and coffee. In the water resources cooperatives jobs are concentrated in the following industries: [water] networks, ice, salt, tar, paint, slaveries [?], oils, smoking, salting and canning.
3. In the housing cooperatives there are broad spheres for the production of implements for buildings and seizing the prisons [as published], and for the production of doors and even prefabricated housing and hygiene implements. This sector also includes branches for furniture and heating and cooling appliances.
4. In the consumer cooperatives production is through the central cooperative societies whose activities range from foods to soap, clothing, furniture and electrical appliances.

It is clear that the consumer cooperatives are able to produce the same kinds of goods and merchandise produced by the agricultural and industrial cooperatives at the same time. It is also clear that a further degree of interlinking is superior to competition and interference inasmuch as all of the cooperatives can be dependent on the construction cooperatives for construction, and they are also dependent on the transport and consumer cooperatives for warehousing, transport and distribution of the products.

It is also clear that the producing cooperatives anticipate that they will be financed by the consumer cooperatives, and that that will bind them with contracts, agreements and participation in permanent committees to decide the policies for this financing, of the contracting of their business relations, and so forth.

It is strange that when we speak about production we get carried away picturing the executive units—that is, the cooperatives—with regard to the kind, the membership, activity, requirements, profits and losses so as to forget completely that the production sector within the cooperative movement first and foremost is a policy which is planned, decided and announced.

1. In the forefront of the policy are those executive steps which are taken by the state or the special higher cooperative institutions to support and develop cooperative production in all sectors.
2. Also within the framework of the policy is investigation of the work requirements. Of prime importance here are suitable legislation, financing and its principles and sources, and the role of the cooperative unions, the banks and the official auditors.
3. Undertaking systematic studies of the economic benefit of each project, and systematic monitoring and evaluation of the implementation.

If this is settled, the requirements of unity would become clear in light of these policies and would include devising internal systems and defining the kinds of jobs, tools, numbers, appliances, raw materials and buildings. It would also include the principles of industrial accounting and vocational training. Here we draw a distinction between the productive jobs in agriculture or industry and those in the professions, and between the size of the industries themselves.

It is well-known that cooperative industrial production in any sphere or sector of the cooperative movement will remain a far cry from the concept of the major industries which have their own meanings, peculiarities, dimensions, geographic distribution, industrial cadres and frightening nature. When they are affected by power, electricity, mineral raw materials and foreign capital they take on another legal and administrative shape which is different from the legal and administrative shape of the cooperatives.

A Charter for Cooperative Production

Talk of transforming the agricultural cooperative movement from brokerage to production, the significant contemporary subject, is therefore not ripe in the absence of a general framework for cooperative production in most of the developing countries. What is needed is solidarity among the cooperative sectors in this matter. Also needed is a detailed document on policies, publicity on the subject and on the kinds of cooperatives, the principles of their establishment, and the circumstances which have a positive effect on

their growth, development, making them formidable, their administration, the levels of production, marketing, training and guidance in cooperative production as an integrated whole. The document will emphasize the need for a permanent higher board or higher committee or any apparatus which will be formed for the cooperative industries. Without that efforts will remain hit or miss in every sector, developing in one sector and coming to a complete standstill in another, and of all things in the agricultural cooperative sector, inasmuch as studies on production in the cooperative industrial sector are quite well-known, and in the whirlpool of the machine and the traditional industries they deal only with agricultural production, and even the latter will for a long time remain a hope which we hope will be realized.

Let us try to set up a study circle for cooperative production. Let us invite all the parties to it so that all the cooperative sectors are represented. Together we will see what this circle will finally come up with in the way of recommendations and decisions.

9123

CSO: 4802

REASONS FOR HIGH DIVORCE RATE DETAILED

Manama AL-BAHRAIN in Arabic 20 Jun 79 pp 6-7

[Article by Subaykah al-Zayid: "A Call To Study This Phenomenon: Two Divorces for Every Seven Marriages Each Day; At Whom Does the Finger of Guilt Point? Foreign Wives Are More Devoted to Married Life; Why?"]

[Text] Divorce is one of the social problems which afflict every society. It results in breakup of the family, which affects the country's social condition, because it makes vagabonds out of the children, who represent the cornerstone in the building of the homeland. Certainly a child who is raised by his parents in an atmosphere of tranquillity and stability will be able to contribute to his homeland more than one who lives distracted by the need for someone to care for him, show affection for him and look after his comfort. Therefore societies try as best they can to use laws and individual judgment to check the problem of divorce. Some Arab and Islamic countries have actually begun to apply some of those laws, such as the personal statute and restricting divorce to the courts.

By means of these laws nations try to ease the tragedies of divorce and return tranquillity and stability to the Arab and Islamic home. At a meeting with some judges in the Ministry of Justice I asked them some questions about the problem of divorce and other problems which afflict our society in Bahrain. My first question, directed to Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Muhazzi', concerned the most important factors which lead to divorce. Have laws or legislation been proposed by the judges to check this problem? His Honor answered me: "According to the cases which we encounter liquor is the leading factor that leads to divorce. If we want to define those factors with respect to the responsibility of the two parties in that, it is our opinion that the wife is the source of some factors, namely:

"1. The demand by the wife for separate living quarters.

"2. The wife's love of external appearances, overburdening her husband with her demands.

"3. Interference by the wife's family in the married couple's problems, and their incitement of the wife against her husband.

"4. Some working wives do not show interest in their husband or children. Each imagines that by divorcing her husband she will find another husband who is more compatible.

"5. A wife may hate her husband and sacrifice him for money.

"And the husband is the source of some factors, namely:

"Addiction to wine, and beating his wife and children.

We will not discuss or approve restricting the man's [power to] divorce by enacting a law such as the personal statute. Here we apply the doctrines of the school of Imam Malik. It was his opinion that the husband could divorce his wife with or without her consent. But we try to reconcile the married couple and persuade the husband to retract his oath of permanent divorce. Frequently we succeed and the married couple return to a normal life."

I asked Judge Shaykh Yusuf al-Siddiqi: "Is it not possible to return to the foundation of the original Shari'ah--the book of God and the Sunnah of His prophet, along with the various juristic schools--to eliminate the excuse and promote the commonweal by curbing divorce through legislation? For example, the judges could propose legislation to check the problem of divorce." His Honor answered: "This question has not yet been discussed, and we have no idea about it." I went back to the question of Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Muhazzi' about the factors frequently associated with divorce among Bahraini men and women while this problem is infrequent among Bahraini men who are married to a foreign woman, as certain statistics clearly indicate. He answered: "In truth, because of the foreign wife's feeling alienness which causes her to cling to her husband she avoids problems with him because in her isolation she has no one else. Therefore divorce occurs infrequently among these couples, in contrast to the Bahraini woman who tries to stir up problems and who are always on the wife's side."

Shaykh Yusuf al-Siddiqi added: "Among the divorces witnessed by the court the cause is sometimes a difference in age. For example, the husband may be advanced in years while the wife is young. This difference in age causes the destruction of many homes. What is needed is that the wife's family take steps to prevent this type of marriage, because it has many [adverse] consequences.

[Divorce] is responsible for scattering the children and destroying the family home. We also witness divorces caused by a difference in education and culture. Presumably marriage is based on a kind of equality in the level of education and culture to ease everyone's anxiety about the stability of life in the future.

"This is what we actually find in some marriages. Young men have begun to choose wives who are culturally aware. This can be attributed to the economic and social change through which we are passing.

"Furthermore, Ministry of Justice statistics confirm the trend for young men to marry non-Bahraini women because of economic and social circumstances. For example, a person's low income may compel him to go abroad to get married because costs are lower there.

"We still have something to say: Marriage is a right and is a permanent union between the two partners for their whole life. However, this union may be based on a faulty foundation, which is unsound. Hatred may prevail. Life between the two partners will stumble. This selection will cause the breakup of the family and the vagabondage of the children, who will remain a problem for their parents and the country."

Marriages and Divorces According to Age Group and Nationality in 1978

Age Group	Marriages		Divorces	
	Bahraini	Non-Bahraini	Bahraini	Non-Bahraini
Under 15	-	-	-	-
Female	48	-	6	-
15 to 19	124	23	15	2
Female	755	40	97	17
20 to 24	101	16		
Female	355	40	102	24
25 to 29	28	7	7	1
Female	9	3	1	
30 to 34	97	4	4	1
Female	3	23		
35 to 39	52	11	33	5
Female	27	2	25	1
40 to 44	27	6	20	9
Female	22	1	10	3
45 to 49	29	4	21	1
Female	10	2	11	1
50 and over	47	4	51	10
Female	9	-	18	-
Not Given	2	-	3	1
Female	4	-	7	-
Total	1,180	274	333	74
Female	1,353	106	337	70

Marriages and Divorces According to Nationality and Level of Education in 1978

Level of Education	Bahraini	Non-Bahraini	Bahraini	Non-Bahraini
Illiterate	148	54	222	22
Reads	-	-	-	-
Reads and Writes	26	13	83	4
Primary	189	61	242	21
Secondary	441	50	420	30
Institute	15	61	7	
University	80	30	77	10
Post Graduate				
Studies	3	-		
Not Given	66	4	104	-
Total	1,185	274	1,353	106

Illiterate	92	34	128	35
Reads	-	-	-	
Reads and Writes	18	6	13	6
Primary	74	11	11	
Preparatory	29	5	24	5
Secondary	83	9	65	6
15 [as published]	2	10	3	
University	14	3	10	3
Post Graduate Studies	-	-	-	-
Not Good [as published]	8	3	11	1
Total	333	73	337	70

0123

CSO: 4802

RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT, OTHER ARABS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 23 Jun 79 pp 47-55

[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "President on Surface--of Iron"]

[Text] The isolation of Egypt has begun to leave its imprint on the economic situation in Egypt. There are Arab states which will demand that Sadat repay his debts to them. Sadat built his hopes on American-German-Japanese capital, but Germany and Japan have informed him that they are unable to solve Egypt's problems. Sadat is the one who nurtured the isolationist spirit in the Egyptians. Thus they have strange expressions such as: "Our capital and Arab capital hate each other."

There are unforgettable sights in the series of American peace efforts in the Middle East. The sight of President Anwar Sadat embracing his historical enemy Menahem Begin cannot be forgotten. The sight of President Sadat himself saluting the Israeli flag cannot be forgotten. The sight of the El Al plane landing at Cairo Airport and the MierAir plane landing at Tel Aviv cannot be forgotten. The sight of Menahem Begin reviewing the Egyptian honor guard at Cairo Airport cannot be forgotten. The sight of the Israeli flag flying over Cairo cannot be forgotten. The sight of Israeli Minister of Defense Weizman visiting the Egyptian naval base at Alexandria cannot be forgotten. Last but not least, the sight of the Egyptian soldier who planted a kiss on the cheek of the Israeli female soldier cannot be forgotten.

These are sights suitable for priceless posters. They are scenes from a modest film, resembling those films which reflect unbelievable ideas. However, the film which is still showing and which millions in the world are viewing will continue until further notice, like films which depict another era.

Perhaps the question which has not yet found a convincing answer is: How did President Sadat do that, why did he do that, and is it a risk or a gamble? There are an infinite number of question marks and problems surrounding this question. Perhaps the answer to the question and its ramifications may be found by a clarification of the situation.

First, there are the positive reasons which made President Sadat take the step he took. Then there are the Arab circumstances which would not tolerate this step. Then there is the present Egyptian situation, and there is the future of the step.

Under positive reasons, one can say, if we set aside certain views, that President Sadat reached the conviction that as long as complete peace was impossible, as long as the opportunity was available only through the American formula, and as long as he believed fundamentally in the American role and the American ability, he should place the problem in the hands of the United States and let it find a solution which it considered suitable. He decided in advance not to argue with the American administration over anything and to agree with it in anything it chose, no matter how large or small the return. He also decided to expedite matters after he found some willingness and even some zeal on the part of the Carter administration about playing an historic role. The most important thing in all of that is that he decided to speed things up on the basis that he does not know who will be president after Carter, and he does not want the same thing to happen that happened with former President Ford. Sadat had begun to pursue the matter of finding a solution to the Middle East crisis when Ford's term ended, and he was forced to begin again with President Carter.

Among the positive reasons one can also say, if we put aside certain views, that President Sadat surrounded the decision which he was determined to make (the decision to announce his willingness to visit Israel and open the door to talks with the enemy) with much secrecy at home and on the Arab scene on the basis that discovery of the decision could abort the step which the president hoped would shake the world and solve for the Arabs and the Palestinians in an instant the problems which constant aggression and war had not solved.

One thing on which President Sadat relied, as he explained later was that he announced his step in the Egyptian Parliament with PLO President Yasir 'Arafat present. Some of 'Arafat's followers say that he faced one of the most embarrassing situations in his life when he heard President Sadat announce that he was willing to go to Jerusalem.

They say that he was ready to leave the Egyptian Parliament building to express his protest and remove from the minds of Egyptians the feeling which lasted a few hours, that is, that their president's initiative was supported by the leader of the Palestinian resistance and hence was a national and a nationalist initiative. Then came the Palestinian reaction to scatter these feelings and open the door to the fight against an unparalleled Egyptian attack on the Palestinians, caused by the fact that the leadership of the resistance immediately and viciously opposed President Sadat's announcement and put him in a corner which he felt harmed the issue. The Egyptian-Palestinian verbal battle has proceeded gradually since that time and has been distinguished by Egyptian steps and Palestinian warnings. During the stages of this battle President Sadat has tried to turn the

head of the Palestinian resistance which pronounced him guilty after it rejected his initiatives of friendship toward the Palestinians of the West Bank, Gaza, and all independent Palestinians who had built bridges in the past with them, but these same Palestinians now turned aside from him and took the side of the PLO. They then took this position more and more after the Jerusalem visit led to an Egyptian-Israeli peace achieved by intimidation and invitation from Jimmy Carter.

Through this stance the Palestinian resistance was able to unite the Arab majority around it at the first Baghdad conference and then at the second conference. It was able to draw away President Sadat's lifeblood, and it achieved an historic accomplishment if we grant it the success of the Khomeyni revolution and the overthrow of the shah. We can say that a new birthday for the Palestinian revolution was recorded after President Sadat had been confident that the revolution had collapsed or was on the verge of collapse and that he could be free to move quickly to his own rhythm.

As for the historic achievement, it is that for the first time the resistance became effective in manufacturing the Arab decision, because it also came about that the decisions taken at the first Baghdad conference and then at the second were not incompatible with the power of the Palestinian influence. This does not mean that the Arab states were obliged to issue resolutions and compliant admonitions directed against President Sadat.

Why Take a Risk?

We come to a basic point: What made President Sadat take this step which apparently will continue for a long time to be a risk not without caution? What are the circumstances which compelled him and those mental circumstances which he exploited to take that step?

If the reason were the economic situation, President Sadat in the 5 years since the 1973 war has been able to obtain unobjectionable aid from the Arab states which are satisfied with his methods of rule and his regime's assault on socialism, 'Abd-al-Nasir's experiment, and the revolutionary line which prevailed for 15 years in Egypt. It may turn out that these years form the golden era for dealings between President Sadat's regime and the Arab conservative bloc.

If we go beyond all of the talk on the matter of this aid and the implied criticism which is directed at some Egyptian officials in this matter, we can say that although Egypt did obtain a good percentage, its effects do not appear clearly on the chart of economic achievements in Egypt for a basic reason, and that is that the economic problems from which Egypt is suffering are innumerable.

Here we can stop at an important point, and that is that President Sadat felt certain that the various upheavals of the political line which prevailed in Egypt were worth far more, in his view, than what happened to him.

As a result of that, not to speak of all of the things which his supporters have begun to talk about, he decided to turn the tables. In methods of political action, that does not appear to be an outstanding method as much as a blow of revenge.

The way was paved for this blow by the fact that chauvinist feelings deepened in the minds of Egyptians. Songs prevailed which had in the past been expressions of rebellion to the minds of some intellectuals. From the song of the Pharaohs to the song of the Egyptian to the song of the European bourgeoisie, whenever songs were found they echoed, with the result that the concept of Arabdom was insufficiently cultivated in Egypt.

Gradually the Egyptian began to feel that Arabdom swallows his personality and that therefore he needs something to glorify the nature of this personality.

President Sadat did not miss an oratorical opportunity to nurture chauvinist feelings. Moreover, he often struck the chord of the efforts which burden the Egyptians, to the extent that before he declared his willingness to visit Israel the psychological preparation had reached the point where we began to hear educated and alert Egyptians say: What have the Arabs given us? How long will we stay in our plight while the Arabs are in the best of circumstances?

Obviously President Sadat was nurturing these feelings when the Arabs were not hesitating to support President Sadat's regime when the first signs of a difficult financial crisis or some sort of dangers from the left appeared on the horizon. For example, as a result of the first painful shock, represented by the events of 18 and 19 January 1976, President Sadat sent one of his closest confidants at that time, Dr Ashraf Mirwan, on a tour which included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and some of the Gulf states. The delegate returned with 1.2 billion dollars, which enabled President Sadat to get out of economic strangulation and hold out while his regime escaped from the edge of the abyss.

Silence of the Military

In addition to nurturing Egyptian chauvinism and ceaseless harping on the point of hardship, President Sadat has radically reconsidered the situation prevailing in the Egyptian army, so that through years of surprise changes in leadership, demobilizations and reorganizations it has become easy to be convinced of the direction which President Sadat has chosen. No army in the world has gone through an operation like the revision operation which the Egyptian army lived through, so that this army has become so flexible that it was not excited when the Israeli flag suddenly was raised in Cairo.

Much has been said to explain this apathy on the part of the Egyptian soldiers, but the fact which is hidden from many is that the army is taking

a position according to popular reactions and as a result of the situation in which it is living. If we tried to define the situation we would find it difficult and considerably complex. This army could not be ready for 10 years, far from family and city or village, without hearing clearly any appeal to return to family and city or village and get away from the atmosphere of readiness and the harsh circumstances of going to war or waiting in the sand. Thus, when President Sadat issued appeal after appeal to substitute peace for war between Egypt and Israel, these appeals found attentive listeners in the Egyptian soldiers. Here we do not assume that all soldiers took the same opinion, for there are always exceptions.

As to the popular interaction, the Egyptian soldiers watched with enthusiasm the effect which President Sadat's appeals to substitute peace for war left on the home front. If these appeals had been disregarded with basic rejection by the civilians, the Egyptian soldiers would also have rejected them. In this atmosphere President Sadat pursued the operation of training his soldiers to a degree that they became extremely flexible with time. In any case, that is a psychological method which a ruler cannot rely on unless he knows the points of weakness of his people.

However, that cannot last, and it does not stand up to any agitation or to many disruptions. It is nothing more than hurried, unstudied approval which came about through pressure from one side and in an atmosphere which does not encourage discussion, all produced by President Sadat's rapid movement. Moreover, it is important that we bear in mind the characteristic reaction of the Egyptian people (civilian and military) toward a resolution issued by their leader. Always, first and before any thoughts or caution toward the leader, there are no questions for a long time until something happens to make the citizen see gaps in the position. We should also take into consideration that some positions which oppose the line chosen by President Sadat were important, but they were rather weak in the face of the approval which prevailed in broad sectors of the Egyptian people. Perhaps the position of Isma'il Fahmi, who refused to continue on the path with President Sadat and resigned from his post as foreign minister (noting that he is one of the engineers of the settlement), can be said to be the major position which continued to interact in the sentiments of numerous Egyptians. However, Isma'il Fahmi quit, and silence followed, with the exception of some writings which did not disperse this dense fog which envelopes the situation.

It is a mistake to consider the waves of approval which we referred to as a permanent situation springing from awareness of the true nature of the Arab-Israeli struggle, since it is impossible when surrounded by the facts of this struggle to develop convictions that it is possible to continue the new situation between Egypt and Israel. Some attached some hopes to Dr Mustafa Khalil, who took over the position of foreign minister in addition to his position as prime minister in order to preserve the balance in the foreign policy course, but these hopes disappeared after it became clear that Mustafa Khalil would not rebel against President Sadat as Isma'il

Fahmi and Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil had done before, not to speak of Muhammad Husnayn Haykal, who preceded them in rebelling against the policy as a whole and in detail.

He Said--Egypt Is Tired

The waves of approval were brought about by a yearning for peace, since Egypt has been at war since 1948 and wants to have a taste of peace. From the first Arab-Israeli War to the tripartite attack against Egypt in 1956 to the Yemen War in 1967 to the 1973 War, in this series of wars Egyptians have lost many men, not to speak of the fact that because of these wars they have carried many burdens and have been deprived of many things which others have not had to do without. The spread of waves of approval was encouraged by the fact that the Egyptian army won victories in the 1973 War which remain important in spite of everything for many reasons, absolutely the most important being that it was the first time this army won a victory over an enemy, and it came about as a result of studied information and psychological campaigns as the army which is not defeated. When the Egyptian army was able to break the Bar Lev Line after the historic crossing operation the picture changed completely, and factors were removed from Egyptian minds which had made them reject any peace as long as they were defeated. They found something in the victories won in the first days of the war which made them say: As long as we are victorious, why not achieve peace?

Thus a surprise victory gave President Sadat the opportunity to turn the Egyptian people to support of the steps taken by their leader without attention to detail. Most Egyptians did not even read the Camp David agreements and the agreements which followed it. There were at least three ministers in the government of Mustafa Khalil who read only the summary published in the Egyptian press and found no objection to it, and they showered abuse on those who rejected the agreements reached by President Sadat. They revealed that they had not read the text of the agreements during a discussion in which a friend asked a question about whether they had read the agreements. They said that they had, but when he mentioned a specific point they said that they had not noticed that because they had read the summary on the front pages and had not read the text on the inside.

Sadat had a reason for permitting the Egyptian press to publish the texts of the agreements. He felt that if the texts were published only a few would read them, and everyone would say that as long as they were published they were harmless, whereas failure to publish them would stir up more questions and there would be great interest in reading them carefully.

Sadat's Concept of Democracy

Those who read slowly and underlined many phrases and words are the traditional opponents of President Sadat. Their opposition began long before

the president's visit to Israel. It began as a result of a sharp contrast between Sadat's concept of democracy and party work and their concept. The president supports the return of the Wafd Party, provided it is his. The president supports the return of the Moslem Brotherhood, provided they are his. He has no objection to the left pursuing its activities, as long as this left is his. The independents are positive, as long as they are his.

That was President Sadat's concept of democracy and party work. However, he did not tolerate continuance of the experiment which he wanted as a winning card in his hand, and disputes began between the party members and any opponent. Then he became angry and made accusations against Fu'ad Saraj al-Din, the former pasha. No sooner had he moved into the spotlight and decided to restore the glory of the Wafd Party than an incomparable movement formed around him. Because of this, President Sadat's attack on Fu'ad Pasha and on the Wafd in general escalated. As to the leftists rallying around the banner of "United Progressive Group," which is the name they chose to replace "party," they are opposed by President Sadat because of charges that they are agents of the Soviet Union. When the size of the religious awakening began to expand, President Sadat put his apparatus on alert to oppose the Moslem Brotherhood if they decided to challenge him.

In time the experiment which President Sadat wanted died, mourned by Egyptians who saw the possibility of its continuance as something to reduce the president's defiance over an isolated regime. When the Wafd Party announced its dissolution, the movement scattered as if a bullet of mercy had been fired at this experiment.

Thus the Egyptian opposition to President Sadat began with the eruption of incompatibility between his concept of democracy and political action and the methods which others persisted in using. Then came his visit to Israel, followed by the agreements which concluded in the Egyptian-Israeli peace to make these opponents raise the level of their opposition, and even more than that to make parties among this opposition think seriously of rallying around the banner of a "united front" to replace the regime in case it fell or was overthrown. In the 2 months following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace, contacts began to take place between the Wafd, which could be categorized as representing the right, and the Marxists. The contacts even included the Moslem Brotherhood and the religious groups which spread in Egypt and caught fire in the aftermath of the victory of the Khomeyni revolution in Iran. Here it must be mentioned that President Sadat realized the sensitivity of the situation and decided to challenge immediately the religious groups which had grown amazingly in Egyptian university circles. Thus he and some of his staff had warned that the regime would not permit Khomeyni movements in Egypt. However, these warnings did not stop the religious expansion, which was becoming more serious day by day. The religious community now seems to have outlined the first attack against the regime, especially since they were not convinced of the regime's logic by which it justified the conclusion of peace with Israel,

not to speak of the fact that they felt that this peace constituted a renunciation of the rights of the Arabs and Moslems in Jerusalem.

The importance of the current of religious opposition is that it carries weight in the Egyptian countryside, which in general will not obtain any financial benefit from peace with Israel. Any financing which the regime obtains from the United States and perhaps from Japan will not be enough so that part of it can be used to develop the countryside. Most of this money will be spent on the cities, since the public utilities are in extremely bad shape. Cairo alone, with its many complex problems in the field of utilities, would consume all of this capital.

When the facts about the financial return become clear, the area of popular support for President Sadat's program will naturally be damaged. At present this area cannot be considered the same as it was a year ago, for example.

Those Who Are For, and Those Who Are Against

The area of support was very wide when President Sadat visited Israel. After the Camp David agreements, the support increased. The Egyptians understood the situation based on their hopes, not on the facts. Even before President Carter's unparalleled initiative during which he unexpectedly visited Egypt and Israel and obtained final approval from President Sadat and Menahem Begin, the area of support was still strong, on the basis that all of Egypt's problems would be solved as long as the United States adopted President Sadat's regime, meaning that nothing else could concern it. No Arab rejection was important. No Soviet rejection was important.

However, this area began to see more shrinkage after the conservative Arab regimes moved from a position of silence to announce a position toward President Sadat's regime which this regime did not take seriously at first. Then the area of support decreased after it became clear to the Egyptians that the aid which their regime would obtain from the United States would be used mainly for weapons. There is not enough to save the economic situation; it is not as much as they wish, especially in view of the size of the economic difficulties. Despite all of this, President Sadat's regime appeared remarkably indifferent in the face of the Arab reactions and the criticism directed toward it. Perhaps that was based on the conviction that the conservative Arab regimes would not go to the end of the road and that they would not rebel against the American will because of their relationship with the United States.

Then it became clear that there was a big gap in President Sadat's analysis, assumptions and assessments. As soon as President Sadat signed the peace with Israel, the conservative Arab regimes took the same position as the rebellious regimes. The two sides came together on the necessity of adopting resolutions calling for punishment of the Egyptian regime because it concluded a peace with Israel. The conference of Arab foreign ministers

held in Baghdad was the first instance of solidarity of its type among the Arab states. Regrettably, this solidarity was to confront an Arab state, and even the first Arab state.

When the Egyptians studied the position and saw how states like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, the Emirates and Qatar, which constitute the basic nerve of the Egyptian economy, had decided to break off diplomatic relations with President Sadat's regime and cut off economic aid to it, they were overcome by fears and anxieties, which were not lessened but were made more complex by President Sadat's reaction. Rather than understanding the circumstances which made these regimes adopt a harsh position, President Sadat criticized them. Then the criticism became harsh words and then an attack not devoid of defamation.

It is said that President Sadat did that because he could not tolerate this startling surprise. But was this really a surprise?

Here also one can say that President Sadat's analyses, assumptions, calculations and estimates were off. It is unreasonable to expect these regimes which in the past had been basically aligned with President Sadat's regime to approve a peace which would move Jerusalem further away rather than bring it closer. In the simple analysis, it was important for President Sadat or some of those around him to note that a state like Saudi Arabia could not be indulgent toward the subject of Jerusalem, nor on the subject of Palestinian rights, especially after the creation of an Islamic state in Iran stirred unparalleled enthusiasm over the two subjects. Such a matter has certain calculable effects.

The situation became more confused when President Sadat diminished the importance of the aid which he obtained from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, but his warning that Saudi Arabia "would pay a high price" clearly meant that the president was angry.

Some of those close to President Sadat hoped that the situation would not reach the point of directing warnings and accusations toward Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. When the warnings and accusations were directed and Saudi Arabia replied with similar violent attacks they began to try to get things under control, but they were unsuccessful.

The Egyptians' fears increased when it was confirmed for them that the question would not stop there and that Saudi Arabia and its allied faction would direct other blows against the Egyptian regime; perhaps the blow which was directed against it at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Islamic States was painful. The effort to exclude Egypt from this conference and freeze its membership in it succeeded. To the Egyptians, this religious people, that means something; it means a great deal.

Pouch of Dollars!

Those who were hopeful are among those who know the facts of the Egyptian economic situation, and they are bitter facts in any case. Some of them

are among those who had been entrusted with earlier missions to obtain capital from the oil states. They had heard unpleasant talk during these missions, and they saw that obtaining aid from the petroleum states required a great deal of knowledge. Some of them must have told President Sadat what the rulers of these states did with some of their newspapers when these papers tried to open the file of the aid given to President Sadat and how there must be control of the way in which this aid is spent.

This aid was always a difficult puzzle to solve. It has been said that President Sadat obtained a very large sum. There is even a story circulating in the tightest councils saying that one time Saudi Arabia sent some pouches full of 100 dollar bills to President Sadat.

In addition to the aid which came from the top, there was official encouragement to citizens to travel to Egypt and spend and invest there. In the heyday of relations, Saudis and citizens of the Gulf states poured into Egypt in numbers which made an impact on the figures of Britain's income from tourism. The unrest in Lebanon provided an occasion for an endless influx of tourists. Then came the sharp tension in Egyptian-Libyan relations, and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf states solved the problem for President Sadat by taking in the workers, civil servants and teachers who left Libya.

Aside from the particulars and details, the judgment can be self-evident, and that is that what President Sadat's circles and President Sadat himself sometimes say about the size of the aid which he obtained from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf is inaccurate, and cannot be accurate. Also, what sources in these states repeated cannot be accurate. There is visible and invisible aid. Visible aid can be disclosed, but it is difficult to reveal invisible aid. It may not be revealed even at the peak of fury.

In addition to visible and invisible aid, there is aid which is not given directly. We mean here capital which pays the cost of arms deals. There is a great deal, and most has gone to the United States.

However, what the Saudi state cannot reveal its press can refer to in one form or another. Before Saudi Arabia, Libya had been forced, in view of President Sadat's denial that Colonel Qadhafi had helped him in any way, to publish lists of aid offered to Egypt before the 1973 War. From now on, all of the Arab states which had helped President Sadat found themselves forced to reveal officially or unofficially what they had given him. It was a natural reaction, although it would leave its imprint on many things.

The situation turned head over heels all of a sudden. After what President Sadat had said in the past about the Saudis in a speech which revealed their mutual allegiance and was carried by the press and news media, worried Egyptians were surprised by the deterioration of relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf states in words which we do not believe it is easy to elaborate on. Because of vehement expressions in the speech which

he delivered on the occasion of Labor Day, 2 May 1979, Saudi Arabia found itself, after discussion and consultation, taking a position from which there is no return. It is said that a strategic decision was made to reach no further understandings with President Sadat's regime and not to recognize it. Translating this decision, it means that the Saudi palace, which could not tolerate phrases in Sadat's speech including: "Saudi Arabia has turned into a tool of Colonel Qadhdhafi, the Syrian 'Alawites, the Iraqi Takritis and the Soviet Union and has bowed to Palestinian and Syrian threats," will work to bring down President Sadat's regime.

Between Saudi Arabia and America

We must pause briefly here to note the seriousness of the situation on the level of Saudi-American relations. If President Sadat had consulted with the United States before he made these statements about Saudi Arabia, that means that the Carter administration wants to take revenge on the Saudi position which rejected its course on a question. If President Sadat had intended to embarrass the United States, putting to the test whether the Carter administration stands with him or with Saudi Arabia, then this means creating a new development in the situation. We must put ourselves in the position of observer of recent developments. It is certain that it is not enough for Saudi Arabia that the American reaction is restricted to the comment of the State Department's official spokesman, Mr Hodding Carter, on President Sadat's speech, that "the United States has always considered Saudi Arabia to be a moderate country interested in achieving complete peace in the Middle East." In this reaction there are untimely subtleties.

As a result of this situation, in the view of most of the princes of the kingdom, the Saudi palace may have commissioned Prince Fahd to agree to publish information about the aid granted to Egypt, with the provision that he end his sick leave in Marbella, Spain and travel to Fez in Morocco to consult with his ally King Hassan to direct a blow against their former friend and ally President Sadat. This blow came in the freezing of Egypt's membership in the Islamic Conference. If the charter of the Islamic Conference had provided for expulsion from membership, that would have happened.

We note that the information concerning the Saudi aid to Egypt was published 3 days after President Sadat's speech, and that means that it was ready and that it was anticipated that President Sadat would go on record with the position which brought on the publication.

A friend in the Saudi palace told us how those who draft political positions in this palace spent 2 weeks night and day watching President Sadat's statements and conversations and monitoring the press and radio, and how after President Sadat's speech they stopped observing, ended their precautions and began to reply. From this came the information which was published in in the newspaper AL-RIYADH on 6 May 1979 attributed to "an authorized source." This information noted that from 1973 to 1979, Saudi Arabia had offered President Sadat's regime aid and assistance totalling 7 billion dollars.

This figure does not include Saudi support offered to Egypt before 1973 or investments of the Saudi private sector in Egyptian companies and projects. It also does not include contributions and small loans made to government or public authorities in Egypt. The information also reported that Saudi support was offered in six different forms, some of them not reimburseable, and that Saudi Arabia had pledged to pay the cost of weapons for the Egyptian army for a 5-year period.

We pause here for a basic observation. That is that Saudi Arabia, in this position, overthrew other appraisals by President Sadat which rested on the assumption that it was impossible for Saudi Arabia to take this position because of the beneficiaries of it: The Rejectionists, and the Arab left in general. Such an appraisal did not take into consideration a basic question, and that is that circumstances have gone beyond such considerations.

Impact of the Saudi Position

When we concentrate on the Saudi position and its effects on President Sadat's plans and even on the future of his regime, there are two reasons:

The first is that the Saudi ability to create confusion within the Egyptian regime lies not only in the area of aid but in being able to do without the services of Egyptian civil servants, teachers and laborers in Saudi Arabia. If they return to Egypt they will constitute a real burden for the regime.

Saudi Arabia may not clearly announce that it will do without the services of these people and deport them, but it is sufficient for the passport office to refuse to renew their permits, and this is what will probably happen.

When Saudi Arabia does that the other Gulf States naturally will follow. Gradually the matter will reach the degree of a catastrophe which President Sadat's regime is unable to bear. Not only will there be too few job opportunities for these huge numbers, but the Egyptian treasury will be deprived of taxes in hard currency amounting to a million dollars a day. One must take into consideration that any job opportunities will go first to the hundreds of soldiers who are discharged from the army every day.

The second reason is that the Saudi position toward Egypt will create a new balance which has not been taken into account by President Sadat. President Numayri, who is slow to take a position against President Sadat, corrected the path of his relations with Libya and announced that he is committed to the resolutions of the Baghdad Conference. Thus President Sadat lost a state in which he felt he had a strong position, noting that the Sudanese position was always mindful of President Sadat's plans and constantly irritated by Sadat's statements such as: "Sudan and I are half of the Arab world," and warnings against the Soviet Union and its friends

in Africa. The situation reached the point where he uttered them from Khartoum during his recent visit there to participate in the joint meeting of the Egyptian and Sudanese parliaments which was held in the framework of plans to achieve integration between the two countries, which seem to be faltering. Despite the deterioration of relations between Baghdad and Khartoum prior to Sudan's announcement of its commitment to the resolutions of the Baghdad conference, the Sudanese step came at a very critical time for President Sadat. It may be a good entry to restore relations between Iraq and Sudan to better than they had been before.

Sudan's belated announcement of its commitment to the resolutions of the Baghdad conference no doubt will influence the positions of two states which are not affected in any case, and they are Somalia and Oman, which have supported President Sadat and sanctioned his steps. Saudi Arabia has great influence over Sultan Qabus and Somali President Siad Barre.

Regardless of whether or not Saudi Arabia had pressed for pulling the Omani carpet and the Somali rug from under Sadat's feet, it is finally clear that President Sadat is completely cut off without Arab cover. There is no Arab public opinion with him so that he can say that he can substitute that for regimes. There are no regimes with him. Instead, there are regimes planning to overthrow him.

Scenario of American Solution

This dramatic picture of the situation is completely different from the picture in which we lived in the 60's, when most of the Arab regimes were opposed to the rule of 'Abd-al-Nasir, but he continued to be strong and effective because Arab public opinion in its silent majority and its demonstrative, vocal minority was with him. Even after he suffered that startling defeat in the 1967 War he did not collapse, although he was affected. Perhaps many remember that historic welcome which 'Abd-al-Nasir received when he arrived in Khartoum to participate in the Arab summit which was held in summer 1967, after the defeat which is known as "the summit of the three no's: No peace, no recognition, no negotiation--with Israel."

On the heels of the defeat and a conspiracy to overthrow him which was hatched by 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir and some military men, 'Abd-al-Nasir received an unparalleled popular reception in Khartoum. There were 12 kilometers of Sudanese lining the road from the airport to the hotel where 'Abd-al-Nasir was staying. They awaited his arrival for hours under the burning sun, as if he had won a great victory and not suffered a calamitous defeat.

This reception and the reactions we observe toward what President Sadat did and the peace treaty which he signed with Israel reflect a response to the current picture of the Arab world. The Arabs lose their being if they permit Israel to enjoy peace in the form it wants and impose the fait accompli which it believes will guarantee its existence. They agreed with 'Abd-al-Nasir in spite of the defeat which he suffered because he did not

raise the white flag and because he wanted to hold out. They turned their backs on Sadat although he represented the victory achieved in 1973, which was important as the first military victory over Israel. It was the effective penetration of a myth planted in the minds of Arabs for 15 years, and that is that Israel is a state which cannot be defeated. They agreed with 'Abd-al-Nasir because he was willing to resist, and they turned their backs on Sadat because he melted the metal of the glittering victories won by the Egyptian army in the October 1973 War in the crucible of hasty and artificial solutions, and it is no secret that this crucible was an invention of the American-Israeli political alchemists.

That leads us to a perplexing question: What made President Sadat reshuffle the cards in his hands, and are they all winning cards?

The talk which circulated in Egypt and became the center of writing, commentary and political statements shortly after the 1973 War was that Egypt had worn itself out, wondering how long it could continue to fight in place of the Arabs when its economic situation was faltering most of the time because the million-man army and arms were draining off everything.

This report did not sprout like a wildflower in a fertile field. President Sadat planted it, surrounded it with attention, and permitted whoever so desired to tend it and help it grow. President Sadat planted it the day he announced, while clad in the uniform of war from the podium of the Egyptian Parliament, that battles were in progress and there were relative victories won by the Egyptian army in Sinai and similar victories won by the Syrian army in Golan in preparation for peace. This call was a very clear interpretation of the war as a limited operation and implementation of the desire of Dr Henry Kissinger that Egypt should heat up the front, as if American diplomacy were a frozen substance requiring a fire to melt it.

At the appearance of mistrust, based on words exchanged between Egypt and Syria at the time of the first collapse of relations after the 1973 War and further based on many writings and conversations in closed sessions, it was said that war and peace after that were two matters making up one theme in the American scenario for a solution. Also, the expulsion of Soviet experts from Egypt, the humiliation of the Soviets, the destruction of their halo and the defamations of their reputation in the area were also themes in that scenario. Also, demolishing the reputation of Soviet weapons despite the relative military victories won with them by the Egyptian army during the October 1973 War was also one of the themes of that amazing scenario.

Because going into questions included in the column of mistrust will lead us to more complications, we will try to answer the basic question: Did Egypt fight in place of the Arabs, and is it because of the state of war that constant depression appears in the Egyptian economy and the society of 40 million people?

Egypt did not fight in place of anyone, although its role and its security forced it to fight. This role and security are two related questions. Egypt's role is leadership. When the state is a leader, it has a duty to play its role. The question of security is a basic one. Israel's presence on the borders with Egypt separating it from the Arab East means that Egyptian security is threatened.

If we took a calm look now at what is happening, we would find that Egypt has no role without the Arabs, although it had a better yield from its role.

We do not believe that ending the state of war means ending the faltering conditions of the economy. Egypt's problem is embodied in two things: The population increase, approaching an explosion, is running into a halt in the expansion of agricultural acreage, and even the disappearance of this land.

Egypt's population is more than 40 million. By the end of the 20th century this figure will reach 80 million. The agricultural acreage has not changed since the time of Muhammad 'Ali, that is, about 6 million feddans. Every day some of this acreage disappears, caused by construction on agricultural land rather than desert land. It was amazing that a complete city, "city of engineers," was built in 10 years on agricultural land in Cairo along the Nile, causing supply problems since this land had supplied Cairo with fruits and vegetables at reasonable prices.

'Abd-al-Nasir had taken note of the problem and resorted to reclamation, but the operation was expensive, not to speak of the fact that success, for instance, was proportionately in al-Tahrir Province. 'Abd-al-Nasir felt that industrialization might compensate Egypt. He built dozens of plants, and at the end of his days the working class consisted of 5 million workers. After Sadat took over following 'Abd-al-Nasir's death he decided, in the framework of a policy of turning away from socialism and relying on a policy of economic opening, to reduce the importance of manufacturing and convert Egypt to a country of trade, services and financial activity. It then became clear to him how difficult the question was. He returned to the idea of reclamation, concentrating on the necessity of reclaiming al-Wadi al-Jadid and some areas of Sinai, declaring that some of the armed forces would be rehabilitation battalions to confront the food security problem.

But that is not an easy matter. Practically, it will not be possible to raise the percentage of agricultural acreage. Hence, the problem exists. With the population increasing by an average of 1 million each year, the size of the problem is increasing, and there will be no growth.

The amazing increase in population means that the development plans will not find a reasonable solution. Perhaps we can give some figures to explain further.

Based on a study prepared by the Egyptian Ministry of Planning in early 1979, one person in Egypt consumed 297 kilograms of grain and starches a year and 21 kilograms of meat, fish and eggs. The figures estimate that in 1979 the Egyptian people will spend a total of 4.293 billion pounds on food and drink, an increase of 17 percent over 1978. On things other than food and drink the people will spend 2.708 billion pounds, an increase of 29 percent over 1978. When Minister of Planning Dr 'Abd-al-Zaraq 'Abd-al-Majid announced the release of the study he found nothing to say except: "Stomachs in Egypt are devouring the growth averages."

Obviously that happened at a time when Arab capital was pouring into Egypt and at the same time President Sadat was stressing that it was necessary to tighten belts and lead a simpler life. But no one responded.

Now, after the Arab capital has vanished and the situation has become increasingly gloomy and complicated, what will happen?

Will the United States solve his problems for President Sadat? Will the American "Marshall Plan" of which he is dreaming come about, or will the United States leave Sadat's regime exposed to storms and thus produce chaos and let the dreams of peace sink into a sea of economic and social complications?

Defiance Cannot Last

The American Marshall Plan which has been named the "Carter project" requires 15 billion dollars. President Sadat had released the idea of the project before he signed with Israel with attention not devoid of pressure from the Carter administration. However, what happened after the signing of the peace dashed the aspirations and hopes of the Egyptians, including President Sadat himself, since the American financial aid which was allocated to Egypt in exchange for its approval of the peace with Israel was no more than 2 billion dollars. Only a quarter of this aid, which was not acknowledged immediately, is economic. The remaining three-quarters is military. This indeed constitutes a burden for Egypt, and it cannot be considered an introduction to the desired relaxation of the crisis.

There are two reasons why this is a burden:

First: It will be offered for a 3-year period at a time when current economic circumstances in Egypt, especially after the cutting off of Arab aid, require a shortened period of payment, meaning that this aid offers no payment immediately.

Second: Egypt will pay 9 percent interest, a very high percentage by any standard, taking into consideration the 1-year period of indulgence and the 30 year period for payment of the loan.

Third: In addition to the fact that this aid is of a purely commercial nature, in view of its smallness it will complicate President Sadat's plans

on the planning level. He had hoped to obtain 3 billion dollars from the United States as economic aid, not including the cost of arms. Based on this hope, he was confident that the five-year plan would proceed according to its schedules and estimates.

When President built his hopes on obtaining 3 billion dollars from the United States, it had not slipped his mind that the American administration would not offer this sum alone, but part of it would be borne by both West Germany and Japan. What happened was that West Germany made it clear that it would not participate with more than 200 million. As for Japan, accumulating problems with its allies and its fear of the Arab reaction toward what was being said to the effect that it would support President Sadat's regime made it hesitate to participate, or at least to participate on the level which President Sadat had hoped.

The question for Japan is not a question of liquidity, because it has a surplus of more than 100 billion dollars. However, Japan has allies such as the United States itself and Italy who feel that Japan's duty is to help them first before it helps Egypt.

In addition, there are given characterizing the Egyptian economic system itself. We also note that Egypt thus far is still applying to international financial organizations for financing for projects it wishes to begin without giving a detailed picture of how the income is to be spent, perhaps because President Sadat wants to spend the income on the basic structure and perhaps because of a lack of planning.

As to why President Sadat wants to spend income on the basic framework, it is not because that has a quick yield or because it softens the voices of those opposed to his policy. When work begins on a new sewer system, 7 million residents of Cairo will be happy. If something were done for the telephone system and streets, more would be happy. These are the projects for the basic framework to which we refer. Such projects are not offered by investment companies but require official aid. It is unreasonable for the United States or other countries to offer aid for such projects.

The result of all of this is that President Sadat has been placed in an unenviable position.

It is said that the surprise which was not taken into account, that is, the revolution in Iran, caused flaws in the scenario which had been progressing according to plan. After these flaws appeared all links of the scenario were disturbed, and consequently President Sadat's steps were disturbed.

According to that scenario, the Palestinian revolution would be tamed, and the solution would be imposed without hearing this voice of Palestine. However, the Ayatollah Khomeini destroyed all estimates, and the Palestinian voice became supreme. All Arabs avoided President Sadat and left him alone to breathe the fire of Egyptian chauvinism, which will not solve his problem.

He was also shunned by the Moslems who suspended Egypt's membership in the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic States, which was held in Fes (Morocco) in the first week of June 1979.

An unprecedented statement issued by al-Azhar after the conference completed its work was unsuccessful, and resolutions and recommendations were adopted, one of the condemning the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and another recommending suspension of Egypt's membership, relieving the condition of hardship which afflicted the Egyptians because of what is happening to them. It was conspicuous that al-Azhar's statement expounded on the advisability of the treaty and said that it "no doubt achieved benefit for the Moslems by returning the Islamic lands to their family and also that it preserves the right of Palestinians to determine their fate and does not include any neglect of the Arabization of Jerusalem." Al-Azhar expressed that which had not been recorded in its history, comparing a resolution adopted by the ruler of Egypt, the Egyptian-Israeli peace, to the Peace of Hudaibah concluded by the Prophet Muhammad with the Quraysh in the period in which he was calling for Islam. However, none of the Islamic states expressed willingness to accept this comparison because they also found themselves rallying to isolate President Sadat's regime.

It is no secret that Saudi Arabia in the person of its strongman Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the crown prince and prime minister, was behind the resolutions which were adopted at the Fes conference. Because President Sadat was aware of that, he launched an extremely vehement and malicious campaign against the rulers of Saudi Arabia to which they replied by solidifying the international political movement aimed at achieving international isolation of President Sadat's regime.

Prince Salman ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, who seems to be one of the most prominent bright men in the Saudi palace and who has been described as having an attentive and educated political outlook, summarized the Saudi position by saying: "Does not renouncing Jerusalem and agreeing with Sadat on that mean that we can renounce Mecca and Madinah?"

Perhaps this view explains to us more clearly why the Fes conference adopted a recommendation considering Jerusalem the capital of Palestine. Also, this view explains to us more clearly Menahem Begin's statement that Israel is ready to strike the heart of Saudi territory.

The Arab alienation has begun to leave its political and economic effects on Egypt. There are Arab states which have requested the withdrawal of their capital from Egypt. There are also states which have asked Sadat to pay his debts.

President Sadat leads and plans by himself the battle to oppose those who are moving to isolate him, leaving the question of coping with the security situation to his deputy Husni Mubarak and his Minister of the Interior al-Nabawi Isma'il. They, in addition to Mansur Hasan, a successful businessman

(Elizabeth Arden's agent in Egypt) who was appointed by the president as official spokesman for the party, make up the most prominent circle in the centers of power in President Sadat's regime.

There is a simple situation which can mean that it will cause the Arab isolation of Egypt.

This summer the Arabs will not send their tourists to Egypt. To the same extent as this will inconvenience those who will turn to Europe, Tunisia and Morocco, so it will constitute a tourism catastrophe which will be felt by the average citizen in Egypt who in the past 4 years has been accustomed to being revived as a result of the large sums which Saudis and citizens have spent in Egypt in the summer season.

In addition, this will produce a shock in tourism plans and in estimates of Egypt's income from tourism. In light of 1978 figures, it is indicated that Egypt's income from tourism by 1983 will reach 1 billion dollars.

However, 1978 is not 1979. Then Egypt was the goal of Arabs. In 1979 it is isolated.

However, Egyptian officials point out that the Egyptian-Israeli peace is suitable for non-Arab tourists visiting Egypt and Israel together. This could be possible if the security situation were normal and there were no internal disturbances in Egypt or on its front with Libya; in other words, if this summer is hot in the political sense, disruptive developments might occur.

The Egyptians have begun to discover that the peace which their president concluded with Israel is a troubled peace filled with one obstacle after another.

The big question is: What can happen when the Egyptians discover that the hardships of war are better by far than the results of the peace?

There is a popular Egyptian proverb that goes: "What catches your interest runs in your blood."

That means that there is an Egyptian return to the Arabs. The leader of the return is not President Sadat, who burned all of his bridges with those who won his attention and who are of his blood. This will be the most conspicuous sight in the series of sights which cannot be forgotten.

Big bets take shape day after day, bets that the summer of 1979 will see the collapse of the attempt to achieve a settlement of the Middle East crisis which President Sadat persists in calling peace, although it is no more than a peace concluded suddenly between unequal peacemakers.

The world will not regret the collapse of this attempt, because it is a time bomb planted by Carter, Sadat and Begin. Defusing it will be far better for the world than the results of its explosion.

OPPOSITION FORCES RALLY BEHIND MEMORIAL TO MOSADDEQ

21 July Anniversary

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 17 Jul 79 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Other Parties and Organizations Also Have Invited People to Participate in These Commemorative Ceremonies"]

[Text] A number of other parties and groups, having already announced their decision to take part in the commemorative ceremonies of the 21 July event, have in the meantime called upon the people to participate in the special celebrations to be held on that occasion at the Baharestan Square and several other districts on 20 and 21 July.

Following the messages of the National Front, Cherikha-ye Feda'i-ye Khalq, the Democratic Front, Iran-e Emruz Political Group, The Society of Azerbaijanis, and the invitation extended by Ayatollah Haj Seyyed-Reza Zanjani to participate in the observance of the anniversary of 21 July, other groups too, including the Federative Republican Party of the Peoples of Iran, Vanguard Teachers' Group of Tehran, the Pan-Iranist Party, the Iran Party, National Union of the Pupils and Students of Iran, and the Besharat Group as well, asked their sympathizers and followers last night to attend the commemorative ceremonies and rallies, in order to honor the martyrs of that day.

It was announced by the National Front of Iran, that at the rally of 21 July, to be held at 6:30 p.m. at the Baharestan Square, the Front will make public its views concerning the Constitution and the convention of the Constituents Assembly, and will then bring up for discussion matters and issues dealing with present difficulties of the country, their elimination, and the ways to safeguard the results obtained by the revolution.

Iran Party:

In the statement issued by the Central Committee of the Iran Party the 21 July uprising has been defined as "a day manifesting all of the genuine forces of the Iranian nation, directed against colonialism and despotism,

as well as a day destined to complete the evolution of democracy," announcing in the meantime that the Party will attend the ceremonies to be held on 20 July at the graves of the martyrs in Ebn-e Babviyeh cemetery, as well as the rally of 21 July at the Baharestan Square.

It has further been proposed in the Party's statement that "...During the incumbency of Dr Mosaddeq's cabinet, according to the approval of the Majles, 21 July has been declared as a 'sacred national uprising day.' It is necessary that the Provisional Government of Eng Bazargan, considering itself to be one of the guardians of the national movement of Iran, proclaim 21 July as a national holiday (on the threshold of the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran), in order to give everybody the opportunity to honor the memory of all those who gave their lives for the sake of freedom and independence."

The National Union of the Pupils and Students of Iran has also issued a statement, announcing its participation in the rally of the Democratic Front of Iran, as well as in the march organized by the Cherikha-ye Feda'i-ye Khalq on the 21st of July.

Besharat Group:

The Executive Board of Besharat Group has proclaimed in a statement, that "it will take part in the commemorative ceremonies of 21 July at the side of the National Front of Iran, and in cooperation with other progressive parties and societies."

Party-members have been asked to be at Ebn-e Babviyeh cemetery at 7:00 p.m. on 20 July.

In a statement the Pan-Iranist Party has announced, that the Pan-Iranists honor the memory of this great national uprising, and that of the martyrs and participants of the event. It has called upon the people throughout the country, to observe it as a great national day.

Federative Republican Party of the Peoples of Iran:

The Federative Republican Party has also informed, that it will take part in the commemorative ceremonies to be held at the cemetery of the martyrs of 21 July.

The Vanguard Teachers' Group of Tehran, and the Political Bureau of the Revolutionary Organization have announced their participation in the commemorative ceremonies of 21 July.

The Vanguard Teachers' Group of Tehran has noted in its statement, that the "revolutionary and progressive forces" should consider it their duty to take part in the march organized to be held on the afternoon of 21 July.

Commemorating 21 July Uprising

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 18 Jul 79 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Mosaddeq's Tape-recorded 21 July Speech to Be Broadcast at Baharestan Rally"]

[Text] In support of honoring the anniversary of 21 July, a number of other groups, parties and political organizations announced yesterday, that they intend to take part in the forthcoming commemorative ceremonies.

At the rally to be held at the Baharestan Square, Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq's speech will be broadcast, delivered by him at the Hague Tribunal.

Society of Kurds Resident in Tehran:

The statement released by the Society of Kurds Resident in Tehran, reads as follows: "In order to honor the memory of the gallant martyrs of 21 July, and at the invitation of Ayatollah Zanjani, the liberal clergyman, the Society will participate in the march to be held by progressive and liberal groups."

Unity for Freedom Party:

After glorifying the 21 July uprising, the Unity for Freedom Party has noted that "The brilliant results of the gallantry of the 21 July have been achieved by the unity, sincerity and devoted cooperation of the nation's leaders against the conspiracies of colonialism, and should history be considered as a mirror to reflect and teach a lesson to people, we could undoubtedly learn a series of lessons from the events of 21 July 1952, in order to achieve victory, as much as possible, from the revolutionary developments of February 1979."

Iran-e Emruz Political Group:

The Group has announced, that a gathering will be held at 6:30 p.m. on 20 July at the Ebn-e Babviyeh cemetery, during which the memory of the martyrs of 21 July, including that of Seyyed Hoseyn Fatemi, will be revived.

Organization of Iran's Democratic Youths and Students:

On the occasion of the anniversary of 21 July, at 5:00 p.m. on 20 July, a rally will be held at the Cement Bridge, on Old Tehran and Shahr-e Rey Road. A march will then start from there towards Ebn-e Babviyeh cemetery.

Tudeh Party:

The secretariat of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran has announced, that in order to honor the anniversary of 21 July, at 5:00 p.m.

on 20 July a gathering will be organized at the Cement Bridge of the Old Tehran and Shahr-e Rey Road, and then they will proceed to the cemetery of Ebn-e Babviyeh.

Independent Center of the Teachers of Tehran:

The Center has announced that it will participate in the commemorative ceremonies honoring the martyrs of 21 July.

Broadcast of Mosaddeq's Tape-recorded Speech:

It was announced today by Dr Sa'id Fatemi, leader of the Political Group of Iran, that Dr Mosaddeq's message on the victory achieved by the Iranian nation on 21 July 1952, and his speech delivered at the Hague Tribunal, will be heard after 26 years at the rally to be held at the Baharestan Square on 21 July.

Protest Against Radio-TV by the National Front:

Asghar Parsa, spokesman of the National Front, discussing last night the programs to be implemented on 21 July in commemoration of the anniversary of 21 July 1952, announced that the people participating in the rally were to gather at the Cement Bridge on Old Shah-'Abdol-'Azim Road, and will then move to Ebn-e Babviyeh cemetery, to place wreaths on the martyrs' graves.

Parsa added: "I regret to say in protest, that despite all claims concerning the freedom of the mass media, any news-items connected with the National Front are not being broadcast, televised and published by the radio, the TV, and the PARS News Agency."

Parsa mentioned also, that at the rally organized by the National Front at the Baharestan Square on 21 July, Dr Sanjabi will discuss the views of the National Front concerning various issues of the country.

Freedom-loving Party of Iran:

The statement released by this Party reads as follows:

"For the purpose of honoring the anniversary of the historic day of 21 July--one of the most glorious days of the national movement era of Iran--the Freedom-loving Party of Iran will join other national forces at the rally to be held at the Baharestan Square, to revive the memory of the martyrs who gave their lives for the freedom of the country."

Shari'at-Madari Praises Mosaddeq

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 19 Jul 79 p 1

[Article: "Moslem People's Republican Party Invites Iranian Nation to Commemorate the Anniversary of 21 July"]

[Text] It was announced last night by the spokesman of the Moslem People's Republican Party that it will pay tribute to the commemorative ceremonies of 21 July by participating in them, and would also like to call on the people to spare no efforts to honor the event as gloriously as possible.

The statement of the Moslem People's Republican Party reads as follows: "Mosaddeq was a great personality, and I support him. "This is a statement made by the Great Ayatollah Shari'at-madari.

Whenever determined by the Iranian nation, it has been capable of inflicting a heavy blow on anti-popular and imperialistic forces by virtue of its unity.

The 21 July uprising, in support of the anti-despotic, anti-imperialistic and anti-reactionary policies of the heroic Mosaddeq, is an evident example of such an integrated upheaval.

The Moslem People's Republican Party, emphasizing the necessity of unity of forces--which guarantees the victory of the Iranian nation over reactionary movements--pays tribute to this glorious day, and calls upon the Iranian nation to observe this historic event in the best way possible, and to manifest its national and religious maturity.

Further Preparations for 21 July

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 19 Jul 79 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Workers of Eighty Factories to Join the March of 21 July"]

[Excerpts] Pursuant to release of statements by tens of parties and political groups and organizations calling upon their members, sympathizers and other people as well to attend the commemorative ceremonies to be held on the occasion of the anniversary of the 21 July uprising of 1952, the spokesman of the Commemorative Committee announced last night, that the workers of 80 factories and plants were to take part in the march to be held during the ceremonies. In addition to the organizations which have already announced their resolution to participate in the rallies, several other groups, mentioned below, have also published statements, announcing their participation.

Organization of Nationalist Officers of Iran:

The Executive Board of the Organization of Nationalist Officers of Iran [SAM: Sazeman-e Afsaran-e Melli-ye Iran] has announced, that in

response to the proclamation of Ayatollah Zanjani, the members of the Organization are asked to participate in the rally to be held at the Baharestan Square.

People's Party of Iran:

The Party has asked all "anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, and patriotic strugglers of Iran" to join the rallies to be held on 21 July at Ebn-e Babviyeh cemetery and Baharestan Square.

Society of Freedom:

In its statement the Society has given a brief account of the events of the past, as a result of which Qavam-Saltaneh, the then Prime Minister, was toppled by the people, and Mosaddeq assumed the premiership once again on 21 July 1952, as "the most radical democrat, and the most unmatched leader of the anti-imperialistic struggles of the people of Iran."

Other groups and parties which are to participate in the rallies and marches to be held on the occasion of the commemoration of 21 July 1952 are as follows:

Socialist Workers' Party
Communist Party of Workers and Peasants of Iran
Organization of Unity of Struggle for Creation of Workers' Party
Kordestan Democrat Party [Tehran Organization]
Revolutionary Union of Struggling Women
Moslem Students' Society of University of Science and Industries
Republican Party
Union of Workers and Peasants
Union of Toilers of Azerbaijan [Tehran Branch]
'Adalat [Justice] Society of Leftist Unity

According to the spokesman of the NIOC, the 21 July uprising anniversary will be observed on 21 July at the conference-hall of the Company, during which Eng Kazem Hasibi, high consultant of the NIOC, and Daryush Foruhar will deliver speeches. The program will be sponsored by the NIOC Employees' Council.

The 21 July uprising anniversary will be observed also by the employees' Council of the Radio-TV, "in conformity with the Iranian nation."

The Commemorative Committee of 21 July has issued a statement, informing the public that every party, group and organization, with no discrimination whatsoever, could participate in the ceremonies as a sign of "national gratitude" to those who gave their lives for the sake of the country.

Following are the names of the factories and corporations, the employees and workers of which are to take part in the commemorative ceremonies and

rallies to be held on the occasion of the anniversary of 21 July uprising:

Workers of Tehran refineries
Tehran brick-kilns
Workers of Tehran Meat Corporation
Railroad personnel
Communications personnel
Workers of Tailors' Syndicate
Workers of Tehran Power Station
Workers of Glass Industries
Melli Shoe Corporation
Minu Corporation
Iran China Industries
Ziba Gherghereh Corporation
Zagros Corporation
Pushak-e Iran Clothing Corporation
Karaj Sugar Plant
Jehan-e Chit Factory
Union of Tehran Printing Press Shops
Leyland Motor Corporation
...and a number of other firms and plants

Tudeh Party March Hindered

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 21 Jul 79 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Great Rally Held in Tehran Today for 21 July Uprising"]

[Excerpts] As a result of the statements concerning the necessity of consolidation of efforts, issued by Ayatollah Taleqani and Ayatollah Zanjani, the National Democratic Front, as well as the Cherikhave Feda'i-ye Khalq organization agreed to join the demonstrations and rallies planned to be held at the Baharestan Square. Thus, complete unity was created among the demonstrators and participants on 21 July. The message released by Ayatollah Taleqani read in part: "Our revolution should, at this sensitive historic moment, learn from Dr Mosaddeq a lesson how to wage a struggle against reactionary movements. The Islamic revolution should be equipped and nourished with progressive and not reactionary Islamic culture, for, otherwise, reactionary moves would undermine and weaken the very existence of our revolution.

Confrontation Between Tudeh Party and Opponents:

Members and sympathizers of the Tudeh Party gathered at the Cement Bridge at 5:30 p.m. in order to proceed to the martyrs' graveyard at Ebn-e Bab-viyeh cemetery. During the march, when they had almost reached the cemetery, all of a sudden they were confronted with a group of people chanting

"The only party is God's Party, and the only leader is Ruhollah [Khomeyni]."
The road was thus blocked, and then Mohammad-'Ali 'Amu'i, a member of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, made a speech, warning the audience of the conspiracies worked out by imperialist agents, aimed at undermining the unity of the nation.

Then a resolution was read by another member of the Tudeh Party, connected with the aims of their march and rally.

By the intervention of guardians the assault unleashed by opponents was prevented, and no confrontation occurred between the two groups.

CSO: 4906

'LE FIGARO' CITES EXILED IRANIANS ON CONCERTED OPPOSITION TO KHOMEYNI

Paris LE FIGARO in French 31 Jul 79 pp 1, 3 LD

[Article by Zhierry Desjardins: "Madness in Power"]

[Text] Will members of the Iranian opposition in exile organize themselves into a united front against the Ayatollah? They may well do so. In the past few days a number of personalities of the former regime--and even members of the former opposition--who have managed to elude Khomeyni's execution squads have reappeared in Paris, London, Rome and Geneva.

First they had to get their second wind. This is understandable. A former minister had to hide in a friend's home in the center of Tehran for 5 months while Islamic committees were looking for him everywhere. He then moved to Kordestan, where he hid for an additional few weeks before crossing the Turkish border, "since he felt that he could no longer put his friends at risk." Another, with a price on his head, sought refuge with his tribe in the country's central region before reaching--in disguise--the gulf coast and taking a fast boat to Dubai, whence he flew to Europe, and so forth.

Scores of former ministers, imperial palace officials and generals and also former opponents of the Shah's regime--who nonetheless do not like the new dictatorship--have managed to flee Iran, often in incredible circumstances. They wanted to save their lives, flee the Islamic terror, in some cases forget everything and start a new life abroad. However, once they met and told one another what they had seen and began receiving information about events back home, then they realized that they must not abandon their country forever.

A former minister told me yesterday: "The news which is reaching us from Tehran is appalling. Madness reigns--and a bloodthirsty madness at that. The country has been ruined completely. Absolute anarchy is prevailing in the provinces.

"I have seen all this with my own eyes, even in Kordestan. All villages are up in arms and no one recognizes any authority. A similar situation prevails in Azarbayjan, Baluchestan and Turkmenistan. In the oil regions, the communists have the arms and the power.

"However, it is even worse in Tehran and the major cities. Poor Bazargan is completely powerless. In all districts local criminals are ruling by terror, apparently on Khomeyni's behalf.

"Ramadan, which started a few days ago, provided the worst fanatics with a pretext for imposing their law. Music has been banned throughout the country and the wearing of the chador has again been made obligatory everywhere. Mass arrests are being made and torture is being used in prisons with unprecedented refinements of cruelty.

"Terror prevails, the country is disintegrating and the economy has collapsed. We who are fortunate enough to be abroad must take counteraction. Our unfortunate compatriots are awaiting some action on our part."

Some former officials have, therefore, decided to "do something" but have so far not joined forces.

Furthermore, some former generals residing in London and Paris have formed a group of "free officers." They claim to be able to rely on some 100,000 former soldiers who have vanished into thin air with their arms and equipment since February 1979. They also assert that they have two possible bridgeheads, including the Khoramshahr region where they apparently still have many friends in the army and also in the navy, which has not been affected by the revolution.

These free officers have recently contacted former Savak officers who sought refuge in Israel and are apparently also preparing something. However, it is not at all clear how former Savak officials could even now make people forget their sinister past.

Shah's Depression

Division and incoherence prevail among the politicians. The Shah's former ministers are still waiting for a word from the exiled monarch. They assert that the emperor has now emerged from his bout of depression and that in recent days he has decided to counterattack "at his people's request."

As for the liberals, they are unsure whom they should approach. It has been said that Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin, whose reputation has largely contributed to the downfall of the dynasty, has put herself at the disposal of liberals who opposed her for years. She has a lot of money, extensive relations and a formidable energy which could be useful. However, she would be a very discreditable ally.

In fact, liberals who could claim to have a certain degree of legality on their side and boast of having been democrats of long standing now hope to be able to bring together under their leadership as many currents of national opinion as possible, arouse new hope in Iran itself and win the support of as yet uncommitted soldiers. However, as one of them stated, "in order to

attempt anything it is necessary not only to represent the new hopes of an Iranian people still traumatized by what they have gone through but also to secure the support of the army and, naturally, that of the communists, along with the Americans' approval and the complicity of one of the countries bordering Iran."

This is probably an accurate analysis of the situation, but it seems that 6 months after the Ayatollah's arrival in Tehran it has become too late for analyses. This has been realized in Mexico and in France.

CSO: 4800

IRAN

PARIS CITES BAKHTIAR ON IRAN, COMMENTS ON PREVIOUS WHEREABOUTS

Paris Domestic Service in French 1700 GMT 31 Jul 79 LD

[Excerpts] [Announcer] France is the land of refuge par excellence and no mistake. When Shahpur Bakhtiar was in power in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeyni was a refugee in Neuville-le-Chateau near Paris. Today, it's exactly the other way round: The Ayatollah is in power in Tehran, and Shahpur Bakhtiar is in France.

Shahpur Bakhtiar directed his criticism at the Islamic revolution which, he said, is leading Iran into chaos and disaster!

[Bakhtiar--begin recording] The losses we have sustained at present exceed everything that was squandered and stolen during the past 25 years. What is sad is that to get the country going again, to make the factories work again, to put some order into that chaos-- if I can put it that way--will inevitably take years and years.

(Yes,) [apparently in response to a question which is not in the recording]. It was so easy. If, last February, collaboration could have been set up between the religious leaders--I am talking about the ones who truly understand Iran's problems such as Shari'at-Madari and Taleqani, or personalities of that kind--no political or religious personality can get the country going again. [Sentence as heard] It is extremely difficult to see Iran finding its economic and social footing again.

We have no state, so we have no guarantees and no security. In every corner there is a sort of feudal power, and these feudal powers clash with each other and occasionally kill each other; the state is floundering. What you are seeing in Iran is the result of the fact that there is no guiding idea, no central idea round which what is called the revolution can focus.

The revolution has turned into chaos, and the chaos is continuing. [End recording]

[Yves-Paul Vincent of French Radio comments on Bakhtiar's reappearance]

[Announcer] Well, the thousand-franc question is: Where was he?

[French radio correspondent Yves-Paul Vincent] Well, officially, that is a mystery. But all the same, I can reveal to you that only 1 and 1/2 months ago Shahpur Bakhtiar was in Iran, outside Tehran, and very probably with the Bakhtiari tribe in the southwest of the country. So it was from (right in the heart) of Iran that he got that clandestine cassette to the AFP office in Tehran denouncing the Islamic republic, and just a few days before the referendum put on by Khomeyni.

I can also tell you that he arrived in France 3 or 4 days ago and that he has no intention of going back to Iran as long as conditions of freedom and security are not assured there, and even if--to theorize--Mehdi Bazargan invites him there.

[Announcer] For their part, the French authorities explain that Shahpur Bakhtiar has the status of a private visitor. He has been authorized to stay in France for 3 months, following which he could ask for a residence permit. As long as he does not commit a breach of the peace, Shahpur Bakhtiar can make whatever statements he likes; in other words, he is in exactly the same boat as Ayatollah Khomeyni was in 6 months ago.

CSO: 4800

IRAN

NEWSPAPER CHIEF EDITOR'S PROPERTY SEIZED

Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1700 GMT 26 Jul 79 LD

[Text] We read in KEYHAN: Yesterday all the property of Abdur-Rasul Azimi, the chief editor of PEYGHAM-E EMRUZ, who was the former deputy of the now defunct Majlis and a member of the association of jurists, was seized and confiscated by the members of the Revolutionary Guards Corps of District No. 1 in Tehran. While searching the house of the chief editor of PEYGHAM-E EMRUZ, a large number of secret papers and documents about his cooperation with the members of the family of the deposed shah, especially Ahmad-Reza Pahlavi and some documents about his misuse of funds in various government departments, were discovered. These documents indicate that Azimi was a special source of news to Ahmad-Reza Pahlavi. He also had close relations with the executed Mansur Rohani [the former minister of agriculture] as well as Sharif Enani, Nasiri [former head of Savak who was executed], Ayadi [personal physician of the shah] (?Hoshabr) Yazdani [a Baha'i businessman] and the executed Khorram [another famous businessman].

In the house of Abdur-Rasul Azimi, a great deal of Iranian money, foreign exchange, foreign drinks, precious carpets and other household goods as well as some photographs of Azimi with the deposed shah and his family and also some Hedayat medals, first, second and third class and their relevant certificates and some signed cheques in various amounts were found. A four-storey building on General Gharani street whose first floor was used as his office was also confiscated. The confiscation of the property of the chief editor of PEYGHAM-E EMRUZ is due to the fact that Azimi has fled the country and that he has some outstanding debts to the government and private creditors.

CSC: 4906

STRIKING WORKERS HURT IN TEHRAN FACTORY SHOOTING

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 23 Jul 79 p 2 LD

[Unattributed report: "Six Persons Wounded in Shooting by Komiteh on Striking Workers"]

[Text] Over 100 dismissed workers of the American Brown and Roote Company yesterday morning staged a sit-in on company premises claiming payment of wages and allowances and took hostage three members of the company staff. The striking workers' representative told AYANDEGAN: "Brown and Roote belonged to the Americans, who left while the revolution was taking place. Meanwhile the navy has undertaken the management of company affairs!"

He added: "The company was working in Chahbahar, building the harbor for the military base, but the company's work began to decrease about 8 months ago and they sacked the workers. We have been pursuing our claims and the payment of wages for some of the workers for over 2 months."

One of the hostages, said to be a member of the joint Imam-Madani Committee, said: "We needed more time to look into the workers' demands. I am now doing this, and in 4 days their claims will be met."

The latest news at 0100 was that, following the continuation of the Brown and Roote sit-in, several members of the Area 3 Komiteh went to the place where the strike was being held and, in order to expel the strikers from the premises, opened fire. Six persons were wounded in the shooting, and they are now in the Tehran clinic.

Yesterday Mahmud Jahangiri, a member of the Komiteh for Area 3, confirmed to AYANDEGAN that members of the Komiteh had been carrying official permits and pointed out that the firing had first come from the workers; the Komiteh officials had then returned the fire.

Meanwhile, workers in front of the Tehran clinic told AYANDEGAN that they had not begun to fire at all, and that it was the Komiteh members who had opened fire on the strikers without any warning.

IRAN

CONTRACT FOR SWEDISH TRANSFORMERS TO BE HONORED

Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 6 Aug 79 LD

[Text] Following a report by the French News Agency about Iran's purchase of 18 transformers at a price of 2.03 billion rials, engineer 'Abbas Taj, the minister of energy, said today in a Paris interview:

Before the revolution, the Iranian Government, after studying various tenders, signed a contract with a Swedish company for the purchase of 18 transformers for installation at electricity posts. During and after the revolution, as no budget had been set aside by the Iranian Government for their purchase, the contract laid dormant and was not followed up by either party.

'Abbas Taj said: The Iranian Government is now ready to honor its obligation concerning this contract but the company refuses, citing the change in price due to the passage of time as the reason for its refusal.

The energy minister concluded: At the moment, we are continuing our discussion so that we can find a solution and can reach agreement.

CSO: 4906

'DAWN': RCD DID NOT DESERVE INGLORIOUS END

Karachi DAWN in English 7 Aug 79 p 7 BK

[Editorial: "An Inglorious End"]

[Text] The Iranian Foreign Office has confirmed the impending demise of the RCD [Regional Cooperative Development]. Last week, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi had hinted that the organisation's fate was to be clarified. Now he has categorically stated that since it is merely a "centre for collecting and distributing funds", the RCD is to be terminated. That the RCD has failed to realise its full potential has been acknowledged repeatedly by the leaders of the three member-countries and we have, in these columns, emphasised again and again the need for greater political will if the RCD was to be made an effective instrument for closer economic and cultural cooperation between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Hence, any disappointment expressed regarding the lack of progress by the RCD is not only understandable but also justified. After fourteen years of colourless existence which has hardly made any impact on the economies of the three member-countries the RCD has no doubt begun to look quite redundant to many people. But its failure to get off to a good start notwithstanding, the RCD did not deserve such an inglorious end. Perhaps representatives from the three countries which are linked together in this organisation could have met to undertake a tripartite review of its working and commitments before finally deciding what was to become of it. If it is recalled that the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan have met 21 times in formal session and five RCD summits have been held since 1964, few, if any, can criticise the organisation for lack of communications at the official level. Hence, Dr Yazdi's disclosure last week that the fate of the RCD was to be decided and then the unilateral confirmation of the decision to terminate the organisation must have taken observers by surprise. What now remains, apparently, is the formal dissolution which has been deferred until Pakistan has reviewed the decision.

It is to be assumed that cooperation between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan at the economic and cultural level will continue independently of the RCD. The economic, ethnic, cultural and strategic compulsions for cooperation among the countries of this region have existed for long, irrespective of

the governments in power in the three states. It seems unlikely that any of the RCD members would ignore these factors and the need for closer ties with its neighbours in the region. In view of such imperatives for cooperation, it is all the more regrettable that the RCD failed to achieve any substantial progress in trade, joint ventures, communications and cultural exchanges. This is, however, to be attributed not to any innate deficiencies in the organisation but to the lack of political will among its members. They repeatedly emphasised the need for greater cooperation but failed to implement their pious declarations. For all practical purposes the RCD has proved a non-starter. Yet it cannot be denied that regional economic cooperation is something which technologically under-developed countries badly need. This is even more crucial if they possess small or medium-sized national markets. Even prosperous developed countries have found it a tempting proposition to create larger markets. Rather than terminating the institutional framework altogether, the three countries could have considered leaving the organisation in suspended animation until circumstances became more favourable for considering whether it was possible to revitalise and expand it. However, it is no use crying over spilt milk. The expected end of the tripartite economic arrangement should not detract from the importance of bilateral cooperation on the basis of reciprocity and equal benefit between the countries belonging to what has been the RCD region.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

RADIO, TELEVISION PROGRAMMING--There were reports in yesterday's newspapers that radio and television programs in Fars Province had been suspended. Correspondent in Shiraz has obtained the following correction concerning these reports: Employees of the production unit of the Fars Radio and Television organization have gone on strike for 15 days. During this period programs specially produced for the holy month of Ramadan and television news broadcasts will be televised each day over the Fars station of the profile of the Iranian Islamic Republic. Fars radio programs will also continue as usual. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0930 GMT 25 Jul 79 LD]

'MOJAHED' PUBLICATION--The Mojahedin-e Khalq organization has begun publishing a publication called MOJAHED. [Summary] [Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 24 Jul 79 p 3 LD]

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR APPOINTED--Following the resignation of Sadeqi Firuzabadi, the revolution's public prosecutor in Bushehr province, ('Abbas) Mahmud Mahtumi has been appointed and started work as the Islamic revolution public prosecutor in Bushehr province by Mehdi Hadavi the Iranian Islamic revolution's prosecutor general. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 26 Jul 79 LD]

SUSPECTED RABIES--Following the rumor about the rabies epidemic in Masandaran today, Dr Sadr (Mirbagheri), director of the department of veterinary medicine in Gilan Province, speaking to a PARS News Agency reporter in Rasht, warned the inhabitants and cattle breeders in Gilan region, saying: During the past few days we have observed a few suspected cases of rabies in Lahijan. So far, the epidemic of this disease has only been observed in isolated cases [as heard], but according to the report by veterinary experts, it is possible that the disease may spread to other cities in Gilan. Dr (Mirbagheri) emphasized that veterinary experts in the province will soon issue relevant hygiene instructions to cattle breeders through the mass media. He also asked all cattle breeders and the inhabitants of Gilan Province that if they notice any signs of rabies in their cattle, they should immediately report it to their nearest veterinary centers so that the further spread of this disease may be checked. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1430 GMT 2 Aug 79 LD]

POLICE OFFICER SENTENCED, EXECUTED--According to a report by a correspondent of the central news bureau, the Urumiyeh Islamic Revolutionary Court held a session yesterday, and after a trial and hearing witnesses and plaintiffs, sentenced Najaf Tahmasbzadeh, a police officer from Miando Ab to death for waging war against God, for willful murder of martyr Gholamreza Forughi, and for beating and injuring other mojahedin. The death sentence was carried out at dawn today. The court also ordered that 25,000 rials a month be paid to his legal heirs. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0930 GMT 2 Aug 79 LD]

AMBASSADOR TO POLAND--The Islamic Republic of Iran's ambassador to the People's Republic of Poland has been appointed. According to a central news bureau report Dr Yazdi has appointed Mohammad Purqazi as ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Warsaw. He is an oldtime diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0930 GMT 28 Jul 79 LD]

AMBASSADOR TO RIYADH--His Royal Highness Amir Sa'ud al-Faysal, foreign minister, received this evening Mohammad Javad Rabbani, the new ambassador of Iran to the kingdom. The ambassador handed his Royal Highness Sa'ud a copy of his credentials in preparation for the honor of meeting His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, to whom he will present his credentials. [Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 1 Aug 79 LD]

USSR-IRAN CONTRACT--The Soviet Union has received an order from Iran for the construction of an 800-MW power plant consisting of four 200-MW power units. The agreement also provides for the co-participation of Poland and Hungary in this construction. The future power plant will operate for the needs of the large industrial center arising around Esfahan. [Text] [Warsaw INWESTYCJE I BUDOWNICTWO in Polish No 6, Jun 79 p 30]

CSO: 2600

INDUSTRY'S ROLE IN THE UNIFICATION PLAN DISCUSSED

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 19 Jun 79 p 3

[Article by Shihab Ahmath: "Industry...on the Road to the State of Unity"]

[Text] The joint labor pact gave particular interest to the economic relations between the two brother regions, Iraq and Syria, and displayed this interest by forming the "Committee on Economic Affairs and Professional Cooperation," emanating from the Joint Higher Political Bureau.

The economic meeting between the two regions, represented by economic and industrial unification, is the solid base on which may be built the State of Unity. Following the agreement of political points of view, a planned economy and joint economic cooperation become the most outstanding issue on the road to economic unification and the construction of one Arab state.

Based on this conviction, the Committee on Economic Affairs and Professional Cooperation set out to realize these goals in all economic and professional fields, as was written in the text of the historic pact.

Through this direction, the question of industrial unification between Iraq and Syria manifested itself as of great importance on this road, for industrial unification is the pillar of economic unity, and the prosperity and flourishing of the one people.

The land of Iraq and Syria is certainly suitable for setting up an advanced industrial entity depending on the power the land possesses to nourish industry with all the raw materials and working forces it needs. It is able to create distinction in the industrial field.

The period which followed the issuance of the joint national labor pact witnessed great and concentrated activity by the Committee on Economic Affairs and its joint committees, and studied the aspects of industrial unification between the two regions. Perhaps the most important result of the activities of this period is the serious direction toward studying the extent of all given possibilities for industrial planning and cooperation, in aiming for unification in industry. The committee did not adopt any

extemporaneous resolutions, or any steps without wide and probing discussion. The resolutions and steps that were adopted came as the ripe fruit of the spent and exhausted efforts of the professional agencies specializing in industrial affairs and the requisites of industrial unification. In this, officials representing all branches of industry in Iraq and Syria participated, and arrived at clear agreements and resolutions having an effective influence on the creation of a firm base for the State of Unity.

During the discussions of the Committee of Economic Affairs and Professional Cooperation which took place in Damascus last January, Iraq presented a complete and comprehensive labor paper for all expected developments between the two regions. Agreement was reached on the establishment of a number of joint projects and mutually complementary projects between the two regions. Agreement was reached on economic planning and cooperation in the area of the exchange of primary and secondary materials and final production in accordance with existing and future demand, as well as a reliance on the principle of specialization in production in the existing projects, on the basis of unification, and the exchange of technical information and expertise to facilitate the operation of defining the destiny of the union, and to unify the specifications of production, and analogous specifications with the goal of positing the principle of specialization in application.

Agreement was clearly reached on the creation of a united strategy in industry. The discussions between the two sides also set as a goal the adoption of practical measures for economic systematization among the methods of planning. Through these discussions, a Central Agency for Joint Planning between the two regions was formed, and the organizational frameworks were unified, in order to set down the foundations and methods on which the coming five-year plan in the two regions will focus.

The meetings of the Joint Economic Committee, which took place in Baghdad and Damascus, resulted in the signing of a number of agreements and official reports containing the bases of cooperation and unification between the two regions in most economic fields, and in the forefront, unification in the industrial sector.

In order to create a sort of specialization in studying the matters presented before the officials concerning industrial unification between Iraq and Syria, six joint branch committees have been formed, of which each one specializes in a particular branch of industry, to prepare special studies on unification in the sphere of local production within the framework of the specialization, and to draw up future plans for expansion, and to put an end to the constrictions which each of these branches faces, and to suggest the implementation of studies for joint projects. For this purpose, industrial committees have been formed, specializing in engineering and chemical industries, spinning and weaving, construction materials, and electrical power.

Useful studies have been completed on the capacity of the two regions in the area of food industries, to cover part of the base of the need of the market, and to limit the scope of proposed expansion.

The branch committees strove diligently to complete their tasks, and each of them presented a detailed study by which they identified the possibilities of creating industrial unification between the two regions within a clear united framework, in light of the Joint National Labor Pact.

The studies of the committees were supported by firm scientific concepts for defining the aspects of industrial specialization and joint investment in the area of setting up new projects, and a study of the economic gain of the existing projects, and the possibility of increasing raw materials for that specialization, and the technical skills and specialized practical expertise.

Throughout the negotiations, the Iraqi side persistently believed in the importance of setting up new joint industrial projects with the goal of responding to the need of both regions for many industrial products, that the studies connected with those projects should adopt the view of the united state and the national concept in the economic and technical dimensions.

The Iraqi side was interested in carrying out studies connected with the proposed joint projects, as well as in unifying future plans, and in outlining the unification of national plans for the years 1981-1986. One of the results achieved in this area is the arrival at clear and studied concepts of the possibility of setting up joint industrial projects between the two regions in the area of cement and glass manufacture.

Wide possibilities appeared for setting up a number of chemical projects, and projects for fertilizer, paper, automobile tires and large trucks.

The existence of potentialities also became clear for setting up a joint project for the production of sodium carbonate. A study has also been carried out to use the products of the petrochemical plant currently under construction by Iraq in Basra as primary materials in the complementary industries in the Syrian region.

It is important that we mention on this subject that the specialized committees agreed that there are wide possibilities in both regions for supplying these industrial projects with the primary materials which they need, and in a way that will insure complete satisfaction in their construction, success and prosperity.

The two regions likewise agreed on more cooperation and planning between them in the leather industries, in that a complete and public survey will be carried out of the productive capabilities in the tanning and footwear factories. An agreement was reached on the exchange of information and expertise, and the organization of programs for experts and professionals in both regions to visit for employment in the corresponding factories, with the goal of benefitting from the human capabilities in the area of leather industry, and for the setting up of scientific circles and joint expositions, and for arranging national Arab conventions and unions. It was decided

that work would be done on unifying technical terms, labor organizations, the system of rewards and discipline, the systems of accounts, expenses and administrative information, preparation of joint studies, and cooperation in carrying out important experiments aiming to develop new forms of labor and production. The two sides agreed that the Iraqi region will export 1 million sheep and goat skin pieces annually, to cover the leather factories in the Syrian region. It was also agreed that a number of bases would be set up for planning in the industry of manufactured and reinforced leather.

The joint committee studied a number of ways of connecting in the area of producing electrical energy, with the goal of linking the main networks with the chief energy production stations, and to invest the sources of electrical energy, of which both regions are in great need, in an organized fashion.

In order to identify all the factors involved in unification in the engineering industries, it was decided to form a number of committees for this purpose, specializing in the industries of aluminum, iron and steel, electrical lamps, electric motors, telephone and electric wires, refrigerators, gas and electric stoves, and automobile, railroad car and tractor bodies.

Throughout these discussions, both sides sought to unify and arrange the systems and organizational frameworks for the various industrial sectors, especially the organization of projects linked with public establishments, according to the national resolution and classification for these industries.

Both sides agreed to set up a managing center in various industrial branches, in order to meet the need of both regions for technical cadres and specializations, with the goal of changing these centers into joint centers of management. It was also agreed that direct meetings would take place between the specialized institutes and centers of study and the centers for management within the industrial sector, in order to draw up plans and exchange information, to arrive at a united labor in the area of its activity, in order to unify the program in preparation for the unification of these installations.

The creative and exhaustive efforts spent for the formation of the requisites of economic planning, with the goal of industrial unification between Iraq and Syria, have clearly expressed the deep and correct esteem of the role represented by the industry in creating the State of Unity. This state, which our people desires to be a state of advanced technological industry, is made strong by the faculty of the people for endurance, life and victory.

SEAPORT EXPANSION, INCREASED CAPACITY ANNOUNCED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 24 Jul 79 p 2

[Article by Ibtisam Abbas: "Iraqi Seaport Expansions]

[Text]

Basrah, the only Iraqi City situated on the sea has a great commercial significance since its foundation in the early Islamic era due to its geographical position overlooking the Arab Gulf, the Arab Sea and the adjacent areas on one hand, and its connection with other parts of Iraq through the two rivers "Tigris" and "Euphrates" which meet each other at the same City.

In 1919, this Seaport was changed from the military management to the civil administration according to which the Basrah Port Directorate was emerged.

In 1956, a new law of the Iraqi Ports Administration was issued followed by another in 1978 which changed that Administration into an Establishment due to its expanded activities.

PORTS DEVELOPMENT

The problem of developing the sea ports had emerged, since the end of the First World War, together with its transformation from a military into a commercial port. So, some of the prerequisites of expanding these ports were building new premises and importing new needed equipments to run the ports.

Despite the fact that ports are one of the oldest governmental institutions but they underwent slight development in their set-up prior to 14 July Revolution 1958. These were only the Maqal

Port which constituted nine wooden wharves, Ashar Wooden Wharf and Fao Oil Exporting Quay which were characterized by their old commercial nature and the limitation of their capacities as well as the usage of primitive means of freighting and unloading.

After 1958, these means were modernized through introducing mechanization to the ports wharves, four concrete quays were built in Ma'qal Port and the first three wharves in Um Qaser Port.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENT

Iraqi ports had witnessed radical changes after 17 July revolution 1968 especially in the early seventies as scientific studies were adopted in planning the construction of ports and increasing their capacities. Certain means were followed as well to develop these ports such as the mobilization of all working power, caring for training and qualifying of workers, using modern means in freighting and unloading, changing wooden wharves into concrete ones, coordinating with the importing quarters to organize the movement of exportation and importation processes laying down plans for expanding the activities of the ports to meet the prerequisites of the National Development Plan... etc.

URGENT STEPS

Urgent steps were taken such as forming a High Coordination Committee with the Transportation Ministry Undersecretary as its Head by a Decree from the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

The tasks of this Committee are to coordinate works among all governmental institutions and the control of transportation means in the country including the ports.

In addition to that, certain procedures were taken to facilitate the work of ports and avoiding unnecessary routines in their activities.

New quays were built in the Area of Abu-Flus on Shatt-el-Arab bank.

LONG-RANGE PLANS

Procedures on the long run were adopted such as erecting new ports and wharves due to the expansion of the importing and exporting activities, building specialized wharves equipped with modern machines, deepening marine canals in accordance with the size of mooring ships, providing main storage silos outside the ports area, developing the planning organs and preparing detailed studies and statistics in order to determine the needed capacities in the present National Development Plan... etc.

In the near future, the present plans aim at increasing ports capacities to reach six million tons of ordinary goods and eight million tons of specific goods in 1980 as well as to expand the ports with a development rate of 16% during the following years.

At the second half of last year, five quays were established in Khour-al-Zubair Port. Three of them for exporting fertilizers and two for petro-chemical and other products. These wharves will be provided with modern equipments including four cranes with a capacity of 150—600 ton per hour. While ten wharves will be erected on the southern side of Um-Qaser River for freighting and unloading ordinary commercial goods.

Needless to mention that all ports development plans are undergoing great coordination with other governmental establishment's activities especially the industrial and transportation ones.

IRAQ

BRIEFS

COMMITMENT TO SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS--Amman, 8 August--An official source in the Iraqi Embassy in Amman stated today that the Iraqi authorities stress that the latest conspiracy against the existing regime in Iraq and the connection of the conspirators to a certain Arab party will not affect Iraq's position on the recent Arab summit resolutions or the positive atmosphere the Arab summit has established. Iraq considers itself fully responsible for the success of these resolutions. Iraq also is fully concerned to settle its commitments which resulted from the Arab summit conference. The source added: As part of its pan-Arab (Qawmiyah) commitments, Iraq has so far paid \$346,666,664 out of \$520 million allocated by the Baghdad summit conference. Syria has so far received \$183,237,000; Jordan \$128,808,533; the PLO \$14,857,555; and the special fund for the steadfastness of the Arab people in the occupied territories, which has chosen the Central Bank of Jordan as its headquarters, \$9,905,422. [all figures as received] The source concluded: Iraq will settle the last installment of its pan-Arab and other commitments on the set dates. [Text] [Amman JNA in Arabic 1510 GMT 8 Aug 79 JN]

CSO: 4802

ISRAELI ROLE IN AUTONOMY TALKS REVIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Jun 79 p 9

[Article by Ze'ev Shif: "From the Left Foot to the Right Foot"]

[Text] The Israeli team for the autonomy negotiations started out with a crying lack of coordination, on its left foot. The two central ministers on the team--the two who had acquired much experience in negotiating with the Egyptians--committed acts of boycott and animosity toward their fellow team-members. Weizman and Dayan "did them a favor" by going to Alexandria. Today it appears that Minister Dayan regrets that he rejected the prime minister's proposal that he become the leader of the autonomy negotiations. At that time Dayan wanted the leadership on his own conditions. Now it is too late.

Even though Dr Burg has no experience in dealing with such matters, no one is going to move him out of his post as chairman against his will, unless he fails decisively. The Foreign Office is now behaving as if it wanted to enjoy two worlds, to be at the center of things and yet not accept any responsibility. It has behaved like that in other matters connected with the negotiations. When they were dealing with autonomy in the committee headed by Dr Ben-'Elishar, the Foreign Office people said that their representatives would not take part in the committee, although Mr Yosef Tchehanover, general manager of the Office, was chairman of one of the subcommittees. Even today there are signs--although Dayan refrains from full participation--that the Office is seeking to preserve its link with the committee.

Minister Weizman succeeded in obtaining an absolute release from membership on the negotiations committee, but he instructed his Office to provide all services to Dr Burg. General Tamir remains a member of the committee by official appointment. Nevertheless there are bitter feelings toward Weizman on the committee. Many of the committee members were offended by his behavior. "Toward the Egyptians he demonstrates friendship, but toward his Israeli comrades he shows contempt," one of the ministers said to me. After Weizman's demonstration at the Lod airport when the Egyptian delegation arrived, Dr Burg was surprised to find Weizman in the room of Mustafah Khalil, prime minister of Egypt. Minister Sharon exploited the void that had been created,

and invited General 'Ali, Egyptian minister of defense, to a "private" security tour close to the "green line."

Calm Negotiation

If Weizman is thinking about strengthening his political position, he is clearly mistaken in demonstrating contempt for the leader of the National Religious Party. He cannot permit himself what Dayan, who lacks a political base, can permit himself in his relations with Burg. Some also consider that by leaving the committee, Weizman increased the influence of the more fanatical of the ministers, even if, for the time being, it is not felt in the discussions.

In the last round of talks a good and pleasant atmosphere prevailed between the two sides. It was recognized that Burg was doing all he could to succeed in his assignment and to make a pleasant atmosphere prevail in spite of all the difficulties caused by his colleagues. The discussions were conducted on a high level, and Shmuel Tamir, minister of justice, was outstanding. In contrast, the minister of agriculture refrained for some reason from participating in the discussion, just as Weizman had done in the first round in Alexandria.

On the eve of the start of the talks a discussion was held on the question of what the Egyptians' objective would be in the new round of negotiations. One of the opinions, held by both Israelis and Americans, was that in the coming stage Sadat would aim at a more stubborn position, in order to please the Arab world, and in order to placate those in Egypt who feared that he would neglect the Palestinian issue. As against this, a minority claimed that the Egyptian tactics would be different at the start, calm and not noisy. According to this opinion, Egypt intends to prove to the Arab world that matters are being conducted as Cairo had planned. If they were to show disappointment in the peace agreement so soon, it would only justify the critics of Egypt in the Arab world.

The Egyptians need quiet negotiations now, to make it possible for their people and the Americans to persuade the representatives of the Palestinians and others to participate in the negotiations. Clearly an immediate split over autonomy in the negotiations would only interfere with convincing the "others" to participate, if it is possible to convince them at all. Taking a stubborn line that would cause an immediate blow-up also does not fit well with the Egyptians' desire to recover half of Sinai in the coming months without raising concern among the Israelis.

more time and more meetings will have to pass before we can be sure which of these opinions is more correct. But so far it appears that those who claim that the Egyptians will refrain for the time being from taking a line of no compromise are right. There is evidence in what our people have heard directly from them. Despite the hints that were heard concerning the final status of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza that they would like, apparently the Egyptians intent to negotiate and deal first of all with what is involved in the

transition period. That is to say, they would postpone for the time being many of the most sensitive subjects.

This was most outstanding in the question of what is called "the Palestinian state." Apparently the Egyptian tactic, at least at this stage, is not to conduct detailed negotiations in the name of the Palestinians. The Egyptians have certainly reached the conclusion that in any case, whatever they achieve, they will always be blamed because they did not achieve more and sold out the Palestinians. They would like, therefore, to establish objectives and principles. In addition, they do not want to arouse grave fears in the hearts of the Israelis. This desire was expressed by Mustafa Khalil, who said at Herzliya: "We do not say 'Palestinian state'. There could be a tie with Jordan, or with Israel, or there could be other arrangements. The Palestinians are the ones who will decide."

Passive Role for the Americans

The Israeli tactics at this stage were determined to no small extent by the fears that were aroused at the start of the journey. One trend also began in Alexandria, by Moshe Dayan and Shmuel Tamir, and was directed essentially at the Americans. The fear was that the Americans, prodded by the Egyptians, intended to play the role of leader and promoter, which Israel did not want.

Even though more than once in the past, Dayan acted to bring the Americans into the course of the negotiations, now he does not want Washington to steer the negotiations, as if it were standing in the Egyptian camp and negotiating with us. The feeling at Herzliya was that things had gone well. The Americans had played a passive role. But it would be a mistake to predict the future from this. Clearly, if the negotiations were to run aground, the Americans would not remain passive. Moreover, so far their senior representative, Straus, has not yet arrived at the discussions.

It appears that a second basic Israeli tactic is to refute the charge (which began to be heard even before the negotiations began) that Israel's entire aim is to slow down the course of the negotiations and gain time. Therefore Israel was not content to oppose the system of dealing with the principles on which autonomy would be based, but chose to suggest at once a series of practical matters for discussion, such as the structure of the administrative council in "autonomy," its powers, and its election procedures. The Israeli team is convinced that in this way Israel proved that it does not intend to try evasive action.

The practical achievement in this round of the talks was the atmosphere during the discussions. The Israeli representatives learned that they were facing a representative (Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil) possessing more authority and leadership, and more empowered to make decisions than we were accustomed to see hitherto among other civilian Egyptian representatives. In these talks there were no fixed agenda. There were exchanges of opinion, but practical negotiation had not yet begun. Yet something was being achieved; previously also deliberations had been conducted without a fixed complete list of agenda. Eventually the two sides will get down to practical negotiation, whether at the next meeting in Alexandria or after Sadat and Begin meet.

DECLINE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 1 Jul 79 p 9

[Article by Dani Rubinshtein]

[Text] Bringing the officials of the Arab community of Shkhem before a military court martial because they violated the governor's order and organized a protest demonstration against Elon Moreh is a step in a very definite direction. This is the direction that Meron Benvenisti, former vice mayor of Jerusalem, described on television as "the decline of the military government." The Israeli authorities in Shkhem are facing the matter in a confusing situation; there were demonstrations in Israel against Elon Moreh, there was also a big demonstration by the "Peace Now" movement at the place itself, but when the people of Shkhem tried to demonstrate they were forbidden to do so. Mayor Basam A-Shak'ah and his comrades were warned by the district commander not to demonstrate. But they ignored the warning, organized a public parade of protest, and marched at its head. The military authority could not exercise restraint in the face of such open provocation. So what could they do? They invited the mayors to a police investigation, they took testimony, and released people on bail. Many of the community officials (including Shak'ah himself) refused to take part in the investigation. One of the Council members, Dr Abu-Ghazala, said that they were actually hoping for a trial. That would provide Shkhem with a good opportunity for another demonstration against Israeli settlements.

The March Was Quiet

This event is another branch in the course of the military government's loss of ideas. When there were demonstrations in schools and teachers' colleges last March, the authorities closed those educational institutions, and when it was revealed that gangs of terrorists were being organized at Bir Zeit University, the university was closed. Five institutions of higher learning in the West Bank were closed and not reopened. Every week since then, the world press, radio, and television tell constantly of the Israeli authorities that close universities and teachers' colleges.

It cannot be said that the military government under Begin is more inflexible than that under the Alinment. Aside from the settlements in Samaria and the

leniency toward the provocations of Gush Emunim, all in all this is the same military government with the ups and downs in the severity of its penalties. But the background today is entirely different from that of the Alinement period. The Arab community officials in Shkhem are being brought to court martial, while in Herzliya and Alexandria they speak of "full autonomy" that the inhabitants of Shkhem will enjoy.

(With respect to the community leaders and officials in Shkhem, they exerted much effort to insure that the march that they had organized would be peaceful, and only after they had dispersed did the violent encounters of local youths with the security forces begin).

Prime Minister Begin speaks rhetorically about the "human dignity and rights" that have arrived for the Arabs of Samaria and Judaea, yet at the same time when some of the Arab mayors dared to arrange a meeting among themselves in Shkhem or Hebron they were punished, because it was forbidden for them to leave their districts. One of these forbidden meetings took place in order to organize a countermarch against the Samaria March that had been permitted the Gush Emunim. So it turned out that Gush Emunim was permitted to march by Shkhem, but the people of Shkhem, who are about to become autonomous, were forbidden to have even a political meeting (not to speak of a march).

The Relations of Ruler and Ruled

It is of course out of place to arrange for symmetry between the rights of Gush Emunim in the West Bank and the rights of the Arabs there; Gush Emunim belongs to the Israeli authority and administration, whereas the Arabs are the ones who are ruled. During the Alinement governments they recognized this fact, and at least from a theoretical standpoint they could hope that some time in the future Israel would cease to rule over areas inhabited by Arabs. The Begin government is not ready to set a limit within western Israel, and it believes in a dual existence of the kind in Elon Moreh and the "Hadassah" building in Hebron. The government that committed itself at Camp David to "free elections" and to "full autonomy" in the Arab occupied areas, and promised the establishment of "strong local police," is meanwhile getting ready for all this by punishing elected leaders who held political meetings and demonstrations, by closing educational institutions, and by continuing sharp political censorship of the Arab press. This is of course absurd. The discussions and the documents that will be prepared, to get ready for autonomy, seem to refer to some other planet. Here, in the reality of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, the relationship of ruler and ruled continues and will continue with their own dynamics.

Since the ruled parties do not want the ruler, force must be used, and rule by force has another custom--it becomes rule by suppression.

ISRAEL

ARAB UNITY SAID DEPENDENT ON PEOPLES' PARTICIPATION

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 21 Jun 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Concerning the Issue of Arab Unity"]

[Text] From the dissolution of the bonds of unity between Egypt and Syria through the rout of 1967 to the present, the banner of Arab unity has been fading, and efforts to achieve any kind of Arab unity have taken two steps backwards for every step forwards.

During this period of modern times, there have been several forms of Arab union which died before they ever saw the light of day. Examples of this are the trilateral federation which included Syria, Libya and Egypt, the Libyan-Tunisian unification plan and the various plans, which are still alive, to unify the two halves of Yemen. The Arab peoples are not directly responsible for the lowering of the banner of unity both in word and in deed, because they do not participate at all in creating or abolishing unity. Unity, both as a slogan and in practical application, has consistently been established without the involvement of the Arab peoples and subject to the control and mood of the Arab regimes alone.

As is well known, the moods of the Arab regimes differ considerably from the wishes of the Arab peoples, who see unity as the only way to end most of the problems which afflict them. Moreover, the moods of regimes fluctuate according to the interests which a particular regime has. Unity which is achieved on the basis of mood is subject to disintegration even before it comes into existence. Thus the proposal to unify the two Yemens came in the wake of a war between the two sister states and their one people, and the proposal to unify Iraq and Syria came after long years of hostility and struggle. Consequently, the union of the two Yemens was not achieved, and that between Iraq and Syria may not be achieved in the near future despite the unification measures upon which agreement has been reached.

Unity is not a feeling, nor is it a sudden reaction. No Arab unity will be achieved unless the Arab peoples participate in a real and democratic process that extends beyond the regimes and their interests. As long as the freedom of the Arab citizen remains restricted, his opinion remains unheard

and he remains answerable either for his applause or his curses, then Arab unity is as good as finished.

There is no need to talk here about the benefits and advantages of unity, or to mention the international federations, both great and small, among peoples of different nationalities and languages, because these things have become very well-known. The earnest effort to unify all of Western Europe is not the least example of this.

8591

CS0: 4802

EDITORIAL URGES PROFITING FROM ISRAEL'S MISTAKES

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 29 Jun 79 p 1

[Editorial: "We Must Benefit From Israel's Mistakes"]

[Text] Israel has benefited many times in the past from our mistakes, and has inflated these mistakes and publicized them throughout the world in an effort to gain sympathy and support for its position and cause resentment and hostility against us.

We are in the right and our cause is just, but we must acknowledge the fact that we do not know how to defend our right and present our cause.

We are not presently concerned with citing the numerous and diverse examples which can be found. Rather it will be sufficient to remind the reader of the former situation with representatives of the Arab governments in the United Nations.

In her memoirs, Golda Meir makes the statement, supported by Abba Eban in his memoirs, that when one of the Arab states wanted to dispense with its permanent representative to the United Nations, Israel offered to pay that representative's salary and all his expenses in order to spare him because he was so successful at repelling people from the Arab cause and gaining sympathy for Israel. Of course, the representative did not do this intentionally, but this was the outcome of his speeches and actions.

When most of the Arab representatives stood behind the rostrum of the international organization to deliver their speeches, they would address the legislator in the Arab nation and would be concerned about the response their speeches would get in the Arab environment irrespective of the world representatives seated in the hall. Some representatives went so far as to delay delivering their speeches if the representatives of the Arab press were absent from the session, wanting these representatives to convey their speeches to the Arab press and thus to the Arab legislator. They did not care whether or not the UN representatives understood the speeches or if they had any effect on their minds and inclinations; the important thing was the applause and acclamation of the Arab legislator.

We do not want to go on and on giving examples and positions, but they are things which we hope we have transcended in our present era.

Today, Israel is committing mistake after mistake and contradiction after contradiction. Its leaders are now delivering repelling speeches, most of them consisting of big talk which makes the boastful Arab speeches of the past unimportant by comparison. These mistakes and contradictions are arousing the disgust of the world--including Israel's friends before its enemies--and Israel has become a symbol of inconsistencies and offenses against logic and conviction.

This ample theme which Israel has provided for us will be lost unless we take good advantage of it and discover how to present it to the world in its real dimensions and clear outlines.

We are now in the most urgent need of minds to work, think, arrange and make plans, and of hands with the skill to implement these plans. We do not lack any of these things, thank God.

8591

CSO: 4802

HEBRON SUFFERS SEVERE WATER SHORTAGE

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 29 Jun 79 p 1

[Article: "Governorate of Hebron Suffers From Severe Drought"]

[Text] The Governorate of Hebron, including the city of Hebron "especially," is being subjected to an extremely severe water crisis which is growing more serious day by day. In Hebron, residents of several suburbs have turned to the municipal council stressing the urgency of their need for water, which has not reached their houses or even their suburbs for more than a month. Meanwhile, responsible sources said that the crisis is being caused by the low volume of water reaching the city from primary sources, including especially the Bayt Fijar well which authorities had been promising for weeks would produce sufficient quantities of water. In addition, the water which usually comes from al-Fawwar well has dwindled because of the large amounts of water required by the population in the area of Dawra, al-Rihiyah and neighboring places due to the scarcity of water there.

As for the governorate as a whole, the crisis reached a peak in the Bayt Awala area, which has been suffering from a severe shortage of water since the beginning of the summer despite promises by military authorities to work with all possible speed to deal with this matter, which has become extremely serious.

In the area of Tarqumiya, Dawra, and al-Khirab al-Tabi'ah, which contains a population of more than 40,000 citizens, the situation has reached an intolerable level, forcing the president of the village confederation of the governorate, Mustafa Dawdin, to contact higher authorities and inform them of the true situation. One important official in the military command was able to study the facts of the critical situation, and he asserted that he would submit a detailed and urgent report to the governor general so that the situation can be dealt with.

Mustafa Dawdin said that he is in continuous contact with the military governor general, the military governor of Hebron and other officials in an effort to have quick and effective measures adopted to deal with the bad water crisis in the area.

A number of residents of the town of Yata have requested that we appeal to the municipal council not to allow people with water containers to take water from Yata's big water tank, because the town and its residents need this water.

In the area of al-Shayukh and Sa'ir, the citizens are complaining bitterly over the lack of sufficient water. They are imploring officials to work to provide them with the needed water via the main water line which supplies the city with water from the 'Asiyun and Bayt Fijar area.

Meanwhile, reliable sources asserted that the water crisis affecting the area, and Hebron in particular, could be solved by expediting authorization to exploit Bini Na'im well, which was recently discovered and which, according to experts' reports, contains enough water to supply the city and surrounding areas for decades. These sources said that it is hoped that the city's crisis will ease within several days as a result of the arrival of sufficient water from the Bayt Fijar source and 'Asiyun.

8591

CSO: 4802

ISRAEL

FAILURE OF FIGHT AGAINST CRIME CRITICIZED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Aug 79 p 3

[Article by Mark Segal]

[Text] Tel Aviv--A former member of the Shimron Commission expressed disappointment on Friday that few of its recommendations, submitted over a year ago after a study of organized crime in Israel, have been implemented.

In an interview to Israel Radio on the eve of his departure as ambassador to South Africa, former Security Services head Yosef Harmelin said that although the commission did not conclude that Israel had an American-style mafia with "bought" judges and policemen, it did discover Israeli-style organized crime "which flourished because of inefficiency and disorganization of law enforcement agencies."

"Regrettably, one cannot say that anything was shaken up" following the report's publication, Harmelin said. Its only possible achievement, he added, was that the Shimron report had set criteria according to which the war on crime could be judged.

Harmelin, who left the Security Services five years ago, said that he was pleased to note that few of its secrets were leaked. He noted that those who undertook the Shin Bet's onerous duties understood that they must keep their work to themselves.

The best thing about retiring, Harmelin confided was no longer having to leave notice of his whereabouts all the time.

CSO: 4820

REPORT INDICATES POLICE SHORTAGE OF 2,080 MEN

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 1 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Yoram Bar]

[Text] The police force is short 2,080 men, Inspector General Haim Tavori revealed yesterday.

Releasing the force's 1978 annual report, Tavori reported that last year's 4.6 percent rise in the number of criminal files was the lowest increase in several years. But figures for rape were up by 80 percent, prostitution arrests by 100 percent and purse snatching by 35 percent. In all, police opened some 213,000 files during the year.

Breakdown of cases investigated were: Property offences 78.6 percent, public disturbances 7.7 percent, offences involving death and assault 5.4 percent, fraud 5.1 percent, sexual offences 2.2 percent, security offences 0.3 percent, offences concerning permits 0.3 percent, administrative and economic offences 0.2 percent, and miscellaneous 0.2 percent.

Introducing the report, Tavori explained that the main effort by the police in the past year went into reorganization in the police system. Simultaneously, the effort to develop police operational power to combat terrorist activity was maintained, following considerable escalation of terrorism.

The inspector-general noted that police personnel of all ranks were required to make intensive, continuous efforts, sometimes working most of the day and night, to make up the severe shortage of manpower.

The inspector-general said that the personnel problem continued to be acute in 1978. A total of 1,375 resigned, and of 10,000 applicants, only 1,666 were drafted into the force. The others were rejected as unsuitable for various reasons, including health, criminal record, unsatisfac-

tory exam results or withdrawals. A number of surveys were carried out to determine reasons for dropouts and how to make police service more attractive. But enlistment has not caught up with the dropout rate, partly because of the need to ensure that police standards were maintained.

The report revealed that 34¹/₂ drug merchants were captured in 1978, a considerable rise compared to arrests in previous years which "indicates the effectiveness of our activities in this area."

The inspector-general said that 1978 marked the completion of the infrastructure of a unified branch for combating crime in police stations throughout the country, whose functions included investigations, intelligence, detection and criminal identification.

CANCER INCIDENCE CLIMBING IN ISRAEL

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 2 Aug 79 p 3

[Article by Alexander Zvielli]

[Text]

The incidence of cancer in Israel has been climbing steadily since 1973, said Dr. Jerry Westin, medical adviser to the Tel Aviv-based Consumer Shield organization yesterday.

Armed with statistics, Westin, who was speaking to the capital's Rotary group, sharply attacked some misconceptions still current with the Israeli public: the belief that cancer is an act of God, or that small amounts of carcinogenic toxins are harmless. One molecule of saccharine may affect billions of molecules in the human body, he claimed, even if each individual does not react in the same way.

Claiming that 90 per cent of cancer cases are caused by environmental factors, Westin called for an end to public and official apathy. Smokers

poison both themselves and those around them.

The presence of carcinogenic chemicals in food is responsible for 80 per cent of cancer cases in men and 75 per cent in women, he said.

Consumer Shield action led, in the past, to a considerable improvement in Israeli milk after the organization pushed farmers to cease the use of harmful insecticides, Westin said. But the Health Ministry, he claimed, still does too little to ensure public safety.

Westin told *The Jerusalem Post* that the Health Ministry had recently created a special committee composed of department heads of medical schools in Israel, which will deal with the problem. This, he said, was a great stride forward.

Westin represents the Consumer Shield on this committee.

CSO: 4820

JEWISH HEBRON BUILDING FUND ESTABLISHED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 1 Aug 79 p 3

[Article by Ian Black]

[Text]

The Kiryat Arba-based "Committee for a Jewish Return to Hebron" has initiated a countrywide fund-raising campaign to finance building and renovation of property in the Arab town.

Committee activists said on Monday that they are still hoping that the government will make a positive decision on Jewish settlement in Hebron before August 12 — the 50th anniversary of the massacre of 1929.

Meir Emdor, a Gush Emunim leader in Kiryat Arba, said last night that "in these days of general despair we are hoping that the

government will get a grip on itself and decide in our favour."

The fund-raising campaign, which got off the ground in the last few days, is called "buy a brick in Hebron" and is modelled after the Jewish National Fund's tree-planting programme. Each brick costs IL20.

Several thousand pounds have been collected so far. Organisers, Emdor said, hope eventually to collect several million pounds. The money will be used to build on an empty plot in Hebron and renovate dilapidated houses in the city's Jewish quarter.

CSO: 4820

NEWSPAPER COMMENTS ON U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

Kuwait AL-RA 'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 9 Aug 79 pp 1, 19 LD

[Editorial: "Those Awaiting the United States"]

[Excerpts] We do not know how long we will go on lying to ourselves and evading the truth and reality. How long will we go on concealing our impotence and weakness with lies and evasion?

Perhaps the biggest of these lies is to imagine that even minimum Palestinian rights to the Palestinian land will be achieved through the United States.

It is known that the Kuwaiti draft resolution submitted to the Security Council with PLO support was based on the assumption that the Americans would allow it to pass. But the Zionist machinery soon went into action to obstruct the draft resolution. Washington announced that it will veto it. We have often said that the United States is neither a free nor an independent state, at least not in the Middle East. It is shackled by written agreements that prevent it from acting in any matter concerning the Palestinian problem without Israel's prior approval.

Therefore even when Washington tries to win over the Arabs with words or particular stands, its attempts fall short of the target. We see the United States, that big and powerful country, eating its own words like any insignificant body.

Perhaps we should recall how Carter went back on the statement he signed with the Soviet Union about 2 years ago simply because the statement contained a clause on the "Palestinian people's legitimate rights." As far as Zionism is concerned the Palestinian people have no rights and therefore cannot be legitimized--let alone allowed to exist.

Therefore in view of this one cannot help feeling that U.S. policy is trivial and lacks morality in that a country like the United States is compelled to be a tool in the hands of Israel and Zionism.

Also one cannot help feeling how trivial and decadent we are because we run and allow ourselves to be dragged behind the United States.

After all this how can we expect Washington to allow the Security Council to pass a resolution providing for the Palestinian people's legitimate rights?

In any case, only a few days are left before the Security Council meets--assuming that it meets 23 August as scheduled--and before it is proved to us that we are only trying to milk the billy goat.

CSO: 4802

KUWAIT'S DELEGATE COMMENTS ON UN DEBATE OF MIDEAST PROBLEM

Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0720 GMT 12 Aug 79 LD

[Text] Kuwait, 12 August, KUNA--Abdallah al-Bishara, Kuwait's permanent UN delegate, said in an interview published here today that it was not expected that the draft resolution on solving the Middle East problem would be presented to the Security Council because of the U.S. intention to veto it.

Al-Bishara told AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM that the Arab and the Palestinian delegations at the United Nations had made great effort to prepare this "non-Kuwaiti" draft resolution which provides for granting the Palestinians their legitimate rights to return home, self-determination, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. He said that this draft resolution, which is an amended copy of Security Council Resolution 242, agreed with Palestinian rights. He added that he had made great efforts to persuade the United States not to use the veto right in opposition to the draft resolution, an intention which it had repeatedly declared. The Security Council is to resume debate of the Palestinian problem on 23 August.

Al-Bishara said that a UN General Assembly resolution on the Palestinian problem is not as effective as one adopted by the Security Council. He added "there are hundreds of UN General Assembly resolutions on the Palestinian and other problems. What have they achieved?" He added: "We want the Security Council to issue a resolution so that it will be effective and capable of being implemented."

Al-Bishara said that the Palestinian problem is getting the attention of international circles and called on all Palestinian organizations "to unite and be of the same opinion, because the continued diversity of opinions will not benefit the national cause which we all strive to present to international gatherings forcefully and without the presence of any gaps."

Answering a question whether the nonaligned summit to be held in Cuba next month would contribute to solving the Palestinian problem, al-Bishara said that nonaligned summits had adopted many resolutions on this matter confirming the need for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands and for

the Palestinians to return home. "Those resolutions, however, will not be useful unless they are accompanied by a firm Security Council resolution aimed at implementing all the desired objectives." He said that he did not believe that Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, would attend next month's UN General Assembly meetings.

Al-Bishara reported to his highness the amir and to the heir apparent and prime minister on the consultations being held at the United Nations and the attitude of the big powers. It is expected that he will give a full report to the Council of Ministers' weekly meeting today and will leave for New York later today.

CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

'WAR ZONE' INSURANCE ISSUE--Kuwait--A responsible source at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Trade and Industry said today that the Ministry was holding contacts with the Kuwaiti national insurance companies with a view to taking a position on the declaration of the Gulf region as a war zone by Lloyd's Insurance Company of London. The source said that the Kuwaiti Government had given particular importance to the problem artificially created by the Lloyd group, which has caused a climate of distrust, fear and wait-and-see to prevail among the owners of tankers and ships that sail through the Gulf area. He said that the government was also having contacts with the Gulf states in order to take a unified and deterring attitude against the declaration. The national insurance companies and the Kuwaiti Reassurance Company have held several meetings and decided to get in touch with the Lloyd group and to convey to it their extreme dissatisfaction at its putting the Gulf area on the list of those regions requiring increased insurance premiums because of the danger of their being in potential war zones. [Excerpt] [Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1208 GMT 13 Aug 79 LD]

CSO: 4802

QADHDHAFI FACES GROWING OPPOSITION

Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 30 Jul 79 p 5

[Text] Opposition to Col Moammer Qadhafi's regime is now almost total among Libya's intellectual and managerial classes, according to a reliable informant who returned recently from Tripoli. The source cited several reasons for this alienation, which brings to an end a lengthy period during which Col Qadhafi's unconventional style of government could count on a very large measure of support from educated Libyans. But the principal cause of today's opposition, the source said, was Col Qadhafi's disastrous involvement in Uganda, where his bungled eleventh-hour attempts to rescue President Idi Amin's blood-soaked rule earlier this year proved very costly in Libyan lives and prestige.

Educated Libyans, the source stressed, felt such a deep sense of shock and shame over what had happened in Uganda that they would only speak about the topic with foreigners with the greatest reluctance and then they deliberately distorted facts which, although they have not been made public in Libya, are very well known to ordinary Libyans. The soldiers sent to defend Amin, according to the version now being retailed to foreigners, were not regular troops but part-time home guards. Compounding Libyan discomfiture over Uganda has been the reported payment of a large sum to ransom several hundred Libyans captured there when the Amin regime collapsed.

(The reports of ransom payments have been denied by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. "We will never trade human lives for money," he declared last week. "We are too poor to be cynical. Libya will get all of her prisoners back. We will not sell them.")

Libyan intellectuals, the source said, had also turned against Col Qadhafi because of his failure to honor promises that senior government posts would be given to university graduates and teachers and the heavy-handed way in which he has sought to keep educated Libyans on the sidelines. At the same time, the source added, Libyan managers and entrepreneurs have seen Col Qadhafi's moves to give power to the people disrupt their working lives and the owners of those businesses which have not been taken over by the state already believe that nationalization is only just around the corner.

The source said opposition to Col Qadhafi was spreading downwards from the top in Libyan society and he believed that the present regime's days were now numbered even though Libyans have proved notoriously slow in the past to translate discontent into political action. Col Qadhafi has been the target for two attempts to assassinate him in recent months and the last bid to kill him ended with the death of members of his immediate entourage, the source said. The Libyan leader, the source added, was now restricting his public appearances and keeping advance information of his movements a closely guarded secret.

But perhaps the most disturbing aspect of current opposition to Col Qadhafi, according to the source, is that its proponents do not rule out the idea of intervention from outside to bring about a change of government. Rightly or wrongly, there has been widespread belief in the Arab world that the United States has given Egypt's President Anwar Sadat a nihil obstat for an invasion of Libya if he should wish to do so to remove a source of subversion in Egypt and provide Cairo with some \$2 billion a year in revenues from Libya's oil fields. It is a very tempting package and Mr Sadat might well try his luck, with or without Washington's blessing, since annexing Libya would probably be neither a lengthy nor a very costly business and would allow him to thumb his nose at Egypt's patrons in the Gulf who cut off economic aid after the Egypto-Israeli peace treaty. What is more, there are a significant number of Arab government who find Col Qadhafi an embarrassment and real antagonism to any move by Egypt to remove him from the scene would probably be muted. Col Qadhafi's recent attempts to mend his fences with other Arab powers is indicative of his realization that this is so.

It would be ironic if Col Qadhafi's bid to counter Tanzania's invasion of Uganda led to his own overthrow through an invasion of Libya by Egypt. Tanzania set a very dangerous modern precedent which could easily lead to other states acting in like fashion, a fact which the almost unanimous detestation of Idi Amin and his barbarous works should not be allowed to obscure. Domestic opposition to Col Qadhafi must be seen therefore as a serious source for further instability inside the Arab world, with implications that could spread far beyond the Middle East.

CSO: 4820

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

LOULY RESIGNATION REFUSED--Rabat--The Moroccan dailies AL-MAGHREB and AL-MITHAQ reported on Sunday that Lt Col Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Ahmed Louly, chairman of Mauritania's Military Committee of National Salvation, presented his resignation in protest against the deal made with the Saharan mercenaries. His resignation was refused, they said, and if he persists in trying to resign he could be brought before a military tribunal. [Rabat MAP in French 1000 GMT 13 Aug 79 LD]

CSO: 4400

PLANNING MINISTER DISCUSSES MANPOWER, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, PETROCHEMICALS

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English 10 Aug 79 pp 17-20

[Text]

The oil producers of the Arabian Peninsula have decided to gain access to the industrialized world's chemical markets by linking future sales of energy products with the sale of Arab petrochemicals.

The common marketing strategy was disclosed by Saudi Arabia's Planning Minister, Sheikh Hisham Nazer, in an interview with "Saudi Business."

"What is going to be done is a joint effort of the Peninsula states that will very much be tied to other activities in the energy field," Nazer said. "I mean the marketing of our other products."

Asked if he meant crude oil, Nazer replied, "I didn't say that. I said it will be very much tied to other activities in the energy field."

For some time, government officials in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have been saying privately that crude oil supplies for the West may depend on access to Western markets for Arab petroleum-based industrial products.

These products — petrochemicals, fertilizers, refined petroleum distillates and liquid petroleum gases — form the backbone of the Peninsula's industrialization program.

Nazer noted that marketing for these products will be crucial during Saudi Arabia's third five-year development plan (1980-1985), which he has described as a shift to a productive era.

The first of seven petrochemical complexes, three export-oriented refineries and major increments in exports of LPG and fertilizers are expected to start operation during the third plan.

Nazer's linkage of energy-product sales with petrochemicals is believed to be the first time a senior official of one of the Peninsula's governments has tied the two as a policy statement rather than as a warning to the West.

"There is definitely a course we will take for marketing, no question about it," he said. "And this is drawn. We are going to insist on the Western consumers to accept our products as we accept theirs, and that would include petrochemicals — that there is no policy to prevent our petrochemicals from coming in."

He said the linkage between energy products and petrochemicals was only "an example" of this common marketing strategy.

Last October, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) held a meeting in Vienna on downstream development. Two major themes emerged from the meeting: the requirement that Western consumers make room for OPEC industrial products, and the need for coordination among the oil producers in their industrial strategies.

Sheikh Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, Kuwait's oil minister, told the confer-

ence that OPEC investments in downstream industries would be undertaken for social as well as commercial reasons to free the producers of their dependence on oil revenues as the predominant source of national income.

It may not be long, he warned, before the removal of obstacles such as the high cost of technology transfer and restricted market access becomes a condition under which OPEC countries supply crude oil to the industrialized nations.

The need for coordination was just as important as market access in the minds of the conferees, and the "joint effort" for marketing mentioned by Nazer appears to represent a breakthrough on this front.

Late in May, industrial officials from Saudi Arabia met with representatives from Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman and Iraq where the goal of a common marketing strategy for petrochemicals was adopted. The meeting, held under the auspices of the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting took place in Doha.

During the second week of June, a conference of planning ministers was held in Riyadh to work towards the economic integration of the Arabian Peninsula. One goal adopted by the conference was for the creation of a single economic entity among the seven peninsula states attending (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and North Yemen). The governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have endorsed the conference's recommendations, and a second meeting is scheduled for December in Qatar.

"What we're trying to do is emphasize the fact that the Arabian Peninsula is really an economic unit," Nazer said. "And that ultimately you have to abide by an economic development plan in the coming years so that we all agree on the philosophy and technology of the Peninsula's economic development."

A common peninsular approach will undoubtedly be an important factor in Saudi Arabia's third five year plan. The

Council of Ministers has approved the plan's basic strategies, but some projects have yet to be decided.

"To this moment I don't know exactly the projects which are going to be included in the third five year plan," Nazer said. "But of course I can tell you the principles on which it is built. They are, firstly, accomplishing the economic philosophy on which the development projects in Saudi Arabia are based. It aims at training the work force and finding alternative national income sources. All future plans will take these two principles into consideration."

Manpower training was an important strategy in the second plan, but for some time there has been a feeling of general dissatisfaction with the results achieved so far. As for the diversification of income sources, the second plan was primarily concerned with the creation of an infrastructure that would enable industries to take root in the Kingdom.

Successes in the infrastructure program include construction of more than 20,000 kilometers of paved roads, 120 berths for the country's seaports, and massive increments in the supply of desalinated water, electricity and telephone services.

Manpower is still the most troubling difficulty. The second plan envisaged a total foreign workforce of 812,000 by 1980, while some estimates now place the total closer to 2 million. Nazer denied that foreigners outnumbered national residents in the major cities of Jeddah, Riyadh and Dammam, but readily agreed that the large number of foreigners in the Kingdom had become a social problem.

"We passed through some experiences during the second five year plan which helped us in preparing and making the strategies for the third five year plan, taking into consideration the positive and negative points of those experiences," he said.

"I will give you an example. In the second five year plan, the government had to import foreign workers to execute the development projects. This

decision was valid, and still is, but we learned in the process some negative effects which should be avoided. We will try to avoid these as much as possible in the third plan."

He said the Council of Ministers is considering changes in educational opportunities in an effort to speed manpower training in the Kingdom. He urged a more active role in this training process by the private sector as well.

"The replacement of a foreigner by a Saudi national should be a national goal for every citizen," he said.

During the third plan, Saudi Arabia's need for foreign workers will remain high. Construction should begin soon on many of the heavy industry projects which will form the cornerstone of the productive phase of the plan, projects which will require tens of thousands of workers.

By the end of the third plan, according to a study done by the World Bank, the Kingdom may be compelled to expand its workforce of foreign technicians and scientists by more than 100 per cent. Net demand, the bank predicted in a study, is expected to rise from below 70,000 in 1976 to over 160,000 in 1985.

Nazer noted the "strong competition" for university educations among Saudi students was thinning the ranks of students needed in vocational and industrial training centers. He said this trend might continue as long as general education "is free from the cradle to the grave."

"The Council of Ministers is preparing a study, as part of the government's efforts to deal with this situation, which makes the joining of the academic or technical sectors depend on the ability of the person, not by its availability freely to anyone," Nazer said. "When you enter a university you don't enter it because it is free, but because of your capability to join the university. The government is now trying to encourage students to join the technical sector."

Several government ministers have expressed concern over the tremendous draw of the private sector, particularly commercial trading, on technical

and engineering graduates. This, in part, appears to motivate Nazer's call on the private sector to play a stronger role in manpower development.

"There is a need for more expertise as well as more participation in the private sector," he said. "If the Saudi nationals coming out of universities find the private sector more attractive than the government sector, then let them go into that sector, but with on-the-job training as a part of their work experience. If they need the resources for this, then I think we will be prepared to make them available. Training on the job will be a very important part of our development."

To encourage more students to enroll in vocational schools and training centers, the government will establish more of them in areas outside the major cities and will provide accommodation for students, "where the people view it as a springboard from their area and will feel no shame from belonging and joining" such schools.

At present, vocational schools appear to represent a social stigma Nazer wants erased from the national consciousness.

"I think a person's work depends on his education, efficiency and endeavor," Nazer said. "If one of these elements is not available, the result will not be satisfactory, regardless of his qualifications. Sometimes we find that experienced people are more productive than those holding high degrees. For example, I would prefer an engineer holding a bachelor's degree who has 15 years of experience in a particular job than a holder of a doctorate in engineering with two years of experience."

"I think a society that gives a special place to title holders, like doctors, is headed in a very dangerous direction," he said. "These people should not be given more attention than they actually deserve. A person should be judged in a just way regardless of the title he holds."

The government's efforts to train more Saudi nationals for technical and skilled jobs has not been without its

achievements. The planning minister cited two examples. Saudia, the national airline, now has more Saudi pilots than foreigners, and the number is increasing steadily. And Saudi workers by far outnumber foreigners at the Kingdom's arms manufacturing factories in Al Kharj.

"These two examples clearly signify that we can replace the foreigners in any field," he said. "In any job, specialization or technique, I think it is just a matter of time."

Until those replacements can be effected, the planning minister counseled a number of other steps to lessen the negative impacts of foreign workers.

"We accepted the principle of importing foreign workers because we were forced to and had no other choice," he said. "So we have to accept some of the negative effects. The important thing is that this should be temporary and linked to the period the foreigner stays in the Kingdom. He performs a particular job — say, one of the important and necessary things like construction works — and is gone. Some of the effects created by his stay we hope will disappear when he leaves."

"Generally," Nazer advised, "importing manpower should be subject to selection of the types of people and countries from where they are brought. Secondly, inside the Kingdom we must apply our laws and regulations, particularly those concerning social affairs and public morals."

The second key strategy in Saudi Arabia's plans — diversity in national income sources — today rests primarily with the steps being taken toward hydrocarbon industrialization.

Saudi Arabia's last five year plan unveiled a number of these projects under a ten-year timetable (1975-1985). Work has already begun on most of the infrastructure for these facilities.

The hydrocarbon industries will be located at Yanbu and Jubail, two former fishing villages on the Kingdom's Red Sea and Gulf coasts that are being transformed into industrial cen-

ters. Infrastructure work at the site of the two cities themselves is being performed under the supervision of the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, of which Nazer is the vice chairman. The total cost of this work has been estimated at \$ 35 billion.

Jubail is already the largest construction project in the world. Building is expected to begin soon on the first major industry there — a direct-reduction steel mill that will provide 850,000 tons per year of steel rebar for contractors in the Kingdom. Plans call for the construction of four ethylene-based petrochemical plants, two methanol plants, a 250,000 barrels per day oil refinery, two fertilizer plants, a large aluminum smelter and the steel complex.

Yanbu is to have another 250,000 bpd oil refinery for exports, a 170,000 bpd refinery for domestic needs, an ethylene-based petrochemicals facility, a natural gas liquids processing complex and an export terminal for 1.4 million bpd of crude oil delivered to Yanbu through a cross-country pipeline.

The two industrial complexes will be linked by pipelines to the Kingdom's oil fields and associated natural gas collectors in the Eastern Province, which represent the biggest infrastructure project of all. The natural gas collection system will use more than 3 billion cubic feet per day of the associated gas now flared at the oil fields.

To build all of these facilities will probably require even larger investments than those which have already been made for industrialization.

The planning minister does not think the social adjustment to the industrial complexes will prove too difficult.

"Saudi society has lived with and in the industrial areas of Riyadh, Jeddah and other towns before these industrial centers were started," Nazer said. "There are about 1,000 factories in the Kingdom now, manufacturing and marketing built by the private sector, and this indicates that the Saudi citizen has benefitted from industrialization. I think the reaction to the Jubail and

Yanbu projects will be no less positive than the reaction to the country's other industrial projects."

And, thanks to government policies, the two cities are already having an important impact on the Saudi economy even before they are ready to open.

"We followed an excellent policy by dividing the large projects into smaller units, giving the Saudi firms an opportunity to participate," Nazer said. "Engineering bureaux are making designs, Saudi lawyers and contractors are also participating. We also insist on using products from Saudi factories in our work whenever they are available. This resulted in Saudi firms and individuals winning 73 per cent of the projects of different sizes which were issued as tenders at Jubail and Yanbu."

"At least the short term benefits of this policy are clear now," he said. "There are some Saudi factories operating for the Jubail and Yanbu projects, and Saudi services and maintenance companies for which these projects are the major recipients."

But what will happen in the interim to Saudi Arabia's oil production policy? Nazer himself said in an interview last year with "Saudi Business" that reducing the Kingdom's dependence on oil exports for the bulk of its income "is a very long term process that isn't going to happen at the end of the second plan or the third or even the fourth plan."

As the Minister of Planning, Nazer is a member of the Kingdom's Supreme Petroleum Council, Saudi Arabia's highest advisory body on oil matters.

He identified three considerations guiding Saudi Arabia's oil policy toward the rest of the world.

"One, how long can the Kingdom preserve its petroleum resources?" he said. "Two, to what extent can the consumers discover alternative energy sources? And three, the Kingdom's ability to keep the market's supply and demand balanced."

"The Kingdom's ability to harmonize these points decides its petroleum

position abroad," he said. "And you should know that to harmonize these elements is not an easy job."

Saudi Arabia's most recent increase in oil production will not cause a resurgence of inflation, Nazer said.

"Investment in Saudi Arabia is linked to the budget, which was approved in May," he said. "The investment figure depends on the expenditure figures prepared for the budget, regardless of what the Kingdom gets by increasing its production, investing abroad, etcetera, which means that expenditure in Saudi Arabia is basically linked with the capacity of the economy to absorb revenues."

"Saudi Arabia ties its oil production to its internal interests and the oil market situation," he said. "If there is more demand, the production is increased. If there is less, it is decreased."

As the Kingdom's hydrocarbon industrialization projects come onstream, however, the marketing success achieved in the Western nations will apparently become another factor in Saudi Arabia's oil policy.

As Nazer made clear, Saudi Arabia will not be travelling this path alone. While the first goal of the Riyadh planning ministers conference was to identify a consensus for integration, the second goal will be to actually bring together the peninsula's development plans.

At their December meeting in Qatar, Nazer said, the ministers will concentrate on "drawing up development principles for the Arabian Peninsula, principles that the governments of the area will comply with."

The ministers will have to find a way "to eliminate in many ways unnecessary waste, and this is not necessarily duplication of plants or projects, but even in education — the establishment of universities, the creation of schools," Nazer said. "The whole thing must be geared toward better coordination."

The Kuwaiti government, which has been a strong advocate of economic integration, has emphasized another point discussed in the Riyadh meeting

— Specialization. Each country, according to the meeting's resolutions, is to establish industries and commercial activities best suited to its own resources and abilities.

In Saudi Arabia's case, that will clearly involve a massive commitment to petrochemicals. The lead government agency in this sector is SABIC, the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation.

SABIC officials, according to a recent issue of "The Economist," have outlined plans to capture 2.2 per cent of world ethylene production, 2.4 per cent for low-density polyethylene, 7 per cent for ethylene glycol, 8.5 per cent for methanol and 12 per cent for ethanol during the 1980s.

Opinion is still somewhat divided on how difficult it will be to capture those market shares. Last month, SABIC's Vice Chairman, Abdul Aziz Alzamil, told "Saudi Business" that the world chemical industry has finally accepted the Gulf producers as serious players.

"Now I think the United States and the West realize the Saudi projects are not a threat," he said. "People are now saying that it is important that these projects come onstream, because they will be needed."

The obstacles standing in the way at present are the tariffs and customs duties the West has put up to protect its own petrochemical industries, primarily from competition against other industrialized nations.

The recently-completed negotia-

tions for the Tokyo round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) lowered these barriers by roughly 35 per cent across the board. Even under these lowered trade barriers, however, GATT countries with petrochemical industries would still face import tariffs and duties ranging from 5 to 6 per cent in the United States, which is still the biggest market for such products.

Saudi Arabia has not yet joined GATT, though some government officials have argued privately for such a move. Nazer, when asked whether it would be to the Kingdom's advantage to join GATT, said he was not sure what such a move would imply at the moment.

First, he said, the peninsula states would have to find a collective economic policy of their own.

"There is no question that there are natural factors that bind us together," he said. "At the moment, perhaps there is more coordination at the political level than there is at the economic level. You can tell that by the way the region works together in OPEC, for example."

It is still too early to say whether the peninsula will form an economic body such as the European Common Market, but Nazer ruled out the creation of a single peninsula nation.

"We didn't have in mind anything like you have in mind, like a peninsula parliament or a ministerial commission — nothing like that," he said. X

SUDAN

BRIEFS

CASTOR DUST--Khartoum, July 8, (SUNA)--A number of researchers and scientists are currently engaged in a research project dealing with the affect of "Castor residue" on residents living around the industrial areas of Port Sudan and Aroma. The project aims at shedding light on the breeding ground of diseases caused by dust from castor residue and its effect on the lungs. It will also study causes for the spread of asthmatic diseases and allergy amongst workers continually exposed to castor dust-particles and will measure the effect of the dust-spread on people residing around the weaving and castor oil factories. The density of the dust will be measured in these areas in an attempt to forestall the resultant diseases. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 8 Jul 79 p 5]

NEW SHIP FROM YUGOSLAVIA--Khartoum, July 30 (SUNA)--New ship (El Obeid) is expected to be received by the Sudan Shipping Line at Port Sudan by the end of August. The ship is one of six ships built by Yugoslavia for the shipping line. The delivery of the other five ships will be completed by the end of the year. The overall tonnage of the six ships is estimated at 72,000 tonnes. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 30 Jul 79 p 3]

NEW SHIPS FROM DENMARK--Khartoum, July 31 (SUNA)--Sudan Shipping Line (SSL) is currently constructing two ships, with overall tonnage of 24,000 tonnes, in Denmark. The company's fleet will jump from seven ships to 15 ships after the construction of the said two ships and the arrival of other six vessels from Yugoslavia. The overall tonnage of the company's ships will increase from 53,000 to 153,000 tonnes. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 31 Jul 79 p 4]

CSO: 4820

SULTANATE OF OMAN

BRIEFS

DEVELOPMENT LOAN--Oman will receive a \$200 million loan to be raised on the international money market. Most of the loan will be used for the development of the Southern Dhofar region. The initial amount of the loan, which is managed by the Abu Dhabi Investment Company, the Gulf International Bank and the Union des Banques Arabes et Francaise (UBAF) was \$150 million but was raised at the desire of the lending institutions. This was reportedly the first time in years that Oman resorted to the international money market for a loan. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 28 Jul 79 p 16]

CSO: 4820

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UAE PAPER SCORES U.S. STAND ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD AL-USBU'I in Arabic 9 Aug 79 p 1 LD

[Text] U.S. circles have firmly and categorically announced that they reject any amendment of Resolution 242 incorporating a clause about the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to establish an independent state. This rejection came in the form of U.S. assurances given by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and White House spokesman Tom Reston as well as by President Carter himself during a working luncheon with the Israeli ambassador in Washington. These assurances were given to Israel and its U.S. friends as well as to the U.S. Zionist pressure groups.

It is unfortunate for Resolution 242 that discussion about it came at a time when President Carter was taking his first step in his campaign for reelection. It has also come at a time when Israel feels that it is in a position of strength, thanks to the gains it achieved from Camp David and the peace with Egypt, and when the Arab camp rejecting the peace treaty is preoccupied with its internal problems and regional disputes to such an extent that Israel has a free hand to bring pressure to bear on U.S. policies.

And because Israel resorts to political intimidation against policy-making quarters in Washington, these very quarters are resorting to intimidation by threatening to use the right of veto to sabotage any approach to the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

We have the right to ask: Is this correct behavior by a great power that constantly talks about peace efforts, the need for a comprehensive settlement, the requirements of stability in the Middle East and about its friends in the area, who cooperate with it within the framework of mutual and common interests?

Are the Arabs not right, in the light of this situation, to doubt the U.S. intentions, which are clearly biased toward Israel, and the U.S. will, which gives in to Tel Aviv's will? This was evident in the successive, anxious U.S. statements about Israeli security, friendship with Israel and the Israeli entity--all of which are at the Arab nation's expense.

If the Americans are asking the Arabs to show moderation, does moderation mean being content with bits of draft resolutions about the right of Palestinians to self-determination rather than directly addressing the heart of the problem--the Palestinian cause--and dealing with it from both its humanitarian and legal aspects?

Furthermore, what does the right to determine the future mean if not the legitimate right to self-determination? Why should phrases liable to a thousand different interpretations be composed when self-determination is a legitimate, accepted and ancient principle in international law which has been applied to all the peoples once subject to colonial domination or usurpation.

This U.S. stand is opposed to the stand of several international powers--including the Islamic and European powers and, more recently, the British Commonwealth as well as the nonaligned powers in the near future--regarding the Palestinian people's legitimate right to self-determination. This U.S. stand, which deals with the problem from the standpoint of Israel, its interests, its military arrogance and its terror that violates all international laws, will only alienate the United States from the Arab nation and from the powers supporting Arab rights.

Therefore, the Arabs must prove to the United States that such alienation is not in its interest or the interest of its citizens, and that an even-handed and just U.S. view of all aspects of the Middle East situation is the sole guarantee of continued Arab-U.S. cooperation far removed from Zionist terror and pressure.

CSO: 4802

FEDERAL BUDGET APPROVED BY CABINET

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 17 Jul 79 p 3

[Text]

Abu Dhabi, July 16 (Gulf): The budget estimates for the remaining period of 1979 totalling Dh. 9,715,407,000 was approved today by the Council of Ministers in a meeting chaired by Vice-President and Prime Minister His Highness Sheikh Rashid bin Saad Al Maktoum.

The allocations in the budget were distributed as follows:

- Chapter I (jobs and salaries) Dh. 2,028,316,600.
- Chapter II (general expenditure) Dh. 1,445,648,300.
- Chapter III (preparation of projects) Dh. 334,623,700.
- Chapter IV (UAE projects and financial investment in international, Arab and regional companies) Dh. 1,897,685,300.

The Council approved Dh. 13,800,000 for the Federal National Council.

The Council also approved twelve development projects which included the Fujairah-Khor Fakkan highway and storm water drains at a cost of 83

million dirhams, Linguistics and Educational Facilities Centre at an outlay of Dh. 37,813,399, television studio in Abu Dhabi at a cost of Dh. 37,500,000, wireless school in Abu Dhabi at a cost of 22 million dirhams, radio transmission at Suhayyat at an outlay of Dh. 14,500,000, a nursing school in Abu Dhabi at a cost of Dh. 13,175,000, expansion of Abu Dhabi Radio Station at a cost of Dh. 324,000, system for the Information Ministry at an outlay of Dh. 875,000, repairshop for the Ministry of Health, in Ajman at a cost of Dh. 2,200,000 and three kindergartens to be located in Abu Dhabi, Musannah and Al Ain at a cost of Dh. 17,600,000.

The Council also approved the draft cultural agreement between the UAE and Jordan, a report from the Planning Ministry on the resolutions of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula Planning Ministers' Conference held last June in Riyadh and a report from Petroleum Minister on the meetings of OPEC in Geneva last month.

CSO: 4820

NATIONAL ECONOMIC TRENDS FOR PRESENT YEAR NOTED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 21 Jul 79 pp 13-17

[Text] In 1977, assets/liabilities of the UAE Currency Board declined from Dh11,017 m. to Dh6,897 m. There was a reduction in foreign exchange holdings as well as in other foreign assets. With the sale of private securities to ADIA in December, 1977, foreign currency liabilities were also reduced. The so-called developmental role of the Currency Board had to be limited. The Board began to function increasingly as a Central Bank during 1978, in terms of its function and powers as enumerated in Union Law No 2 of 1973, under which it had been established. The law clearly stated the objectives of the Currency Board as follows:

1. To issue, redeem and exchange currency;
2. To safeguard the internal and external value of the currency.
3. To foster and promote a soundly-based banking and financial system.

The law stipulated a 70 percent cover in defined external assets for the demand liabilities of the Board, including deposits and currency in circulation. During 1978, this requirement has been generally observed.

At the end of 1978, total currency issued (notes and coins) amounted to Dh.1,914 m. as against Dh.1,574 m. a year before. The breakdown as at the end of 1978 was: Notes, Dh.1876.83 million; Coins, Dh.21.09 million; and gold coin, Dh.15.75 million. The major part of notes were in Dh.1000 (56.3%) and Dh.100 (35.7%) denominations. Compared to a year before, the share of Dh.1000 denomination notes increased while that of Dh.100 denomination fell. Foreign exchange and gold holdings amounted to Dh.3,021 million as against Dh.3,043 million a year before.

The two major items in time deposits with the Board were a deposit of Dh.1364 million by the government of Abu Dhabi and banks' deposits for reserves requirements amounting to Dh.994 million. Loans to Emirates amounted to Dh.1642 million and those to banks were Dh.1387 million. Both were, of course, a carry over from the past.

The foreign exchange holding of the Currency Board must be seen not in terms of the legal cover requirements, but also in the level of imports and other foreign exchange requirements of the system arising from remittances, travel expenditure and the like. So viewed, the holdings of the Board are indeed small. A larger and systematic channelling of the foreign exchange earnings of the country through the currency Board, and a steady build-up of a higher and sustained level of foreign exchange with the Board, are needed. This is predicated on an understanding among Abu Dhabi Dubai and other Emirates about the Functions and working of the Board as the Monetary Authority for the U.A.E.

These functions essentially are as already stated in the present Law noted above. In the draft legislation under consideration to transform the Currency Board into the Central Bank of the U.A.E., they are enumerated. The Central Bank of the UAE has to be visualized at the apex expert and technical institution in all financial matters, charged with the task of maintaining an environment of financial stability conducive to the steady economic development of the country.

1979 would seem to be appropriate for setting up the Central Bank. For the banking system and for the economy, 1978 was a year of some slowdown and consolidation. The uncertainties and difficulties of 1976-77 have been overcome and confidence is being restored. Still, the current phase is one of suspended animation. With well-considered policy guidelines and resources, it now becomes feasible to steer on a steady growth path.

As spelt out in the Board's annual Report for 1977, certain important regulatory measures were taken by the Board in May 1977. These related mainly to the continuation of the moratorium on bank licences, increased reserve requirements, own funds of a bank in relation to total assets, and advances/deposits ratios.

On February 8, 1978 a comprehensive circular was issued to the banks reiterating the need for caution with a view to keeping inflation under control. Some modifications were made in existing regulations as follows: a) previous commitments to banks with respect to long-term finance facilities would continue; and b) effective March 1, 1978 reserve requirements for dirham deposits would be 7% instead of 7 and a half percent, but no interest will be paid on these reserves.

It was clearly stated that the Board would be prepared to act as lender of last resort when needed in terms of Article 22 (h) of Union Law No 2 of 1973, subject to conditions and limits laid down by the Board. Requirements in regard to own funds/assets ratio, and the need to bring down advances/deposits ratios that continued to be high for some banks, were reiterated. In November 1978, banks were again advised that capital requirements for 1979 would remain the same as for 1978 i.e. a 1:15 ratio of own funds to total assets.

As some banks were found to be often overdrawn in their current accounts with the Currency Board, and as it was necessary to discourage this tendency, penalty rates for short falls, of 20, 30, and 50% per annum were introduced for December 1978: with effect from January 1, 1979, a single penalty rate of 50% per annum was applied. Other measures currently under study would be adopted when needed, to serve the banking community and the economy as well.

In terms of the requirements of Union Law No 2 of 1973, early in December 1978, banks were reminded that each of them--foreign or local--should furnish to the Board within four months of the close of the financial year consolidated statement of its assets and liabilities as at the end of the year, covering its branches operating in the UAE. The statement has to be signed by external auditor approved by the Board or by the Chief of the internal inspection department of the bank's Head Office, with the prior approval of the Board.

Early in March 1978, banks were asked to inform the Board whether they had made firm commitments about premises and had taken steps to open branches for which they had outstanding approvals were withdrawn. Similarly, seven of the original 12 approvals RLBs which had not been utilized were cancelled.

A significant step taken by the Board when it set up its Banking Supervision Department in April 1978. Inspection of Banks is its chief function. This work can only be done effectively and usefully with the trust and cooperation of the banking and financial community, not just by statutory powers. During 1978, a number of banks were inspected. As this work develops, in the coming years, it will become not systematic detailed. Other techniques to classify and evaluate banks operating in the country would be introduced. [as published]

Money Supply and Banking Trends. Money supply growth was moderate, from Dh. 5,215 mn at the end of 1977 to Dh. 5,776 mn at the end of 1978--a rise of 10.72; currency in circulation rose Dh. 1,392 mn to Dh. 1,704 mn. The rise in other measures of liquidity was similarly moderate. Total bank credit expanded over the year by 21%, to Dh. 22.06 bn; bank credit to private sector at the end of 1978 was Dh. 19.6 bn, as against Dh. 16.0 bn at the end of 1977.

As at the end 1978, there were 51 commercial banks operating in the UAE--31 foreign and locally incorporated. In the Agman Arab Bank, whose operations had been suspended in May 1977, was restructured by March 1979, and its assets and liabilities will be taken by the first Gulf Bank. The Ganata Bank, which was also suspended in May 1977, was reopened in July 1977 with substantial finances obtained from the Central Bank of Bangladesh and from the Currency Board, and is making steady effort to improve its working. In all, in the UAE, there were 340

commercial bank branches operating at the end of 1978--105 of locally incorporated banks; and 235 of foreign banks. There were also 11 representative offices of foreign banks operating at the end of the year under review, and a few investment, merchant banking, and other financial institutions.

With such proliferation of banks and branches, the moratorium and the opening of new banks must continue. New branches may be considered on a selective basis where there is clearly felt need and business potential for banking services, with preference being given to local banks which are well conducted and have only a few branches. While taking somewhat more liberal view of fresh applications for opening representative offices as well as towards investments/merchant banking units, hereto the approach will be cautious and selective.

As noted earlier, the rate of inflation in 1978 was probably about 15%, or 1-1/2 to the rate in the previous years. Still this must be considered high, and policy must continue to be to bring it down further. Bank credit trends have been salutary from view point during 1978.

The consolidated total of assets/liabilities of commercial banks amounted to Dh. 35.8 bn at the end of 1978. As recently as the end of 1974, this total was a mere Dh. 8.9 bn.

The considered growth of the banking sector is attributable partly to genuine growth of banking activity, but is also a reflection of the impact of the inflation. The underlying factor in this as for the economy as a whole, is the large increase in oil receipts after 1973.

Based on continuing oil revenue, at current or somewhat higher levels, in 1979 and beyond, and with the healthy development of the financial structure and practices, a steady rise in banking business can be expected. But the euphoric phase of 1974-77 is ended.

There is one particularly disquieting feature of banking trends in 1978: the stagnation of deposits. Deposits of (private) residents were Dh 14.1 bn in December 1977, Dh 14.8 bn in June 1978, and Dh 15.8 bn at the end of 1978. On the other hand, partly because of this and to meet credit demand, foreign liabilities have risen noticeably and more than foreign assets. Since November 1977, foreign liabilities of commercial banks have been higher than foreign assets which is a reversal of the position that obtained till then.

The inner bank market has become somewhat compartmentalized and has also remained at a rather stationary level. Given the policy of maintaining a needed rein on conditions of liquidity and the uneven Government spending levels, this became an added element in the tightness of funds

of some banks at times in the year. This resulted in erratic increases in short term interest rates in the market from time to time. There are also the interest rates differentials between here and outside that cause movements of funds within the Gulf region and in relation to the European markets.

There are certain other characteristics of the banking situation that need some watchfulness and corrective action: (1) concentration of a main part of banking business in about 10 or 12 banks; (2) the continuing and large share of construction and trade in total bank credit; (3) the rather high ratio of advances to deposits for several banks.

It is important therefore, that banks redouble their efforts for deposit mobilization especially of longer term maturities, and adopt improved internal control systems and credit rating criteria. Responsibility for improved banking performance rests primarily with banks.

Here, there is a general and pronounced tendency among savers to remain liquid. This explains predominantly short-term nature of the deposit of the resources available to the banking system. The growth of a capital market as well as of industry in private sector depend on the availability of term funds on an adequate and sustained basis.

CSO: 4820

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

TRADE SURPLUS REPORT--Abu Dhabi, July 22 (WAM): The UAE balance of trade has attained a surplus of 17.897 billion dirhams in 1978 and it is expected that it will attain 18.046 billion dirhams in 1979 precluding the increase in the prices of oil exports, according to a report released by the Planning Ministry. According to the report, UAE oil exports last year were 33.429 compared to 26.642 billions in 1975, an increase of 6,787 million dirhams. UAE re-exports were 1,776 million dirhams in 1978 compared to 597 million dirhams in 1975, an increase of 299 percent. Re-exports are expected to reach 1,824 million dirhams this year. Of the re-exports, 88.5 percent were centred on machinery, transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactured commodities. The report indicated that the total of UAE imports rose from 10.912 billion dirhams in 1975 to 20.032 billion in 1978, an increase of 83.6 percent during the last four years. Imports are expected to reach 20.141 billion dirhams at the end of the current year. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 23 Jul 79 p 3]

CSO: 4820

WESTERN SAHARA

BRIEFS

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CONFLICT--There is an explosive situation in Western Sahara. The Mauritaniens demand the withdrawal of Moroccan forces from Dakhla which they occupied Sunday but which is still under Mauritanian administration, and the Mauritaniens intend to appeal to the United Nations. The Moroccans consider these Mauritanian protests as a last-ditch effort. The Algerian side is talking about a bluff by the Moroccans. And here is the opinion on the situation of the Polisario spokesman Ibrahim Hakim: [Hakim--begin recording] Hasan II's unbending attitude and bellicose stand are (?a rejection) of the attempts at a political solution and international resolutions; they do not leave any other door open, no other choice for us than to intensify our fight of legitimate defense, and I can tell you that this fight will be intensified, as far as possible inside Morocco, as hard as possible inside Morocco, and in the parts of our country occupied by the Moroccan criminals. One thing is certain, the escalation launched by the king of Morocco in this war will, if it continues, result in the internationalization of the war. [end recording] [Text] [Paris Domestic Service in French 1100 GMT 14 Aug 79 LD]

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